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I. INTRODUCTION
he Texas Supreme Court continued to be active in defining and
refining various employment law concepts. Two clearly significant
decisions covered this year are Texas Mexican Railway v. Bouchett
(concluding that non-subscribers to the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act cannot be sued for retaliatory or discriminatory acts that violate
Texas Labor Code section 451.001), and Austin v. Health Trust, Inc.2 (es-
tablishing that no common law, private whistle blower cause of action
exists under Texas law). Further, in Montgomery County Hospital Dis-
trict v. Brown,3 the Texas Supreme Court has now clarified that an em-
ployer's general statements to the effect that an employee will not be
discharged so long as work is "satisfactory" or the employee is doing a
"good job" do not constitute an oral modification to the employment-at-
will relationship.4 While these cases provide relatively clear direction in
case evaluation, other areas of employment law, for example, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and workers' compensation retaliation,
continue to be highly litigated and extremely fact specific in analyzing the
often divergent outcomes.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 5
In addition to statutory exceptions, many discharged employees have
unsuccessfully tried to bring their claims of wrongful discharge within the
Sabine Pilot public policy exception. 6 In Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc.,7
Lynda Austin sued her former employer, HealthTrust, Inc., for wrongful
termination. She claimed that she was wrongfully terminated in retalia-
tion for reporting to her supervisor the suspected illegal drug use of a
coworker. She also reported that the coworker was distributing prescrip-
tion medicine to patients without authorization from a physician. The
1. 963 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1998); see infra notes 529-31.
2. 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998); see infra notes 7-13.
3. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998); see infra notes 87-91.
4. Id. at 502-03.
5. For a comprehensive background of the at-will doctrine, see Cyndi M. Benedict et
al., Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 51 SMU L. REV. 941, 942-
44 & nn.3-8 (1998) [hereinafter Benedict].
6. See Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); see also
Benedict, supra note 5, at 943-44 & nn.6-8.
7. 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998).
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coworker whom Austin reported for the drug activity was a family friend
of Austin's supervisor.
The Supreme Court of Texas held that no common law, private whistle
blower cause of action exists under Texas law.8 Austin advocated for the
creation of a limited cause of action protecting employees who report
conduct or activity that would have a "a probable adverse effect upon the
public."9 The court concluded that it would be unwise to create such a
cause of action because to do so would overshadow more narrowly-
crafted statutory whistle blower causes of action. 10 The court noted that
in 1995, the Texas legislature rejected an amendment to the Labor Code
that would have prohibited an employer from terminating an employee
"who in good faith reports activities within the workplace that constitute
a violation of law or would otherwise have a probable adverse effect on
the public."'" The court found that the legislature has enacted statutes to
protect specific classes of employees from various types of retaliation,
rather than creating a broad whistle blower statute.' 2 The court specifi-
cally noted that registered nurses, such as Austin, are required by state
law to report another registered nurse who "has exposed or is likely to
expose a patient or other person unnecessarily to a risk of harm" or who
"is likely to be impaired by chemical dependency," and that a nurse who
so reports is protected from retaliation. 13
In Mayfield v. Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Co.,14 James Mayfield,
an employee of Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company (Lock-
heed), complained to higher management regarding concerns that data in
financial reports required under Lockheed's contract with NASA may be
fictitious and without sufficient support. Contending that as a result of
his inquiries he was demoted and ultimately laid off, Mayfield filed suit
against Lockheed for wrongful termination. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for Lockheed, and Mayfield appealed.
Affirming summary judgment, the court explained that to prevail on
the exception to the employment-at-will doctrine set forth in Sabine Pilot,
"the terminated employee must prove [that] his discharge was solely be-
cause he refused to perform an illegal act that could result in criminal
penalties against him."15 While undisputed that Lockheed did not ask
Mayfield to perform an illegal act, Mayfield urged that the Sabine Pilot
exception applied via its expansion in Johnston v. Del Mar Distribution
Co.,1 6 in which the court of appeals held that Sabine Pilot encompasses





13. Id. at 402.
14. 970 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (Rule 53.7(f)
motion filed).
15. Id. at 187 (citing Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985)).
16. See id. (citing Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., Inc., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied)).
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claims by an employee who attempts to determine if instructed duties are
illegal. 17 Because Mayfield had not made inquiry to any federal, state, or
local governmental agency about the legality of anything he was asked to
do by Lockheed, but simply made his complaints to management, the
Johnston exception did not apply. 18 Moreover, the court added that even
if Johnston were applicable, it would question the holding of that case and
would not agree that a cause of action exists when termination follows an
inquiry into the legality of an act later determined to be within the
bounds of law. 19 Refusing to expand Sabine Pilot "to encompass the dis-
charge of an employee for inquiring to upper management regarding the
legality of his actions," summary judgment was therefore appropriate. 20
In Garza v. Doctors on Wilcrest, P.A.,21 Guadalupe Garza sued her
employers (the Doctors) for wrongful termination. The jury determined
that the Doctors had wrongfully terminated her for reporting to the Texas
Board of Medical Examiners that certain of her coworkers had per-
formed x-rays without being properly certified and without using proper
protective shielding. The jury awarded Garza $75,000 in actual damages
and $28,000 in exemplary damages. The trial court granted the Doctors'
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and Garza
appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of the JNOV.22
The court reasoned that while Sabine Pilot had carved out an illegal act
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, "Garza was not unaccept-
ably forced to choose between risking criminal liability or being dis-
charged." 23 The court also explained that Garza's claim did not fall
within the expanded interpretation of the illegal act exception set forth in
Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co., which recognized an extension of
the Sabine Pilot exception by holding that the "plaintiff must only show a
good faith belief that the act might be illegal."' 24 Herein, "Garza was not
asked to perform any act," and thus could not fall within the Johnston
exception. 25 Accordingly, the court affirmed the JNOV because Garza
failed to establish that her discharge was for no reason other than her
refusal to perform an illegal act.26 Further, because there is no cause of
action for a private whistle blower in Texas, that trial court properly de-
nied Garza's motion for leave to file a trial amendment seeking to add
such a claim.27
17. See id. (citing Johnston, 776 S.W.2d at 771).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 187-88.
20. Id. at 188-89.
21. 976 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
22. See id. at 900.
23. Id. at 901 (citing Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735).
24. Id. at 901 (citing Johnston, 776 S.W.2d at 772).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 902.
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In Ran Ken, Inc. v. Schlapper,28 Ran Ken, Inc. (Ran Ken) held a na-
tionwide contest among the managers of its restaurants in conjunction
with Remy-Amerique, a liquor company. According to the rules of the
contest, the manager of the restaurant that sold the most margaritas con-
taining Cointreau, a Remy-Amerique product, would win a free trip to
Las Vegas, to be paid for by Remy-Amerique. Concerned that it may be
a violation of Texas law to have Remy-Amerique pay for the trip, a Ran
Ken vice president asked Cindy Schlapper, the company's advertising di-
rector, to bill Remy-Amerique for the Las Vegas trip by indicating that
the invoice was for advertising expenses. Schlapper told the vice presi-
dent and the company's senior vice president that she had a problem gen-
erating such an invoice and asked about "the legalities." Eventually,
Schlapper created a blank invoice, which was completed by another em-
ployee. One month later, Schlapper was terminated and sued Ran Ken
for wrongful termination, contending that she was fired because she re-
fused for perform an illegal act and attempted in good faith to find out
whether she was being asked to perform an illegal act. The jury con-
cluded that Ran Ken did terminate Schlapper for the sole reason that she
attempted in good faith to find out whether she was being asked to per-
form an illegal act, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Schlapper. Ran Ken appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ren-
dered judgment that Schlapper take nothing.29 The court reasoned that
under the Sabine Pilot public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine, an employee must prove that the sole reason for discharge was
the employee's refusal to perform an illegal act.30 Thus, an employee
who has not refused to perform a requested act or who cannot show that
performance of the requested act would result in criminal penalties will
not meet the burden of proof necessary to succeed in a Sabine Pilot cause
of action. The court refused to expand the exception to a case where the
employee refuses to perform a legal act but questioned or sought to in-
vestigate its legality, concluding that any expansion of Sabine Pilot should
be made by the supreme court, not by an intermediate appellate court.31
In Guerra v. Datapoint Corp.,32 Joseph Guerra, an employee of
Datapoint Corporation (Datapoint) sued for wrongful discharge when he
was terminated following his refusal to sign off on test logs for a product
to be sold to consumers. The product was shipped to customers with no-
tice that it did not conform to specifications, could be returned, and the
purchase price would be refunded. The trial court granted a directed ver-
dict for Datapoint.
28. 963 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
29. See id. at 107.
30. See id. at 105.
31. See id. at 106-07.
32. 956 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
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On appeal, the court narrowed the issue to whether Guerra had been
fired for refusing to perform an act which violated section 32.42(b)(12) of
the Texas Penal Code. 33 A person violates this section when the person
"in the course of business. .. intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence, [makes] a materially false or misleading state-
ment ... in connection with the purchase or sale of property or service"
or in an advertisement for the purchase or sale of property or service. 34
Guerra claimed that signing off on the test logs would have constituted a
false representation to customers. The court, however, found that be-
cause Datapoint admitted to its customers that the product did not meet
specifications when the product was sold, no false or misleading state-
ment was made. 35 Consequently, there was no possibility that Guerra
could have been exposed to criminal liability. As a result, the award of a
directed verdict for Datapoint was affirmed. 36
In Salmon v. Miller,37 Richard Salmon claimed that he was wrongfully
discharged from his position as municipal judge for the City of Waskom
(City). Salmon was appointed by a majority vote of the City Council of
Waskom (Council) pursuant to a City ordinance. A City ordinance also
proscribed that his term was to be for two years, running concurrently
with the mayor's two year term. After the mayoral election of Christine
Miller in May 1994, the Council appointed Miller as the temporary mu-
nicipal judge. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants on Salmon's wrongful discharge claim.
On appeal, Salmon claimed that he was employed for a given term and
that his term renewed automatically, absent the Council appointing a new
judge. However, pursuant to City ordinance, Salmon's term had expired
with the election of a new mayor. Salmon claimed that the Council's ac-
tion of appointing a new judge was illegal and that his term continued to
run because the Council made the new appointment with the hopes of
increasing the collection of fines, and the Council's impure motives nulli-
fied their appointment. The court found that while Salmon's pleadings
did state that the Council terminated him for refusing to perform an ille-
gal act, his pleadings never stated that the Council acted illegally in ap-
pointing a new municipal judge.38 Consequently, the court found that
Salmon had waived this argument on appeal. 39 Salmon also claimed that
if he was an at-will employee, he could maintain a cause of action for
wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot exception. The court, however,
found that Salmon served a specified term pursuant to City ordinance
and simply was not reappointed to the position.40 Affirming summary
33. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.42(b)(12) (Vernon 1994).
34. Id.; Guerra, 956 S.W.2d at 658 & n.16.
35. See Guerra, 956 S.W.2d at 658.
36. See id.
37. 958 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.).
38. See id. at 429.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 429-30.
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judgment, the court held that "[b]ecause Salmon was not an employee at
will, but served according to the dictates of the city statute for a specified
term, the Sabine exception does not apply in this case, and we do not
reach the merits of an argument under Sabine."'41
In Carey v. Aldine Independent School District,42 Mary Ann Carey was
a teacher for the Aldine Independent School District (Aldine). She first
taught for a year under a one-year contract and then resigned. She was
rehired after the start of the succeeding school year, also on a one-year
contract. The following year, she was advised that her contract would not
be renewed. Carey filed suit, alleging, among other things, breach of
contract.
Carey claimed that because she worked for Aldine for three years in a
row, sections 21.201 through 21.208 of the Texas Education Code were
applicable. 43 Section 21.203 requires at least an annual evaluation and
mandates that a school board consider the most recent evaluation when
making a decision on nonrenewal of a contract if the evaluations are rele-
vant to the board's decision."4 Carey alleged her contract was breached
because she was not evaluated until after the decision had been made not
to renew her contract. Carey also alleged that her notice of nonrenewal
did not contain a statement of reasons for the action as required by the
Aldine Teacher Handbook (the Handbook).45 According to the court,
Carey's argument depended on her being able to show that her contract
was not probationary. Under the Handbook, however, a probationary
teacher was one with less than two years of continuous service with the
district. The school district provided uncontroverted, competent sum-
mary judgment evidence that Carey did not have two continuous years of
employment with Aldine because she had resigned after her first year and
was re-employed after the start of the following school year.46 The court
found that:
[i]t is also undisputed that the school board applied to Carey the
procedures applicable to nonrenewal of a probationary contract.
The Texas Education Code's requirements for the nonrenewal of a
probationary contract are that the board determine that the nonre-
newal would be in the district's "best interests" and that the board
"give notice of its intention to terminate the employment to the
teacher not later than the 4 5th day before the last day of instruction
required under the contract. '47
Carey did not dispute that Aldine met these requirements. Further-
more, under the Texas Education Code and the Handbook, the require-
ment of an evaluation and a statement of reasons for nonrenewal did not
41. Id. at 430.
42. 996 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
43. See id. at 652; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.201-21.208 (Vernon 1996).
44. See Carey, 996 F. Supp. at 652.
45. See id.




apply to probationary contracts. 48 Consequently, the court granted the
defendant's summary judgment motion on Carey's breach of contract
claim.49
A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or
is left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at-will and with-
out cause.50 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge
litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agree-
ment has increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed
modify the at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for
the discharge of an employee. 51
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove the existence of a contract, which limits in a "meaningful and
special way," the employer's right to terminate the employment relation-
ship at-will.52 Where no actual employment contract exists, arguments
have been made that an employer's letter or handbook distributed to an
employee regarding his position or salary may provide a basis upon which
the employee may argue that there is a written employment contract
which limits the employer's right to terminate in a "meaningful and spe-
cial way."'53 While employee claims of a contractual modification of the
at-will relationship based on a handbook have generally been unsuccess-
ful, the cases involving other writings are somewhat difficult to reconcile
and appear to be decided on the specific facts involved. 54
In City of Odessa v. Barton,55 William Barton sued the City of Odessa
for breach of contract arising out of his termination from his job as a
swimming pool specialist with the City. The City had conferred just-
48. See id.
49. See id. at 654.
50. See Wilson v. Sysco Food Servs. of Dallas, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex.
1996); Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Schroeder v.
Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991).
51. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992), affd, 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994). See generally Op. Tex. Att'y Gen.
No. JM-941 (1988) (noting that employees of the state are generally at-will employees).
52. Rios v. Texas Commerce Bankshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
53. Id. See generally Benedict, supra note 5, at 945-47 & nn. 22-29 for a detailed analy-
sis of written modification arguments.
54. See Gamble v. Gregg County, 932 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996,
no writ) (employee policy handbook or manual does not, by itself, constitute binding con-
tract unless the manual uses language clearly indicating intent to do so); Peoples v. Dallas
Baptist Univ., No. 05-95-00583-CV, 1996 WL 253340, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 14,
1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (employee's claim that employer did not
follow its procedures involving vacation and sick pay set forth in policy was nothing more
than restated wrongful discharge claim precluded by employee's at-will status).
55. 967 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 1998).
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cause status on Barton through its adoption by ordinance of the City's
personnel policies and procedure manual. This manual also stated, how-
ever, that any employee who continued to work for the City for thirty
days after its adoption would be deemed to have accepted the manual's
employment terms. Following his termination, Barton timely requested a
post-termination hearing pursuant to the manual's provisions. Barton ap-
peared on his own behalf and, at some point during the appeal, became
angry and left. The appeals panel stopped the hearing and never issued a
final order. Barton sued for breach of contract, but he did not seek judi-
cial review of the City's decision nor request that the City be ordered to
comply with the manual's terms. A jury found for Barton, and their
award was affirmed on appeal. The City appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court.
In its analysis, the court noted that the manual had "conferred the ben-
efit of just-cause status on [Barton], while at the same time limiting [his]
remedy upon termination to administrative review."'56 "When an em-
ployee continues working with knowledge of changes to the employment
relationship, he or she accepts the modified terms as a matter of law."'57
As Barton continued his employment after the City came out with the
manual, he agreed to his just-cause status and to administrative review as
his exclusive remedy for challenging adverse employment decisions.58
The manual also purported to limit Barton's right of appeal from the
hearing panel's decision.59 The court held that conferring just-cause sta-
tus on Barton had given him a property interest in his continued employ-
ment and, consequently, he could have sought judicial review of the
City's administrative action.61° Barton had accepted the City's administra-
tive procedures as his exclusive remedy, and "Barton's only recourse in
the trial court was to seek judicial review of the City's failure to render an
administrative decision to dismiss him. '61 Reversing the decision of the
court of appeals and rendering judgment that Barton take nothing, the
court held that "Barton's sole recourse under the terms of the parties'
agreement was an administrative appeal of his termination ... [and h]e
could not bring an independent claim for breach of contract damages. '62
In Saucedo v. Rheem Manufacturing Co.,63 Jose Saucedo sued Rheem
Manufacturing Co., his former employer, for breach of contract. Saucedo
alleged that he was employed as the maintenance manager for another
company when he was recruited for employment with Rheem in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico. Saucedo alleged that Rheem promised him a stable and




60. See id. at 835-36.
61. Id. at 836.
62. Id.
63. 974 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); see infra text accom-




permanent position until retirement. Saucedo relied on a copy of the
written confirmation of the job offer in claiming that when Rheem termi-
nated him, Rheem breached its contract with him. The written confirma-
tion made no mention of the length of Saucedo's employment, but
indicated a base salary of $36,000 annually. Saucedo further alleged that
he satisfactorily performed his duties until terminated. The trial court
granted Rheem's motion for summary judgment on Saucedo's breach of
contract claim.
Ultimately the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.64 The Court of Appeals first noted that "[a] verbal agreement for
employment until retirement is unenforceable. ' 65 The court then found
that "[a] hiring based upon an agreement of an annual salary limits in a
meaningful and special way the employer's prerogative to discharge the
employee during the dictated period of employment. '66 The court found
that where, as in this case, "the employment is for an annual salary, by its
terms it could have been performed in one year and was therefore ex-
cused from the Statute of Frauds."'67 Two months later, however, and
based on the authority of Montgomery County Hospital District v.
Brown,68 rehearing was granted and the court found that Rheem's repre-
sentations as to annual salary were insufficient to create a contract or
modify the at-will relationship. 69
In Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc.,70 Douglas Welch filed suit against his
former employer, Doss Aviation, Inc. (Doss), for, among other claims,
breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Doss, and Welch appealed.
Analyzing Welch's claim for written modification to the employment-
at-will relationship, the court noted that while the employee handbook
contained a "probationary period during which new employees can be
'dismissed without cause or prejudice,"' the handbook did not expressly
state that the employee could only be terminated for cause after the end
of the probationary period. 71 While the handbook did provide that one
reason for which an employee could be fired was "cause," the handbook
did not expressly limit the company's right to fire employees. 72 Accord-
ingly, there was no agreement modifying the at-will relationship, and
Welch could be terminated for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason
at all. 73
64. See id. at 126.
65. Id. at 124.
66. Id. at 125.
67. Id.
68. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).
69. See Saucedo, 975 S.W.2d at 128.
70. 978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet. h.); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 92-94 (discussing Welch's claim of oral modification of his employment contract).
71. Id. at 221.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 223. See generally Benedict, supra note 5, at 942-44 & nn.3-8.
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In DeMunbrun v. Gray,74 David DeMunbrun brought suit against his
employer, Tim Gray and Gray Air Conditioning (collectively Gray) alleg-
ing that Gray breached his employment agreement by terminating him
without good cause. The trial court granted summary judgment to Gray
on the basis that DeMunbrun was an at-will employee, and DeMunbrun
appealed. The court of appeals noted that a former employee asserting
that his employer had "contractually agreed to limit the employer's right
to terminate .. .at will has the burden of proving an express . . .or
written representation" to that effect, and that any such agreement must
limit, in "a meaningful and special way," the employer's right to termi-
nate at will.75 Additionally, the court stated that "a hiring at a stated sum
per week, month, or year, is a definite employment for the period named
and may not be arbitrarily concluded. '76 DeMunbrun's contract stated
that he would be "salaried exempt as defined by the Dep't of Labor at an
annual base of $50,000," and "[tihere [was] no language reserving the
right of either party to terminate the contract at will despite the annual
salary reference." 77 Accordingly, the court held that the contract created
a fact issue on DeMunbrun's at-will status and reversed summary
judgment. 78
In Norris v. Housing Authority of the City of Galveston,79 Walter Nor-
ris, the former director of Galveston Housing Authority (GHA), brought
a breach of contract suit against GHA, the Board of Commissioners of
the GHA, Galveston Redevelopment Community Enterprise Corpora-
tion, and three individuals serving on the Board who voted to terminate
him. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants.80
The court addressed and dismissed the breach of contract claims against
the individual directors and the Board of GHA based, generally, on lack
of privity of contract.81 Turning to the breach of contract claim against
GHA, the court concluded that GHA did not violate the termination
upon good cause provision in Norris's employment contract.82 The court
stated that generally what constitutes good cause is a matter of fact, but
when the employee's misconduct is undisputed and the effect on the em-
ployer's business is clear, the question of good cause becomes one of
law.8 3 In this case, among other bad acts, the employee's unauthorized
use of GHA travel benefits and failure to pay GHA's city and county
taxes constituted good cause as a matter of law. 84
74. No. 08-97-00233-CV, 1998 WL 547056 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 28, 1998, no pet.
h.).
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 980 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
80. See id. at 903.
81. See id. at 892-94.
82. See id. at 899.
83. See id. at 895.
84. See id. at 896-97.
1999] 1011
SMU LAW REVIEW
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
An employee may also seek to avoid the at-will rule by asserting the
existence of an oral agreement modifying the terms and conditions under
which the employment relationship may be terminated.8 5 The success of
the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of the employer's
assurance and the duration of the oral agreement. 86
Significant cases decided during the Survey period include Montgom-
ery County Hospital District v. Brown,87 where Valerie Brown was em-
ployed by the Montgomery County Hospital District (Hospital) as a
laboratory systems manager. After termination, she filed suit claiming
that she was told, both at hire and during her employment, that she could
keep her job as long as she was doing her job and that she would not be
fired unless there was a good reason. The Texas Supreme Court agreed
with the Hospital that its assurances were too indefinite to limit its right
to discharge Brown at will.88 Analyzing oral modification to employ-
ment-at-will, the court stated that:
[an] employer must unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be
bound not to terminate the employee except under clearly specified
circumstances. General comments that an employee will not be dis-
charged as long as his work is satisfactory do not in themselves mani-
fest such an intent. Neither do statements that an employee will be
discharged only for "good reason" or "good cause" when there is no
agreement on what those terms encompass. 89
The Hospital also argued that oral promises modifying employment-at-
will were unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The court stated
that this was true only if such promises could not be performed within
one year and that an employment contract for an indefinite term was
considered performable within one year. 90 Further signaling the diffi-
culty that future oral modification claims will likely have, the court noted
that it "would be unusual ... for oral assurances of employment for an
indefinite term to be sufficiently specific and definite to modify an at-will
relationship. "91
In Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc.,92 Douglas Welch filed suit against his
former employer, Doss Aviation, Inc. (Doss), for, among other claims,
breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Doss, and Welch appealed.
85. See Benedict, supra note 5, at 950-52 & nn. 60-73.
86. See Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ denied) (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982). See generally
Benedict, supra note 5, at 951-52 & nn.67-73, and application of Statute of Frauds.
87. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).
88. See id. at 502-04.
89. Id. at 502.
90. See id. at 503.
91. Id.
92. 978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet. h.); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 70-73 (discussing Welch's claim of written modification of his employment
contract).
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On appeal, Welch complained that the trial court improperly struck
oral representations by Doss that Welch would be hired for life, as long as
he performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. The court explained
that while the employment-at-will doctrine may be modified by oral
statements, the statements must show the employer's intent to make a
binding contract of employment, and "to not terminate the employee ex-
cept in clearly specified circumstances. ' 93 The court concluded that the
employer's comments were "not definite enough to constitute an enforce-
able contract," and their exclusion was, at most, harmless error.94
In American Lantern Co. v. Hamilton,95 Leroy Hamilton sued his em-
ployer, alleging that his termination breached his employment contract.
Upon hire, American Lantern's president told Hamilton that "as long as
[he] did well and did a good job [he] had nothing to worry about. '96 Fol-
lowing a series of professional and personal work related incidents, Ham-
ilton was fired. At trial, the jury found that Hamilton entered into an
oral employment contract with American Lantern, whereby Hamilton
could only be discharged for cause. The jury found that Hamilton was
discharged without good cause and awarded $37,000 in damages for the
breach.
Reversing that judgment, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
American Lantern's statement that Hamilton would not be fired from his
job so long as he performed satisfactorily did not rebut the presumption
of at-will employment. 97 The court noted that, assuming an employer's
oral assurance of job security can overcome the at-will presumption, prin-
ciples of contract must still be applied to determine whether the oral as-
surance rises to the level of an enforceable contract. 98 The court found
no evidence of a meeting of the minds between American Lantern and
Hamilton to modify the employment-at-will relationship, and, further-
more, Hamilton gave no consideration for the alleged agreement. 99 The
court held that American Lantern's statement added nothing to the basic
employer-employee principle exemplified in the at-will doctrine that "ab-
sent extraordinary circumstances, the employee may retain his job as long
as the employer is pleased with his performance,"100 and, further, the law
does not allow an "offhand word of encouragement or a simple reminder
of company policy to so dramatically affect the employment
relationship."1 01
93. Id. at 220-21.
94. Id. at 221.
95. No. 04-95-00517-CV, 1997 WL 667167 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 22, 1997, no
pet.).
96. Id. at *1.
97. See id. at *4.
98. See id. at *3.
99. See id. at *4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5.
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3. Estoppel, Release, and Waiver
In Arends v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,10 2 Cheryl Arends sued
her former employer for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention fol-
lowing her participation in a voluntary severance plan, execution of a re-
lease of all claims, and acceptance of over $15,000 in severance. Houston
Lighting and Power Co. (HL&P) moved for summary judgment based on
the release. The court noted that Texas law requires a valid release to be
supported by consideration and an indication that the "releasor has re-
ceived 'a satisfaction' of any obligations referred to in the release.'
' 0 3
Also, "the defendant must conclusively establish that the plaintiff signed
the release and accepted the benefits offered. 1"1 4 If the defendant estab-
lishes its affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to directly
attack the release or establish fact issues creating an affirmative defense
in order to avoid summary judgment. 0 5 The court found no evidence
that Arends was not competent to sign the release and, further, that the
monies received in severance were adequate consideration for the release
as a matter of law.' 06 "Therefore, because the clear language of the Re-
lease states that the parties contemplated a waiver of all causes of action
'relating in any way to [Plaintiff's] employment with or separation from
the Company,' the waiver is valid and enforceable under Texas law." 10
7
Furthermore, the court held that Arend's affirmative defenses were inef-
fective because Arend's retention of the benefits received in exchange for
signing the release ratified it.108
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress,109 Texas courts have consistently required plaintiffs to es-
tablish a level of conduct that is "extreme and outrageous" as that term is
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.tt 0
In Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Franco,'11 Odilia Franco
and Patricia Mendez were terminated from their positions with South-
western Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (Southwestern Bell) for allegedly mis-
appropriating air-time credit certificates and defrauding Southwestern
Bell. Franco and Mendez claimed that their terminations were in retalia-
tion for reports of sexual harassment. Franco and Mendez sued South-
western Bell for, among other claims, intentional infliction of emotional
102. 969 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Tex. 1997).






109. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically rejected the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). See generally Benedict,
supra note 5, at 953 & nn.83-89.
111. 971 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1998).
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distress. The jury found in favor of Franco and Mendez on the claim and
awarded actual and punitive damages, and the trial court rendered judg-
ment in favor of Franco and Mendez.' 12 On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed the award of damages. 113
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.114 The court rea-
soned that even if Franco and Mendez were terminated in retaliation for
reports of sexual harassment, the mere fact of termination, even if wrong-
ful, is not sufficient evidence that the employer's conduct was extreme
and outrageous.115 The court also concluded that even if Southwestern
Bell fired Mendez and Franco in the presence of others, forced them to
collect and remove their belongings in the presence of coworkers, and
immediately took steps to repossess company car phones, the evidence
was legally insufficient to prove that Southwestern Bell's conduct was ex-
treme and outrageous." 6 Because no evidence supported the jury's find-
ing of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court rendered
judgment that Franco and Mendez take nothing on the claim.11 7 Addi-
tionally, because no evidence supported the claim for which actual dam-
ages were rewarded, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the punitive
damages award. 118
In GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce,119 Rhonda Bruce, Linda Davis, and
Joyce Poelstra filed suit against GTE Southwest, Inc. (GTE) for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress allegedly caused by their supervisor,
Morris Shields. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $275,000 plus prejudgment
interest, and GTE appealed. GTE argued that the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act barred the plaintiffs' claim. 120 The court distinguished GTE's
case, noting that a previous case GTE relied upon involved conduct by a
fellow employee, not a supervisor; and, because the present case involved
the intent of the employer -not that of a fellow employee- the claim was
not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act.121 GTE also argued that
there was a conflict with the jury's findings that Shields intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs, but that GTE did not act with
malice, thus, negating the requisite intent. The court rejected this argu-
ment as well, holding that the jury's finding that GTE did not act with
malice in no way meant that Shields had not acted with the requisite
intent.l22
112. See id.
113. See id. at 54.
114. See id. at 54-55.
115. See id. at 54.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 56.
118. See id.
119. 956 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. granted).
120. See id. at 638 (citing Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 365
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied)).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 639.
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GTE additionally claimed that there was no evidence that it acted with
the necessary intent. The court, however, pointed out that no corporate
approval or ratification of a wrongful act by an agent would be required
where the act was considered to be the act of the corporation itself. 23
Direct corporate liability could be created by, among others, those with
the authority to employ, direct, and discharge servants and those to
whom the corporation has entrusted the management of a whole or a
department or division of its business. 124 Shields had such authority, and,
consequently, his intent was attributable to the company.125 Likewise re-
jecting GTE's challenge to issues of limitations, forseeability, and dam-
ages, the court then turned to GTE's claim of no evidence or insufficient
evidence to support a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct neces-
sary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 26 To sup-
port such a finding, the conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized commu-
nity."'1 27 The court noted that, in the employment context, very few inci-
dents have been held to constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. 28
Mere employment disputes are insufficient, as the employer must be al-
lowed to supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline its
employees in order to effectively manage its business.' 29 The plaintiffs
complained that Shields had, on occasion, threatened to terminate their
employment if they did not straighten the office and stated that they
could be replaced and sent back to a former job.130 Recognizing that the
behavior of Shields in this regard might reflect poor management skills,
the court held that an employer had a right to terminate an at-will em-
ployee with or without cause, and it was not outrageous conduct to so
inform the employee.131 The plaintiffs also testified that they were forced
to do jobs that they did not consider part of their responsibilities. 132 The
court, however, noted that there was no job description or contract speci-
fying what the plaintiffs' duties were. 133 While the jobs might be consid-
ered degrading, "a job assignment that is legal and not violative of a
contract, policy, or job description cannot be considered behavior that
would amount to intentional infliction of emotional harm."134 The court
likewise discounted a complaint by one of the plaintiffs that Shields called
on her in a meeting when he knew she did not know the answer, referring
123. See id. at 641.
124. See id. at 641-42.
125. See id. at 642.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 643-44 (quoting Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994)).





133. See id. at 645.
134. Id.
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to this as a common teaching practice and stating that her embarrassment
did not amount to a legal wrong. 135
The court, however, confirmed its review of additional facts regarding
physically intimidating, sexually oriented, and verbal hostilities by
Shields. Noting that it could not make all workplaces free from offensive
language by giving monetary awards to those who might be offended, the
court did state that objections by one of the parties to a conversation
could establish what is acceptable between those parties.136 The court
pointed out that both Bruce and Davis testified that they told Shields
they did not appreciate dirty language or sexual references. 137 The court
went on to say that Shields's conduct of flying into rages, charging em-
ployees, getting in their faces, and cursing them might be common on a
football field or in the military but was not common in the civilian
workforce. 138 Also, the plaintiffs were not complaining of isolated inci-
dents but the continuous conduct on the part of Shields that made his
behavior outrageous.139 The court stated that the evidence clearly
showed that Shields was intentionally intimidating, humiliating, frighten-
ing, and embarrassing the plaintiffs.140 Davis said the conduct of Shields
made her feel like a "puddle of water."141 The court felt that the evi-
dence presented was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's
finding of outrageous behavior and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
1 4 2
In Stokes v. Puckett,143 Lauri Puckett, Deann Carlton, and Cheryl Shir-
ley sued their employer, Dr. George Stokes, for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. At trial, the plaintiffs testified to various and numer-
ous acts by Stokes involving unwelcome physical touching and verbal re-
marks. The plaintiffs asserted, in conjunction with their psychiatric
experts that the conduct of Stokes led to a variety of physical and mental
medical problems. The psychiatrist testified that in his opinion all of the
plaintiffs needed to seek help for their problems associated with Stokes's
behavior and that all suffered from severe mental anguish. The jury
awarded each of the plaintiffs $87,500.144
The Beaumont Court of Appeals found that the evidence was both le-
gally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.145 The court found that the evidence
showed that Stokes acted intentionally or recklessly; that his conduct was
extreme and outrageous; that his conduct caused the employees emo-
135. See id. at 647.
136. See id. at 646.
137. See id.





143. 972 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
144. See id. at 925-26.
145. See id. at 925.
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tional distress; that the emotional distress was severe; and that the con-
duct of Stokes went beyond all possible bounds of decency and was
utterly intolerable in a civilized society.146
In Saucedo v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 14 7 Jose Saucedo sued his for-
mer employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Saucedo al-
leged that Jaime Loera, his supervisor, frequently used profanity in
conversations with Saucedo, told him he was stupid, and insulted him in
front of an environmental official. Saucedo further alleged that after he
stayed late to repair a machine, the following morning Loera took a pic-
ture of Saucedo while Saucedo was dozing at his desk, later confronted
Saucedo with the picture, and threatened to fire him. Saucedo also
claimed that Loera would sometimes call him twenty to thirty times at
night for no reason or to check to see if he had his beeper on. The trial
court granted Rheem's motion for summary judgment. 148
The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment in favor
of Rheem. 149 The court noted that the elements of a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress require intentional or reckless conduct by
a defendant that was extreme and outrageous and caused the plaintiff
severe emotional distress.' 50 The court indicated that insensitive or rude
behavior does not rise to the level of outrageous behavior. 151 The court
found that Loera's conduct-if true-did not, as a matter of law, surpass
all possible bounds of decency and was not utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized society. 152
In McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp.,153 Marge McConathy
sued her former employer, Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp. (Dr. Pepper), for,
among other claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mc-
Conathy, who was forced to miss work because of medical reasons and
was ultimately terminated in connection with a reorganization, alleged
that her supervisor was not supportive of her health problems, advised
her that he would no longer tolerate her health problems, and told her
that it was inappropriate for her to make such extensive use of Dr. Pep-
per's health benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Dr. Pepper on the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, and McConathy appealed.154
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Pep-
per. 1 55 The court reasoned that McConathy had not alleged or shown
extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of Dr. Pepper or its employ-
146. See id.
147. 974 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); see supra notes 63-69
(discussing Saucedo's claim for breach of contract).
148. See id. at 117.
149. See id. at 124.
150. See id. at 123.
151. See id. at 124.
152. See id.
153. 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998).
154. See id. at 561.
155. See id. at 564.
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ees.156 The court noted that even if McConathy's supervisor was cruel,
unfair, and threatened to fire McConathy, such conduct was not suffi-
ciently indecent, intolerable, or atrocious to support a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.157
In Huckabay v. Moore,158 William Huckabay sued his employer, Ed-
ward Moore, who was the commissioner of Precinct Four in Jefferson
County for 1987. Huckabay, who is Caucasian, claims that Moore, who is
African-American, implemented racist employment practices (e.g.,
Moore hired twenty-two African-American employees, but only one
Caucasian employee during his tenure as commissioner) and fostered an
atmosphere of discrimination against white employees. Huckabay also
claimed that he was demoted from mechanic to laborer, and his pay was
cut when he broke his arm and had to take time off from work. In addi-
tion, Huckabay indicated that he was not allowed to run equipment, and
he was not considered for a supervisory role when a position became
available, despite his experience. Furthermore, Huckabay stated that he
was forced to tolerate verbal and nonverbal racial harassment as a condi-
tion of his employment. Huckabay filed suit against Moore for, among
other claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted summary judgment for Moore, and Huckabay appealed
that decision. 159
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim. 160 The court indicated that
Texas law permits recovery under intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress only when the plaintiff's distress is severe. 161 The court stated that
Huckabay had failed to show his distress was severe; thus, his claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress could not withstand summary
judgment.162
In Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 163 plaintiffs, including Herman
Dancy, filed a suit against Fina Oil & Chemical Company (Fina), alleging,
among other claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs stated that when the management of Fina allegedly
published a list of employees with excessive absences, they suffered se-
vere emotional distress. The court granted summary judgment in favor of
Fina on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 164 The court
indicated that Fina's act of publishing the list did not rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous conduct that is necessary for intentional inflic-
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1998). See infra notes 373-77 for additional facts and causes
of action.
159. See id. at 238.
160. See id. at 241-42.
161. See id. at 242.
162. See id.
163. 3 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
164. See id. at 740.
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tion of emotional distress. 165 At most, the court noted that the list caused
the employees embarrassment, but not enough to rise to the level of an
actionable claim. 166
In Stewart v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,167 Starla Stewart resigned
from her position as a reactor plant operator at Houston Lighting Power
Company's (HL&P) South Texas Project Nuclear Electric Generating
Station, alleging, among other causes of action, intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court noted a litany of Stewart's complaints of
disparate conduct and treatment between herself and male employees. 168
The court held, however, that even when viewed in a light most favorable
to Stewart, her allegations did not rise to the level necessary to establish a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which requires ex-
treme and outrageous conduct that must surpass all bounds of decency,
and be intolerable in a civilized society.' 69 As a result, HL&P was
awarded summary judgment on Stewart's claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.1 70
In Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,'71 Robin Young sued her
former employer, Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P), for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. She was hired in 1985 to work at the South
Texas Project Nuclear Electric Generating Station as a chemical operator
trainee in the Chemical Operations Division. Young alleged that because
of her sex and because she had previously filed discrimination lawsuits
against HL&P, she was denied promotions and was treated differently
than males in the workplace. She also alleged that the atmosphere at
HL&P included sexual jokes, discussions about one's sex life, comments
that women are less qualified, sexually explicit posters, comments that
women are emotionally out of control, innuendo that women must have
been promoted because of who they are having a sexual relationship
with, and disparate treatment in work assignments. The court granted
HL&P's motion for summary judgment, finding no evidence to substanti-
ate any of Stewart's allegations other than her own affidavit.172 In addi-
tion, the court held that her allegations did not rise to the level necessary
to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court
noted that liability does not attach from mere insults, indignities, or petty
oppressions.1 73 The court commented that in the context of employment
disputes, even successful claims of discrimination do not necessarily rise
to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress because for con-
duct to be extreme and outrageous, it must surpass all bounds of decency,
165. See id. at 739-40.
166. See id. at 740.
167. 998 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See infra notes 369-71, 668-86 for additional
facts and causes of action.
168. See id. at 748-49.
169. See id. at 757.
170. See id.
171. 11 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
172. See id. at 934.
173. See id.
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such that it is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.174
In Hanna v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber,'75 Charelee Hanna was em-
ployed by Goodyear from May 25, 1995 to August 20, 1995. She filed a
timely charge of discrimination with the Texas Human Rights Commis-
sion and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on
June 14, 1996, receiving a notice of right to sue on August 22, 1997. Later,
Hanna attempted to amend her complaint filed on September 12, 1997
against Goodyear to add a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Goodyear argued that the amendment would be futile, as the
claim would be untimely under the two-year statute of limitations gov-
erning such claims, and leave to amend should be denied. The court held
that regardless of whether Hanna asserted her claims against Goodyear
under a ratification theory or a respondeat superior theory, her claim
would be timely. 176 The court noted that Texas law established that an
employer could be liable for the intentional acts of its employee if it rati-
fied such acts. 177 The court then found that, based on the sketchy record
before it, it was reasonable to infer that the alleged ratification by Good-
year occurred after June 14, 1996, the date on which Hanna filed her
charge with the EEOC. 178 The court felt that Goodyear's written re-
sponse to the EEOC charge could constitute ratification of the conduct of
the coworker about whom Hanna complained. 179 Given the limited evi-
dence before the court and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it,
the court found that Hanna's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim appeared timely, even without relation back to the date of the origi-
nal complaint. 18°
If Hanna attempted to use a respondeat superior theory, her claim
would have arisen during her employment with Goodyear and the statute
of limitations would have commenced running on the last day of her em-
ployment.181 The court felt, however, that the facts before it were appro-
priate for equitably tolling the statute of limitations.1 82 The court first
stated that the Fifth Circuit had adopted a general rule barring claim
splitting.1 83 In order to comply with this rule, Hanna was justified in
waiting to file suit on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress until she received her right to sue letter.184 Also, the court noted
that the EEOC waited a very long time (fourteen months) before issuing
the right to sue letter.185 Based on these facts, the early stage the litiga-
174. See id.
175. 6 F. Supp. 2d 605 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
176. See id. at 606.











tion was in, and the fact there was no real prejudice to Goodyear, the
court found it appropriate to equitably toll the statute of limitations for
fourteen months. 18 6 Consequently, the court granted Hanna leave to file
her amended complaint including the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.,8 7
Subsequently in Hanna v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber,18 8 Hanna alleged
harassing behavior by a coworker Eric Wright. Goodyear moved for
summary judgment, which was denied, and the case proceeded to trial. In
order to prevail on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, Hanna had to establish that the behavior of Wright caused her se-
vere emotional distress and that Goodyear ratified this behavior. 189
Hanna testified that she suffered several nightmares over the three-year
period since she ended her employment, and additional testimony indi-
cated that she was otherwise well adjusted and led a productive personal
and work life.' 90 Hanna put forth no evidence that she required any
medical or psychological treatment or counseling. 191
The court found that this was not legally sufficient evidence of severe
emotional distress. 192 Furthermore, even if this were severe emotional
distress, as the behavior was clearly outside Wright's scope of employ-
ment, Goodyear could not be held liable for this conduct absent ratifica-
tion. Hannah put forth no evidence to establish that Goodyear had
ratified Wright's conduct. Consequently, no rational jury could find that
Goodyear intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Hanna, and Good-
year was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.193
In Carter v. TC Media Services, 194 TCI Media Services (TCI) moved
for summary judgment on Mary Carter's claim that TCI intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress upon her by: (1) removing her from the position
of local sales manager and replacing her with a younger man, (2) retain-
ing her in the manager position with little remaining authority for several
months after the announcement of her demotion, and (3) transferring her
to the position of senior account executive and assigning her work above
and beyond that received by other senior account executives. 195 Carter
relied for support on the case of Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co.,19 6 in
which the plaintiff's demotion from a high-level position to essentially a
janitorial position was found to have constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 608.
188. 17 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Tex. 1998). See infra notes 690-94 for additional facts and
causes of action.





194. No. CA 3:97-CV-1096-R, 1998 WL 686777 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998).
195. See id. at *9.
196. See id. (citing Wilson, 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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The district court noted that, although Carter was demoted, the reas-
signment took place in the context of a company reorganization in which
she was not the only employee reassigned. 197 Also, she was given an op-
portunity to apply for the local sales manager job but was not selected,
and after she was not selected, she was given another high-level position
at a comparable salary. 198 Consequently, she failed to raise allegations of
the type of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary for a finding of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, making summary judgment for
TCI proper.199
Carter also alleged that TCI intentionally inflicted emotional distress
by making unfounded and inaccurate accusations in the warnings she was
given and then basing her termination on these warnings. 200 Further-
more, after being terminated by TCI, Carter started her own company
and claimed that TCI intentionally inflicted emotional distress and pre-
vented her from realizing a profit on her contract with a client by refusing
to accept the contract and instead negotiating the contract with the client
directly. 201 The court pointed out that the act of discharge itself, as a
matter of law, could not constitute outrageous behavior necessary to es-
tablish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.202 Further-
more, "mere employment disputes" cannot support such a claim and
"[clonduct that rises to the level of illegality has only been found to be
extreme and outrageous 'in the most unusual cases."' 20 3 The court held
that these additional allegations by Carter did not rise beyond the level of
mere employment disputes, making summary judgment proper for TCI
on Carter's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 20 4
In Quintanilla v. K-Bin, Inc.,205 Mario Quintanilla was subjected to a
random drug test pursuant to the policy of his employer K-Bin, Inc. The
test came back positive and Quintanilla was terminated over his objec-
tions that tea purchased in Mexico had individually caused the positive
result. Quintanilla sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court held that even if all of Quintanilla's allegations were true, K-
Bin's actions did not even approach the level of outrageousness needed
to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 206 The
court pointed out that Quintanilla conceded that the test result was posi-
tive, and did not allege any wrongdoing in the administration of the
test.20 7 He claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress not merely
197. See id. at *10.
198. See id.
199. See id.




204. See id. at *10.
205. 993 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See infra notes 262-63, 297-98, 353-58 for addi-
tional facts and causes of action.




from his termination, but also from his claim that K-Bin's actions
branded him a drug user.2°8 The court held that "where an employer has
reason to suspect that an employee is using illegal drugs, it is neither out-
rageous nor extreme to terminate that employee, especially after receiv-
ing confirmation (in this case, from Dr. Giannone) that the employee's
explanation was inadequate, and regardless of the consequence that the
employee may be 'branded.' 20 9 Consequently, the court dismissed
Quintanilla's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 210
In Dupre v. Harris County Hospital District,211 Denise Rene Dupre,
who suffered from bipolar disorder, was employed by Harris County Hos-
pital District d/b/a Ben Taub General Hospital. After repeated incidents
of unsafe nursing practices, Dupre was terminated. 21 2 Dupre filed suit
against the Hospital for, among other causes of action, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 213 The Hospital filed a motion for summary
judgment on Dupre's claims.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital
on Dupre's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.214 The court
reasoned that Dupre did not describe any conduct amounting to extreme
and outrageous behavior.21 5 The court noted that there was no indication
that the Hospital had criticized or degraded Dupre; rather, the Hospital
treated Dupre in a polite and professional manner.216 The court also rea-
soned that Dupre had not shown that any severe emotional distress that
she may have suffered was a result of the Hospital's actions.217 Dupre did
not claim to have experienced any psychiatric problems as a result of the
Hospital's conduct and was already experiencing depression and bipolar
disorder before being terminated by the Hospital.218 Moreover, Dupre's
disorder was effectively controlled by medication.219 The court also ad-
ded that Dupre had effectively abandoned her intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim when she did not respond to the Hospital's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue.220
In Buster v. Dallas County Hospital District,22' Samuel Buster sued his
former employer, Dallas County Hospital District (DCHD), for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action.
Buster, an African-American male, claimed that he was discriminated




211. 8 F. Supp. 2d 908 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
212. See id. at 914.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 927.




219. See id. at 927.
220. See id.
221. No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-0172-P, 1998 WL 460284, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 1998).
[Vol. 521024
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
treated the same. Specifically, Buster claimed that he was placed in a
position that his supervisors knew he could not perform.
The court granted DCHD's motion for summary judgment and stated
that the facts of this case do not rise to the level of extreme and outra-
geous conduct.222 The court explained that an intentional infliction claim
does not lie for mere employment disputes, nor does the mere fact of
termination give rise to an infliction of emotional distress claim.2 23 As a
result, the court held that the conduct alleged by Buster was not extreme
and outrageous as a matter of law.22 4
In Gazda v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co.,225 Cheryl Gazda, an employee of
Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. (Pioneer), complained that she had been
harassed during her employement. Thereafter, Gazda stopped reporting
to work, apparently because of depression, and was ultimately termi-
nated. Gazda sued, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer on the
claim.22 6 The court reasoned that Gazda presented no evidence to sup-
port any outrageous conduct by Pioneer, except, at most, inappropriate
profanity and vulgar language used by coworkers, anger expressed by
Gazda's supervisor on occasion, or shunning by coworkers. 22 7
In Fisher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2 2 8 Stephen
Fisher sued his former employer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company (State Farm), for, among other claims, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Fisher was forced to miss work to take care of
his ill father.229 When Fisher's father died, he requested sixty days of
leave and was approved for only two weeks. 230 At the end of the two
weeks, Fisher did not return to work, nor did he contact State Farm.23'
State Farm classified Fisher as absent without leave and terminated his
employment based on those grounds.2 32
The court granted the State Farm's motion for summary judgment.233
In doing so, the court stated that Fisher's claims fall short of the extreme
and outrageous conduct required for a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and indicated that Fisher's claims were indicative of a
mere employment dispute.234 The court also noted that Fisher alleged
that State Farm placed a memorandum containing false information in his
employee file.2 35 While the court noted that this alleged action could rise
222. See id at *8.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. 10 F. Supp. 2d 656 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
226. See id. at 676.
227. See id.
228. 999 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
229. See id. at 867.
230. See id. at 867-68.
231. See id. at 868.
232. See id.





to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress, it concluded
that because Fisher did not attach the supporting evidence to his brief, his
claim lacked merit.2 36
In Brown v. St. Joseph's Hospital & Health Center,237 June Brown, a
former employee of St. Joseph's Hospital and Health Center (St. Jo-
seph's), filed suit against her former supervisor for, among other claims,
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Brown claimed that her for-
mer supervisor subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances and retali-
ated against her for refusing the advances, thereby intentionally inflicting
emotional distress upon her. The district court denied the former super-
visor's motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, holding that a supervisor may be held personally liable for such
claims.238
In Cochrane v. Houston Light & Power Co.,239 Linda Cochrane
claimed that she was discriminated against based on her sex and race, and
that she was retaliated against after she complained of such mistreatment.
Cochrane filed suit against her employer, Houston Light & Power Com-
pany (HLP), for, among other claims, intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court dismissed Cochrane's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim with prejudice. 240 The court reasoned that
Cochrane's allegations did not rise to the level necessary to support a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 241 The court added
that mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions do
not create liability for an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.242
In Colbert v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,243 Melynda Colbert complained
that she was sexually harassed by the crew leadman. Upon being made
aware of Colbert's allegations, Georgia-Pacific Corp. (GPC) began an in-
vestigation, which resulted in the termination of the leadman. Following
her resignation, Colbert sued GPC and Rob Williams, a manager who
assisted in the investigation, for, among other things, intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of GPC and Williams on Colbert's intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim. 244 The court reasoned that Colbert failed to show
that GPC acted intentionally or recklessly.245 Moreover, Colbert
presented no evidence that GPC or Williams ratified the leadman's
236. See id.
237. 998 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
238. See id. at 729.
239. 996 F. Supp. 657 (S. D. Tex. 1998). See infra notes 366-68, 707-10 for additional
facts and causes of action.
240. See id. at 667.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. 995 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1998). See infra notes 363-65, 698-706 for additional
facts and causes of action.
244. See id. at 704.
245. See id.
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behavior. 246
In Sanborn v. David A. Dean & Associates,247 Carmen Sanborn sued
her former employer David A. Dean & Associates (Dean) for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. She alleged in her petition that she was
hired as an executive secretary with Dean in 1996 and shortly thereafter
discovered that she was pregnant. She was terminated at the conclusion
of a sixty-day introductory period and was never informed that her per-
formance was unsatisfactory. She further alleged that she was told by a
Dean representative that she was terminated due to her pregnancy and
that Dean never intended to continue her employment once it was dis-
covered she was pregnant. The district court granted Dean's motion to
dismiss Sanborn's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 248
The court held that it is well settled that an employer's conduct, even if a
Title VII violation, rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct
only in the most unusual circumstances.2 49 The court concluded that
Sanborn did not allege facts that, viewed most favorably to her, state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.250
In Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc.,251 Tami Cannizzaro brought
suit against Neiman Marcus, alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Underlying the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
was a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act. Neiman Marcus argued that her intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim failed because it was: (1) preempted by the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act; (2) barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act; and/or (3) not sup-
ported by evidence establishing that the alleged conduct was sufficiently
extreme or outrageous or that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional dis-
tress. Noting the abundance of case law cited by Neiman Marcus as sup-
port for its preemption and exclusive remedy arguments and the lack of
any opposition filed by Cannizzaro, the court held that it was persuaded
by these arguments and found that they were supported by the precedent
cited.252 The court also agreed with Neiman Marcus that Cannizzaro had
put forth no competent evidence to establish that she suffered severe
emotional distress or that the conduct of Neiman Marcus was extreme
and outrageous. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment for
Neiman Marcus on Cannizzaro's intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim.25 3
In Carey v. Aldine Independent School District,2 54 Mary Ann Carey was
246. See id.
247. No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2239-D, 1998 WL 690608 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998).
248. See id. at *3.
249. See id. at *2.
250. See id.
251. 979 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
252. See id. at 479.
253. See id.
254. 996 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See supra notes 42-49 and infra notes 378-90,
786-94 for additional facts and causes of action.
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a teacher working for the Aldine Independent School District (Aldine).
When her contract was not renewed, Carey filed suit alleging, among
other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Carey claimed that the school principal, Leschper, intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress on her on numerous occasions. First, Carey was
berated after the principal received a telephone call by Carey's husband,
complaining about the number of students in Carey's class. Second, the
principal berated Carey following Carey's conversation with a social
worker who had called concerning the alleged abuse of one of Carey's
students. Third, the principal gave Carey a negative evaluation. Accord-
ing to the court, section 22.051 of the Texas Education Code provides
immunity to professional employees for acts incident to or within the
scope of their employment that involve the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion on the part of the employee, except in limited circumstances that
were not applicable to this case.255 The court found that termination and
contract renewal decisions, as well as evaluations, were functions that re-
quired the exercise of a school supervisor's discretion and judgment. Fur-
thermore, Leschper submitted an affidavit asserting that, as a school
principal, she had authority to evaluate teachers before the school dis-
trict's renewal decisions, and she acted in good faith in evaluating Ca-
rey.256 Because Carey presented no summary judgment evidence to
contradict either of these statements, the court held that Leschper pos-
sessed qualified immunity for her evaluation of Carey. 257 The court also
noted that, in order to make a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Carey had to prove extreme and outrageous conduct. 258 Carey's
claims that she was berated by Leschper on two occasions were not suffi-
cient because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress did
not protect against mere insults, indignities, and threats.259 Conse-
quently, the court granted summary judgment to Leschper on Carey's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.260
5. Drug Testing
Few significant cases have addressed drug testing in the employment
context since the 1995 Texas Supreme Court decision in SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Doe.261 One notable decision is the case of Quintanilla
v. K-Bin, Inc.,262 where the court rejected Quintanilla's claim of employer
negligence, which was not based on the usual allegation of inaccuracy of
test results or test procedures. Instead, the court rejected Quantilla's




259. See id. at 657.
260. See id.
261. 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995) (no duty of laboratory to warn either employer or
prospective employee that eating poppy seeds will cause positive drug test).
262. 993 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See supra notes 205-10 and infra notes 297-98,
353-58 for additional facts and causes of action.
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claim that the employer allegedly failed to reasonably consider and evalu-
ate the employee's explanation that the positive drug screen was the re-
sult of herbal teas from Mexico.263
6. Defamation
Defamation under Texas law is a "defamatory statement orally commu-
nicated or published to a third person without legal excuse. '' 264 A court
must make the threshold determination of whether the complained of
statement or publication is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.
While defamation claims and defenses may take many forms in the em-
ployment context, there are three common issues: self-publication, abso-
lute privilege, and an employer's qualified privilege.265
Significant defamation cases decided during the Survey period include
Saucedo v. Rheem Manufacturing Co.,266 where Jose Saucedo sued his
former employer and supervisor, Jaime Loera. Saucedo had been work-
ing as maintenance superintendent of Rheem's plant in Nuevo Laredo
when he was terminated in 1994. Saucedo claimed that after his termina-
tion, Rheem and Loera gave strict orders to all Rheem employees that all
inquiries regarding Saucedo were to be referred to Loera. Loera was to
inform prospective employers that Saucedo was a "chief mechanic"
rather than "maintenance supervisor" and that no further information
would be given regarding Saucedo. 267 Saucedo alleged that not giving
additional information would lead the prospective employer to believe
that there was something that Rheem was unable or unwilling to discuss
about Saucedo. Saucedo presented deposition testimony from a prospec-
tive employer that Rheem refused to provide information regarding
Saucedo, that Rheem did not indicate it was company policy to not pro-
vide information, and that the prospective employer viewed the lack of
information negatively on Saucedo. 268 Saucedo also presented affidavit
testimony of a recruiter that he asked to call Rheem for the purposes of a
reference check. The recruiter indicated in her affidavit that she believed
that Loera, by refusing to provide information about Saucedo and by the
manner in which he conducted himself during the reference check, gave
Saucedo a bad reference. The recruiter stated that Loera called her back
the next day and explained that he did not intend to give Saucedo a bad
reference, that Saucedo was a good employee. Loena corrected his prior
statement to her, disclosing that Saucedo was really a maintenance man-
263. See id. at 563.
264. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Ramos
v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331,333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) and applying
Texas law).
265. For a comprehensive background of the doctrine of defamation, see Benedict,
supra note 5, at 959-64 & nn.144-89.
266. 974 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). See supra notes 63-
67, 147-52 for additional facts and causes of action.
267. See id. at 120.
268. See id. at 120-21.
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ager rather than a chief mechanic. 269 The trial court granted Rheem and
Loera's motion for summary judgment.2 7°
The court of appeals upheld summary judgment, reasoning that merely
refusing to give information about an employee as a matter of law does
not constitute defamation. 271 The court noted that the law imposes no
duty on anyone to talk about a former employee, and, furthermore, be-
cause the publications to the recruiter were invited by Saucedo, Saucedo
cannot recover for any defamation injury sustained from those
communications.2 72
In Garcia v. Burris,273 Travis Burris, the president and CEO of the
Bank of Alice (Bank), completed an evaluation of Louis Garcia's per-
formance, in which Burris noted that the Bank had received a complaint
threatening legal action against the Bank for Garcia's violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act. After Garcia refused to discuss the evalu-
ation, the Bank terminated Garcia for insubordination. Garcia sued Bur-
ris and the Bank, alleging that the statement contained in the
performance evaluation was defamatory. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Garcia appealed. 274
Affirming summary judgment, the court reasoned that if the elements
of a cause of action for defamation had been met, a qualified privilege
existed protecting the publication.275 The court noted that other than
Garcia, only two members of the Bank reviewed the evaluation - Burris
and Garcia's immediate supervisor.2 76 Because both Burris and the su-
pervisor had a direct interest or duty in Garcia's evaluation, the court
concluded that a qualified privilege existed as a matter of law.277 The
court also concluded that Garcia did not present summary judgment evi-
dence that Burris or the Bank acted with malice, as required to overcome
the privilege.2 78 The court disagreed with Garcia's assertion that the
Bank's failure to reprimand Garcia at the time of the threatening phone
call illustrated the Bank's belief that the allegation was unfounded.279 To
hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would require an employer to take
punitive action against an employee on every allegation regarding the
employee's conduct, or suffer possible exposure to a defamation lawsuit if
the allegation were documented in a subsequent employment
evaluation. 280
269. See id. at 121.
270. See id. at 120.
271. See id. at 122.
272. See id. at 121-22.
273. 961 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 606.
276. See id.
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In Banfield v. Laidlaw Waste Systems,281 the plaintiffs sued their
formed employer, Laidlaw Waste Systems (Laidlaw) alleging, among
other things, a cause of action for defamation. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Laidlaw, and the plaintiffs appealed.282
The court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Laidlaw, holding that the statements were not defamatory as a
matter of law. 283 The court explained that a reference to the plaintiffs as
being "son of a bitching troublemakers" was a constitutional protected
opinion and was, therefore, not defamatory.284 The court also concluded
that the characterization of the plaintiffs as "ring leaders" cannot be the
basis for a defamation claim because it merely relates to the undisputed
fact that the plaintiffs were in-plant union organizers. 285 Moreover, the
statements by Laidlaw managers that they intended to "fix it so that [the
plaintiffs] . .. would not be able to get a job anywhere" were merely
expressions of intent to do an act and could not injure the plaintiffs' repu-
tations or expose them to hatred, ridicule, contempt, or financial in-
jury.286 The court concluded that because all of the statements made
were either true or not defamatory, summary judgment was
appropriate. 287
In Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc.,288 Douglas Welch was fired from his
employment with Doss Aviation, Inc. (Doss) after performing unauthor-
ized flight maneuvers. Welch filed suit alleging, among other claims, that
Doss had slandered him by circulating a memo after Welch's termination
describing the event leading to his termination. 289 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Doss, and Welch appealed. 290
Affirming summary judgment, the court reasoned that the circulation
of the memo to other civilian pilot instructors fell within the scope of the
qualified privilege.291 The court also concluded that the summary judg-
ment evidence established that Doss acted without malice.292 The court
noted that Doss took statements from personnel who witnessed the ma-
neuver and spoke with Welch about the incident, thus indicating that
Doss did not act with a reckless disregard for the truth.293 Moreover, the
author of the memo provided an affidavit that he did not entertain any
doubts about the truth of the matters in the memo.294 In the absence of
281. 977 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied).
282. See id. at 436.





288. 978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet. h.). See supra notes 70-73, 92-
94 for additional facts and causes of action.
289. See id. at 219.
290. See id. at 220.






controverting truth, the court concluded that the affidavit was sufficient
to negate actual malice.295
7. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing296
While no significant cases addressing the duty of good faith and fair
dealing were decided during the Survey period, Quintanilla v. K-Bin,
Inc.2 97 reiterates Texas law rejecting a legal tort duty between parties to
an employment contract, absent a special relationship.298
8. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Employees will often attempt to circumvent the restrictions of tradi-
tional contract damages by expanding claims to include fraud and
misrepresentation. 299
In Carr v. Christie,30 0 Linda Marek negotiated to sell her business to
Joe Christie, with the stipulation that he would promise to retain Bradley
Carr, the plaintiff, as an employee for four years. Christie agreed to the
contract and assured Marek that he would enter into a written agreement
with Carr. Carr entered into a written employment agreement with
Christie and Galvanix Corporation, operator of the new business. After
Carr had worked for eighteen months, Galvanix discharged him. Carr
sued Christie and Galvanix for damages resulting from, among other
claims, fraudulent inducement. Specifically, Carr claims that Christie's
promise of a four-year employment contract induced him to relocate, and
he sustained injury when the promise proved to be false. The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 301
Reversing summary judgment, the court of appeals stated that Christie
failed to negate the element of reliance as a matter of law.302 Because
affidavits containing evidence of Carr's reliance were improperly ex-
cluded, Christie failed to negate the element of reliance.303
In Offshore Petroleum Divers, Inc. v. Cromp,304 Paul Cromp and Rich-
ard Marsh (Plaintiffs) sued their former employer, Offshore Petroleum
Divers, Inc. (OPD) for, among other things, fraud. Plaintiffs complained
that while they were students at a diving center in Seattle, OPD repre-
sented to them that there were plenty of diving jobs available and that if
they accepted positions with OPD, they would start work as divers imme-
295. See id.
296. See generally Benedict, supra note 5, at 968-69 & nn.229-33.
297. 993 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Tex. 1998). See supra notes 205-10, 262-63 and infra notes
353-58 for additional facts and causes of action.
298. See id. at 563.
299. See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 929-30 (Tex. 1996);
Williams v. City of Midland, 932 S.W.2d 679, 684-85 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ);
Wilson v. Sysco Food Serv. of Dallas, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1003, 1014-15 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
300. 970 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
301. See id. at 621.
302. See id. at 626.
303. See id. at 625-26.
304. 952 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, pet. denied).
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diately, rather than as divers' assistants. Plaintiffs asserted that in reli-
ance on these representations, they accepted positions with OPD and
incurred relocation and additional travel expenses. Plaintiffs sued and
asserted that they were not given diving jobs as represented. The jury
found that OPD committed fraud and awarded Cromp and Marsh dam-
ages for out-of-pocket expenses and exemplary damages.
On appeal, OPD argued that the trial court erred in not granting OPD
a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict because em-
ployees-at-will cannot maintain a cause of action for fraud against their
employers as a matter of law.30 5 The appellate court disagreed, holding
that the employment-at-will doctrine does not bar a claim for fraud.306
The court explained that in earlier cases disallowing fraud claims based
on the employment-at-will doctrine, the representations were made dur-
ing the time that the plaintiffs were employees.30 7 Herein, unlike prior
cases, the allegations included both pre-employment fraudulent represen-
tations and those made during employment. 30 8 The court thus concluded
that the trial court did not err in overruling OPD's motion for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.30 9
OPD also argued on appeal that the Statute of Frauds barred Plaintiffs'
claim for fraud. OPD asserted that because any agreement between
OPD and Plaintiffs was not one which was to be performed within one
year of its making, any such agreement had to be in writing to be enforce-
able. The court again disagreed, concluding that Plaintiffs were seeking
to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations made both before
and during employment, and not seeking to enforce an agreement barred
by the Statute of Frauds.310 The court explained that because Plaintiffs
recovered out-of-pocket expenses, and not damages based on the lost
"benefit of the bargain," Plaintiffs' recovery sounded in tort and not in
contract, thus supporting the propriety of the fraud claim. 311 The court
concluded that, "under the unique circumstances of this case, allegations
of fraud regarding pre-employment misrepresentations... are not barred
by the Statute of Frauds. '31 2
In American Lantern Co. v. Hamilton,3 13 Leroy Hamilton sued his em-
ployer for fraud. American Lantern hired Hamilton to fill the general
manager's position in a new manufacturing plant being built in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico. American Lantern's president told Hamilton that "as
long as [he] did well and did a good job [he] had nothing to worry
305. See id. at 955.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 956.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 956-57.
311. Id. at 957.
312. Id.
313. No. 04-95-00517-CV, 1997 WL 667167 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 22, 1997, no
pet.). See supra notes 95-101 for additional facts and causes of action.
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about."' 314 Hamilton sold an unrelated business based on assurances re-
lated to American Lantern's management incentive program. When the
plant experienced problems, Hamilton was demoted. When management
for American Lantern arrived to inform Hamilton of his demotion, they
learned that Hamilton had been engaged in an affair with a production
line employee and had made unauthorized payments to three pregnant
employees. American Lantern terminated Hamilton. At trial, the jury
found the existence of an oral employment contract, whereby Hamilton
could only be discharged for cause. The jury further found that American
Lantern committed fraud in relation to Hamilton's employment and
awarded $4,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in exemplary damages.315
The court of appeals held that Hamilton's only claim was in contract,
based on the assurance that he would be employed as long as he did
well.316 The court held that if a plaintiff's recovery depends on proving
the contents of his contract, then the cause of action rests in contract
alone and not fraud. 317
In Buerger v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,3 18 Robert Buerger
claimed that he was unwillingly placed into Southwestern Bell's employee
assistance program because he possessed religious drawings at his work
area and opposed possibly unlawful actions by his employer. Related to
these events, Buerger set forth a claim for fraud, alleging that he was
transported across several county lines to Bellaire, Texas under false pre-
tenses. The court dismissed Buerger's fraud claim, finding that he had
failed to allege, among other things, what material misrepresentation was
made or that he suffered injury from the alleged fraud. 319
9. Tortious Interference
Texas courts recognize tortious interference with contract as a viable
cause of action in the employment context, regardless of an "at will" rela-
tionship.32°1 The requisite elements to establish a claim of tortious inter-
ference are: (a) existence of a contract, (b) willful or intentional
interference with the contract, (c) the act of interference was the proxi-
mate cause of damages, and (d) damages or loss actually occurred. 321
Legal justification or excuse is available as an affirmative defense. 322 The
protection from tortious interference applies both to existing and pro-
314. Id. at *1.
315. See id. at *2.
316. See id. at *4-*5.
317. See id. at *5.
318. 982 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
319. See id. at 1252.
320. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Tex. 1989).
321. See Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no
writ). See also Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996) (discussion
of cause of action and affirmative defense in a non-employment law dispute).
322. See Marathon Oil, 767 S.W.2d at 689-90; Texas Beef Cattle, 921 S.W.2d at 210-12.
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spective contracts. 323 Furthermore, while the general rule is that one may
not tortiously interfere with one's own contract, 324 when an agent of a
party to the contract acts so contrary to the principal's interest that it can
only be concluded that the agent was motivated by personal interests, the
claim may be pursued by the injured party.325
In Villegas v. Griffin Industries,326 plaintiff Maria Villegas had lived
with Jose Villegas since 1967. Jose's brother-in-law, Presidiano Trevio,
operated a business collecting and selling used grease. Jose operated a
similar business and was occasionally assisted by Maria. Griffin Indus-
tries (Griffin), a grease rendering company, had noticed thefts of grease
from Griffin containers placed outside of restaurants. Griffin hired sev-
eral off-duty police officers to investigate the thefts, and Maria and Jose
were arrested one night after being observed stealing grease from a Grif-
fin container. Although her pleading was less than clear at the trial level,
on appeal Maria contended that she had set forth a claim for tortious
interference with contract against Griffin, its director of security, and the
four police officers (collectively Appellees). Maria claimed that the Ap-
pellees' conduct caused her to lose her employment. Even assuming she
had so plead, the court found that Maria had presented no evidence that
she was an employee of either Jose Villegas or Presidiano Trevio. As a
result, the court found that there was no business relationship to interfere
with and the trial court had not erred in awarding a directed verdict on
Maria's claim.327
In Benningfield v. City of Houston,328 Debbie Benningfield, Pamela
Grant, and Peggy Frankhouser worked in the Identification Division (ID)
of the Houston Police Department and complained of discrimination and
a hostile working environment. As a result of their complaints, Audra
Runnels, the head of the department was fired. Audra Runnel's son, A.
Wade Runnels, became the new head of the division. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendants, A. Wade Runnels and other current and for-
mer employees of the Houston Police Department, harassed and
retaliated against them because they continued to report problems of dis-
crimination and hostile working environment in ID. The plaintiffs filed,
among other claims, a tortious interference claim against the defendants
and the City of Houston. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
which the district court denied.
The Fifth Circuit reversed denial of summary judgment on the tortious
323. See Marathon Oil, 767 S.W.2d at 689; Meza v. Service Merchandise Co., 951
S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ. denied).
324. See Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793,795 (Tex. 1995); Dalrymple v. University
of Texas Sys., 949 S.W.2d 395, 405 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ. granted); O'Bryant v.
City of Midland, 949 S.W.2d 406, 415 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ. granted).
325. See Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796-98; Dalrymple, 949 S.W.2d at 405; O'Bryant, 949
S.W.2d at 415.
326. 975 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
327. See id. at 755.
328. 157 F. 3d 369 (5th Cir. 1998).
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interference claim.329 Generally, as agents of the city, the defendants
cannot be liable for interference with the city's contracts unless those in-
dividuals acted in furtherance of their own personal interests.33°) Herein,
the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that the defendants' actions
could have only been motivated by personal interests.331 Thus, plaintiffs'
contentions were legally insufficient to state a claim for tortious
interference. 332
10. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision of Employees
In limited circumstances courts have imposed liability on employers
who knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that a hired individual created an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.333 Conversely, evidence of training programs, grievance proce-
dures, and earlier positive experiences have contributed to favorable em-
ployer verdicts. 334 At least one court has declined to recognize "an
employer's duty to provide knowledgeable and competent managers as a
viable common law cause of action in Texas. '335 Finally, claims of negli-
gent hiring, supervision, and retention may also be subject to a defense of
workers' compensation preemption.
In Houser v. Smith,336 Rose Houser, a customer of Accurate Transmis-
sion (Accurate), owned by David Smith, sued Accurate and others after
she was sexually assaulted by Accurate's employee, Robert Sylvester, fol-
lowing a company sponsored barbecue that she had been invited to by
and attended with Sylvester. The barbecue occurred at an off-site loca-
tion, the assault occurred on-site at Accurate's facilities while the busi-
ness was closed. Houser sued for negligence, but the jury found for the
Defendants and Houser appealed.
The court of appeals found Smith owed no duty to Houser as a matter
of law. 337 The court noted that an exception to the general rule that there
is no duty to protect another from the conduct of a third person existed
when there was a special relationship between the defendant and the
329. See id. at 373.
330. See id. at 379.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778, 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1996, writ denied) (employer's failure to inquire into security guard applicant's prior work
history as police officer created fact issue preventing summary judgment); Deerings West
Nursing Ctr. v. Scott, 787 S.W.2d 494, 496-97 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied) (em-
ployer breached duty by hiring an unlicensed nurse, who later assaulted a visitor to the
nursing home, when background check would have revealed 56 prior convictions). Cf.
Guidry v. National Freight, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 807, 809-11 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ)
(employer not liable for truck driver's assault of third party when employer, based on
driver's job duties, neither knew or should have known of a forseeable harm).
334. See Mackey v. U.P. Enter., Inc., 935 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ);
Yaeger v. Drillers, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
335. Bonenberger v. Continental Ins. Co., No. 05-95-01055-CV, 1996 WL 429299, at *7(Tex. App.-Dallas July 29, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication).
336. 968 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
337. See id. at 546.
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third person. Under this exception, the theory of negligent hiring and
supervision would impose a duty on employers to adequately hire, train,
and supervise employees. 338 Houser claimed that Smith had a duty to
investigate Sylvester's criminal background, which included three forgery
convictions. Noting that the question of whether Smith would have hired
Sylvester in light of the convictions was irrelevant, the court stated that
the issue was whether the criminal conduct of Sylvester and the type of
harm that Houser suffered were foreseeable and presented a risk that
Smith should have to guard against by investigating Sylvester's criminal
background.
The court found that Smith owed Houser no duty because the conduct
and harm were not foreseeable and that Smith's only duty was to provide
a competent transmission mechanic. 339 Even though Houser was a cus-
tomer and the events occurred on Accurate's premises, the court held
these facts were not significant as Sylvester's conduct did not occur at the
company sponsored barbecue but later at the shop, which was supposed
to have been closed for business at Smith's direction. Also, at the time of
the incident, Sylvester was off-duty and was not required by his job to be
at the garage. Houser and Sylvester only returned to the garage because
her car had been left there prior to the barbecue. Citing recent precedent
in which the court held that an employer was not liable for his employee's
criminal conduct in the absence of a duty to the public that included the
victim, the court said it would not:
hold Smith liable for Sylvester's criminal actions committed on the
premises after midnight even though Sylvester had a key to the ga-
rage because he was an employee. The type of conduct and harm
that occurred were not foreseeable when Smith hired, retained, or
supervised Sylvester as an employee of the transmission shop.340
The court distinguished this case from situations in which the employee
is placed in a position that creates a peculiar and forseeable risk of harm
to others by reason of the employment duties. The court cited a case in
which an employer was found negligent for hiring a security guard with a
criminal record.341 The court noted that the risk that foreseeable harm
might come to a customer was greater when the employee was armed or
charged with carrying out a hazardous job that required skill or experi-
ence. The court found that Sylvester's job did not require him to be in
close and possibly confrontational situations with customers or to carry a
weapon and his job required no skills or experience beyond that of a
mechanic.342
The court also found that the case was different from those decisions
finding a duty to investigate an employee's background because of poten-
338. See id. at 544.
339. See id. at 545.
340. Id.
341. See id. (citing Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
342. See id. at 545.
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tial contact with vulnerable individuals, distinguishing cases involving a
drug counselor, a child care business, and a nursing home.343 The court
noted that Houser was not a member of a vulnerable or specially pro-
tected group and the harm she suffered did not arise from her status as a
customer but from an after hours association with an employee. 344 In
addition to finding a lack of foreseeability, the court found other factors
weighed against imposing a duty on Smith. For one, requiring Smith to
perform a background check on all criminal and military records and
other sources of similar data on all current and prospective employees
would impose a great administrative burden and cost on a small busi-
ness. 345 Finally, the court stated that even if Smith had used reasonable
care in discovering Sylvester's forgery convictions, "he could not have
foreseen that hiring or retaining Sylvester created an unreasonable risk of
harm to Houser .... ,,346 For these reasons, the court affirmed the jury's
finding that Houser take nothing.347
In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church,348 Robyn Sanders and Cynthia
Mullinex sued their employer, Casa View Baptist Church (CVBC) for,
among other things, negligent retention of their supervisor Shelby Bau-
cum with whom they had a sexual relationship, and were ultimately ter-
minated from employment for the adulterous relationship. CVBC sought
and was granted summary judgment as to all claims.
On appeal, Sanders and Mullinax claimed that the district court had
erred in awarding summary judgment to CVBC on their claims for negli-
gent retention, under which an employer who negligently retains an em-
ployee who is incompetent or unfit for the job may be liable to a third
party whose injury was proximately caused by the employer's negligence.
In order to withstand summary judgment on this claim, however, the
court of appeals stated that Sanders and Mullinax "needed to show that
CVBC knew or should have known that Baucum's conduct as a supervi-
sor or counselor presented an unreasonable risk of harm to others. '349
The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs' evidence showed that CVBC
knew that Baucum had offended a few women by complimenting them on
their appearances and by hugging them.350 This evidence did not indicate
that CVBC should have known of Baucum's sexual harassment of Sand-
ers and Mullinax. "Further, even if the plaintiffs' evidence suggested that
CVBC should have known that Baucum was counseling the plaintiffs,
there is simply no evidence that CVBC should have known that Baucum
was likely to engage in sexual misconduct or disclose confidences as a
343. See id. (citing Porter v. Nemir, 900 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ);
Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc. 868 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994),
aff'd 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995); Deerings West Nursing Home, 787 S.W.2d at 494).




348. 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 WL 3961860 (Oct. 5, 1998).
349. Id. at 340.
350. See id. at 338.
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marriage counselor."'351 Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's award of summary judgment for CVBC on the plaintiffs' neg-
ligent retention claims. 352
In Quintanilla v. K-Bin, Inc.,353 plaintiff Mario Quintanilla sued his em-
ployer, K-Bin, Inc. (K-Bin) for, among other things, breach of good faith
and fair dealing and negligence following his termination resulting from a
positive drug test. Quintanilla informed K-Bin that the positive test was
the result of herbal teas purchased in Mexico. Quintanilla argued that K-
Bin was negligent and grossly negligent because it had a legal duty to
reasonably consider and evaluate his explanation for the positive test re-
sult since Quintanilla had signed a consent form "which gave his em-
ployer the power to terminate him if his drug test revealed 'an
unexplained presence of a drug and/or alcohol.' ' 354 The court stated that
Quintanilla was essentially arguing for a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in an employment-at-will context.355
Rejecting Quintanilla's attempt to create a legal duty through the con-
sent form, the court reasoned that Texas does not recognize a legal tort
duty between parties to a contract unless a special relationship exists be-
tween them. An at will employment relationship does not create such a
special relationship. Consequently, there was no legal duty on the part of
K-Bin and the court dismissed Quintanilla's negligence claim.356 Dis-
missing Plaintiff's claim for gross negligence, the court stated that:
[t]he possibility that the plaintiff may be harmed by termination for
failing a drug test, especially where there is absolutely no allegation
that the results of the test were not accurate or that the testing was
negligently performed, does not even begin to rise to the level of
extreme risk required for gross negligence. 357
The court also dismissed Quintanilla's claims of negligence and gross neg-
ligence "because this Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot
pursue pendent state claims of negligence for an act alleged under a con-
temporaneous cause of action to be intentional discrimination. '358
In Ward v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 3 5 9 Kevin Ward was terminated
from his employment with Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. because he was un-
able to perform the essential functions of his job at the time his leave of
absence expired. After his termination, Ward sued Dr. Pepper for,
among other claims, negligent hiring and negligent retention. Specifi-
cally, Ward claimed that Dr. Pepper was negligent in hiring and retaining
four managers or supervisors.
351. Id. at 340.
352. See id.
353. 993 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
354. Id. at 563.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. Id. at 563-564.
358. Id. at 563 n.2.
359. No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-0952-G, 1998 WL 664962 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 1998).
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Pepper. 360
The court reasoned that the undisputed evidence established that two of
the individuals alleged by Ward to have been negligently hired or re-
tained by Dr. Pepper were never employed by Dr. Pepper. 361 With re-
spect to the other two individuals, the undisputed evidence showed that
Dr. Pepper made a reasonable inquiry into their competence and qualifi-
cations by contacting references listed on their employment applications
and obtaining copies of their driving records.362
In Colbert v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,363 employee Colbert complained
that she was sexually harassed by Georgia-Pacific Corp.'s (GPC) crew
leadman. GPC conducted an investigation and the leadman was termi-
nated. Colbert resigned despite GPC's actions and sued both GPC and
Rob Williams, a manager who assisted in the investigation, for sexual har-
assment as well as common law claims including negligence. Colbert al-
leged that: (1) GPC and Williams failed to take action to remedy the
sexual harassment against Colbert after experiencing similar incidents in
which the leadman sexually harassed other employees; and (2) GPC and
Williams failed to take action to remedy the sexual harassment against
Colbert after having notice of it.
The district court granted summary judgment for GPC, concluding that
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for
injuries sustained by an employee in the course of employment as a result
of the employer's negligence. 364 The district court also granted summary
judgment for Williams, concluding that Williams could not be personally
liable for negligence in the absence of an independent duty owed to Col-
bert outside his role as the GPC personnel manager.365
In Cochrane v. Houston Light and Power Co.,366 Linda Cochrane
(Cochrane) claimed that she was discriminated against based on her sex
and race, and was retaliated against after she complained of such mis-
treatment. Cochrane filed suit against her employer, Houston Light and
Power Company, for, among other claims, negligent hiring, supervision
and retention.
The district court dismissed Cochrane's negligent hiring, supervision
and retention claims with prejudice. 367 The court stated that Cochrane
not only failed to establish the necessary elements of negligence, but she
also failed to demonstrate why her claims were not barred by the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA). The court indicated that TWCA
provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee in
360. See id. at *3.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. 995 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
364. See id. at 705.
365. See id.
366. 996 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
367. See id. at 667.
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the course of employment as a result of the employer's negligence. 368
In Stewart v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,369 the court dismissed
plaintiff Starla Stewart's claims against Houston Lighting and Power for
general negligence, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent
retention on the basis that the claims were barred by the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act. 370 The court also found that Stewart's claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by the Workers'
Compensation Act as well.371
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Commentators have urged employees to pursue claims for violations of
their state constitutional rights when they sue their employers. These
claims have by and large been unsuccessful. 372
In Huckabay v. Moore,373 William Huckabay (Huckabay) sued his em-
ployer, Edward Moore (Moore), then Commissioner of Precinct Four in
Jefferson County, for, among other claims, monetary damages under the
Texas Constitution. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendant and Huckabay appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Texas Supreme Court has
specifically rejected the implication of a Bivens-type action for damages
under the state constitution.374 The only remedy afforded by the Texas
Constitution is equitable relief from government actions violating its
mandates. 375 The Fifth Circuit also rejected Huckabay's claim for equita-
ble relief because Huckabay's complaint only requested monetary com-
pensation.376 Consequently, the court affirmed summary judgment for
the defendant. 377
In Carey v. Aldine Independent School District,378 Mary Ann Carey
worked as a teacher for the Aldine Independent School District (Aldine).
When her contract was not renewed Carey sued for, among other claims,
violations of the Texas Constitution.
368. See id.
369. 998 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
370. See id. at 756.
371. See id. at 757 n.11.
372. See City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464,474 (Tex. 1996) (Texas Constitution
did not provide a right of privacy for a police officer denied a promotion because of an
affair with wife of another officer); Favero v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp.
1281, 1296 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (no implied private right of action for damages for violation of
Texas Constitution); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147-49 (Tex. 1995) (no
implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly
sections of the Texas Constitution, and that suits for equitable remedies for violation of
constitutional rights are not prohibited, while suits for money damages are barred).
373. 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1998). See supra notes 158-62 for additional facts and causes
of action.








Carey claimed that Aldine denied her precedural due process and thus
violated Artile I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution. The court pointed
out that Texas law does not authorize a cause of action for monetary
damages for Texas constitutional violations. 379 To the extent that Carey
sought equitable relief based on her "due course of law" claims, however,
they would be analyzed using federal due process standards. In order to
claim a deprivation of due process, Carey first had to show that she had a
property interest entitled to protection. According to the court, there
was no property interest in state governmental employment unless state
law created such a claim.38°1 Courts applying Texas law "have held that a
teacher working under a probationary contract does not have a property
interest in continued employment, as a matter of law."' 38 Also, the court
noted that the Texas Education Code had been amended to state that
teachers did not have a property interest in their employment beyond the
terms of their contract.382 The court found that Carey had a one year
contract and was not terminated during that school year.383 Her contract
was not renewed, which occurs when a teacher is allowed to serve the full
contract term but is not offered a new contract for the next year. A fail-
ure to renew, according to the court, was not the same as a dismissal or
discharge because a contract for a specified length automatically expires
at the end of the term.384
Carey also stated that the Aldine Teacher Handbook (the Handbook)
contained a procedure for the nonrenewal of contracts. This procedure
required the school board to give a reason for the nonrenewal. Carey
claimed that the board failed to state a reason for its action in the nonre-
newal letter she received, thereby violating her due process rights by fail-
ing to follow its own procedure. However, the court found that the
procedure, at most, created a property interest in her employment that
state law eliminated. 385 Moreover, her argument assumed the fact that
she was entitled to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal. 386 The Hand-
book required such a statement only for "term contract" employees, not
for probationary employees such as Carey.387 Carey claimed that she was
not a probationary teacher. The Handbook defined a probationary
teacher as a teacher with less than two years of continuous service with
the district. According to the court, Aldine and Leschper (Defendants)
put on summary judgment evidence that her employment before 1995-
1996 had not been continuous. Carey resigned at the end of the 1993-
1994 school year and was rehired after the 1994-1995 school year had
already begun. The Defendants also produced an affidavit from Leschper
379. See id. at 650.
380. See id. at 651.
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stating that Carey was employed under a probationary contract. Carey
argued she was not a probationary employee because she was in her third
year with Aldine and probationary contracts were only for teachers in
their first or second year. Carey also alleged that she was told after her
second year that she was no longer a probationary employee. The court
found, however, that Carey did not respond to the summary judgment
evidence that her employment was not continuous. 388 Also, she did not
identify who told her she was no longer on probationary status or indicate
whether the person was aware of her interrupted second year of employ-
ment. According to the court, Carey also ignored the fact that, under the
Texas Education Code, a probationary contract could apply to a third
year teacher.389 Therefore, the court held that Carey was not deprived of
a property interest in continued employment when her contract was not
renewed following the 1995-1996 school year. Consequently, the court
granted summary judgment for the Defendants on Carey's due course of
law claim under Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution. 390
C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge under Texas Workers' Compensation Act391
The legislative purpose of sections 451.001-.003 to the Texas Labor
Code392 is to "protect persons who are entitled to benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Law and to prevent them from being discharged
by reason of taking steps to collect such benefits. '393 This protection,
however, applies only to an employee of a subscriber to the Texas work-
ers' compensation system as employees of non-subscribers are excluded
from coverage. 394
In Housing Authority v. Guerra,395 George Guerra was hurt on the job
while working as a carpenter for the Housing Authority of the City of El
Paso (the Authority). Guerra was unable to work for several months but
was eventually released by his doctor to perform light duty. While he was
off work, the project Guerra had been hired for was completed and the
number of workers was substantially reduced. The Authority sent Guerra
a letter soon after he had been released by his doctor informing him that
no maintenance positions were open that could accommodate his limita-
tions. Guerra filed suit alleging that he had been terminated for filing a
workers' compensation claim and a jury awarded him $66,000.396
388. See id. at 652.
389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See Benedict, supra note 5, at 981-83 & nn.347-69 for a comprehensive analysis of
Texas statutory claims, burden of proof, and damages.
392. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1996) (formerly TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1993) (repealed 1993)).
393. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
394. See Texas Mexican Ry. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1998).
395. 963 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1998, pet. denied).
396. See id. at 949.
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On appeal, the Authority first asserted that there was no evidence of
causation to support a finding of liability. 397 In discussing this argument,
the court noted that it was not necessary to have filed a workers' compen-
sation claim in order for a worker to receive the protection of the anti-
retaliation provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.398 The worker
need only have taken steps toward instituting such a claim, such as in-
forming his employer of an on-the-job injury. Furthermore, while an em-
ployee must show a causal link between the protected activity and the
termination or discrimination, the worker need not show that the work-
ers' compensation claim was the sole cause of the retaliation. 399 The
court then went on to find sufficient evidence to support the jury's ver-
dict. For one, the court pointed out that Guerra was discharged after
giving notice of his injury to the Authority.40° Guerra also testified that
after he told his supervisor, Jose Robles, of his injury, Robles told "him
that he might as well leave his tools, that his job just ended, because any-
body in workers' compensation is cut out from the job. '40 1 The court
found that this testimony went beyond Guerra's mere subjective belief of
discrimination.4 02 While Robles denied making the statement and
claimed that he only told Guerra to fill out paperwork and then go to the
hospital, the jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve either side. Addi-
tionally, Robles testified at trial that he had no problem with the way that
Guerra reported his injury or the timeliness of such report but could not
explain a reprimand of Guerra that he had signed that documented
Guerra's failure to report and see the doctor immediately. The court
found that the jury could consider this inconsistency when considering
Robles' credibility.403 Furthermore, the Authority gave conflicting infor-
mation as to the reason for Guerra's termination. In a letter sent to
Guerra, the Authority mentioned physical limitations and the inability to
accommodate such limitations. In contrast, another employee of the Au-
thority testified that Guerra was let go because the temporary project
Guerra had been working on had ended. Consequently, the court held
that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of liability.
404
The Authority also argued that no evidence supported the submission
of the jury question regarding damages.40 5 After first pointing out that
the Authority had waived an argument that the damages question was
improper for failing to guide the jury on what should have been consid-
ered in arriving at an amount of actual damages, the court stated that
where, as in this instance, "a damage question is submitted in broad form,
with all damage elements combined in a single sum, so long as the aggre-
397. See id.
398. See id. at 950.
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. Id. at 950-51.
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gate evidence for all elements of damage supports the award," the award
must be upheld.40 6 The court found that Guerra's wages in the five years
between his discharge and the time of trial, without taking into considera-
tion raises, benefits, or overtime, would almost equal the $66,000 dam-
ages awarded by the jury.407 Also, the court found that the jury could
have reasonably concluded that Guerra's inability to find full-time work
in the interim was attributable to his wrongful discharge. 408 Guerra testi-
fied that the Authority had not discussed reasonable accommodations
with him, that he had not been informed of the opening of jobs that he
could have performed, and that he was not hired for any job where the
application process contained inquiry into the reasons why he left the
Authority.40 9 The court found the evidence sufficient to support the
jury's damages award.410
The Authority also complained about the trial court's failure to submit
several of its requested jury instructions. Specifically, the Authority com-
plained of the trial court's failure to submit its requested causation in-
struction.411 The court pointed out, however, that the trial court's
instruction that the employee must show that the workers' compensation
proceeding "was a reason" for the firing, was sufficiently similar to the
"but for" language now prescribed by the Texas Supreme Court to have
sufficiently informed the jury of the proper causation standard.412 Also,
the trial court's instruction followed the rule that instructions in statutory
violation cases should track the language of the statute as closely as possi-
ble. Although the Authority's requested instruction may have been cor-
rect, the court found it was not required and that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in failing to submit it.413 Finally, the court con-
cluded that the Authority's requested instructions on the "effect of a non-
discriminatory policy" and the "effect of other instances" of employee
termination also were not necessary and that the trial court's ruling in
these matters should be affirmed as well.414
In Vasquez v. Ritchey,4 15 plaintiff Dominga Vasquez worked for Haggar
Apparel Company (Haggar) until she voluntarily quit in 1987. Vasquez
contacted Haggar in 1990 about re-employment opportunities and she
was informed by her former supervisor, Connie Garcia, that there was an
opening and that Garcia would speak with floor manager Sylvia Barrera.
Garcia eventually contacted Vasquez and told her that she was hired and






412. Id. at 953 (citing Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450
(Tex. 1996)).
413. See id. at 953-54.
414. Id. at 954.
415. 973 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. granted, judgment vacated
w.r.m.)(Ritchey v. Vasquez, No. 98-0788, 1999 WL 47280 (Tex. 1999)) (respondent no
longer wished to prosecute litigation).
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would need to take a drug test. Vasquez completed and returned the
drug test form and Barrera again informed her that she was hired and
told her to report for work the following Monday. When she arrived at
the plant, Vasquez was told to wait in the lobby. After waiting for three
hours, she was told by Angel Ritchey that Haggar was not going to hire
her because she had too many workers' compensation claims. Vasquez
filed suit under former article 8307c of the TWCA (now section 451 of
the Texas Labor Code) claiming she was wrongfully discharged. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Haggar and Ritchey (collectively
Appellees).
On appeal, the Appellees argued that they were not liable because Vas-
quez never became an employee of Haggar since she never began work-
ing for Haggar.41 6 In support of this argument, the Appellees pointed to
Vasquez's admission that she never left the lobby when she arrived to
start work, that she never filled out any payroll or tax forms, and that she
never stepped foot on the production floor.417 The court stated that a
person becomes an employee for purposes of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act when "that person, pursuant to an oral or written contract for
hire, begins the service of his or her employer. '418 The court went on to
note that the only summary judgment evidence before it on the issue of
hiring, Vasquez's deposition testimony, indicated that she had been
hired.419 Therefore, the issue before the court was whether Vasquez was
"in the service" of Haggar at the time she was terminated. 420 Harmoniz-
ing conflicting case law, the court held that "a person begins the service
of his or her employer and thus becomes an employee under the workers'
compensation provisions, when, pursuant to a contract for hire, the em-
ployer obtains the right to control the employee."' 421 While generally the
right to control would arise when the employee actively began working
for the employer, it could also arise where an employee submits to a
physical exam on the employer's premises or where the employee shows
up for work at a designated location and remains at that location pending
further instruction from the employer.422 Noting that Appellees' motion
focused on the fact that Vasquez had not filled out payroll or tax forms,
or set foot on the production floor, the court found that the Appellees did
not show that they lacked the right to control Vasquez at the time she
arrived at the workplace. 42 3 According to the court, the evidence was
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the conclusion that Vasquez
had not been an employee of Haggar at the time of her termination.424
Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's award of summary
416. See id. at 407.
417. See id. at 408.
418. Id.
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judgment and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.425
In Gorges Foodservice, Inc. v. Huerta,426 Gorges Foodservice, Inc.
(Gorges) challenged a judgment won by Guadalupe Huerta following a
jury trial award of significant compensatory and punitive damages for,
among other claims, retaliation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Gorges challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's
determination that Huerta had been fired because he had filed a workers'
compensation claim or hired a lawyer to assist him with such a claim.
Noting that the workers' compensation claim need not be the sole cause
of Huerta's termination, the court pointed out several factors that would
(and ultimately did) serve as circumstantial evidence to establish a causal
link between filing a workers' compensation claim and subsequent termi-
nation including: "(1) knowledge of the compensation claim by those
making the decision on termination; (2) expression of a negative attitude
toward the employee's injured condition; (3) failure to adhere to estab-
lished company policies; (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to
similarly situated employees; and (5) evidence that the stated reason for
the discharge was false. '427
The court held that Huerta proved numerous instances of discrimina-
tion.428 For one, Huerta testified that he was reassigned to work as a
parking lot security guard after his injury and was forced to wear a yellow
fireman's hat that no one else was required to wear. He also testified that
he was not allowed to use a nearby restroom and was required to use a
more distant one that required him to walk thirty minutes. Huerta was
later warned that he would be fired if he was absent from his post for
such a period of time again. Later, when Huerta was transferred to an-
other Gorges facility to work as a security guard, he was told by employ-
ees there that they had been instructed by management not to let him
into the office, preventing him from using the telephone or the restroom.
Huerta also testified that when he brought a light duty release to Gorges,
they told him that they would not discuss a light duty assignment until he
had dismissed the lawyer he had retained, which Huerta did. Huerta also
stated that he brought a "full" release to Gorges on October 15, 1993, but
that on October 26, he received a letter from Gorges stating that they had
no positions available for a person with his medical restrictions and that
he would be at risk working at Gorges. While Gorges disputed many of
the facts above, the court held that the jury was the sole evaluator of the
credibility of the witness and could resolve the conflicts as it saw fit.429
The court then discussed several damages issues.430 First, Gorges
claimed that Huerta should not be allowed to recover damages for future
lost wages because he refused an offer of re-employment from Gorges.
425. See id.
426. 964 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. withdrawn).
427. Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
428. See id. at 666.
429. See id.
430. See id. at 669.
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The court noted that Huerta had an obligation to mitigate damages by
making a good faith effort to obtain and retain employment. 431 However,
rejection of a job offer from the former employer alone would not conclu-
sively prove failure to mitigate, an issue on which Gorges bore the burden
of proof.4 32 The only evidence of an offer of re-employment came from
Buford, who testified that after seeing Huerta's full duty release in De-
cember of 1993, she called to ask him to come back to work, which he
agreed to do. However, Huerta denied ever receiving such a phone call
and the jury was entitled to resolve this dispute in favor of Huerta.433
Gorges also challenged what it called an implicit jury finding that Huerta
had no future earning capacity. Huerta testified that he quit a newspaper
job because he was unable to concentrate after leaving Gorges and these
lapses in concentration caused him to miss several houses and have his
pay cut. The court held that, in light of Huerta's explanation for stopping
his newspaper job and the fact that he worked approximately fifty hours a
week driving a taxi, the jury had sufficient evidence to allow it to refuse
to consider any earnings he may have had from his newspaper job in its
calculation of future wages. 434 However, the court found the jury's disre-
gard of his wages from his taxi job to be problematic. 435 The court stated
that where a plaintiff's earning capacity is not totally destroyed, "the ex-
tent of the loss can best be shown by comparing the plaintiff's actual earn-
ings before and after the injury. '436 Finding no evidence to support the
jury's disregard of Huerta's taxi wages, the court suggested a remittitur of
the future wages damages to reflect the amount of his yearly wages from
his taxi job. 4 3 7
Gorges also challenged the award of backpay. Gorges claimed that no
backpay damages should be awarded after January 3, 1994, as that was
the date that Buford had instructed Huerta to return to work. As stated
earlier, however, the court found that Huerta denied that he had been
instructed to return to work. 438 Consequently, the jury was entitled to
resolve this credibility issue in Huerta's favor and had sufficient evidence
to allow it to calculate backpay damages up to the January 31, 1996 date
of trial.439 Furthermore, the court found that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support using October 1992, as the starting date for the calcula-
tion of backpay damages.44 Gorges had two other light duty positions








438. See id. at 670-71.
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[alithough Gorges had already placed Huerta in four different light
duty posts when it refused him light duty in October 1992, Huerta
presented evidence that Gorges itself was to blame for the problems
Huerta experienced as a parking lot attendant, and Huerta testified
that, although he had complained about the job of night security
guard, he was willing to accept that position if Gorges had no other
positions available. 442
The jury awarded Huerta $35,500 for backpay.443 However, the jury
apparently failed to take into consideration Huerta's earnings as a taxi
driver and from delivering newspapers. Nonetheless, Huerta remitted
$20,637.80 of this award. After calculating what it felt to be the proper
amount of backpay owed and the proper remittitur, the difference be-
tween the court's calculation and Huerta's award after remittitur was ap-
proximately $2,400. The court stated that an "appellate court should be
reluctant to disturb a personal injury damages award, particularly when a
substantial remittitur has been made."' 4 4 Consequently, in light of
Huerta's remittitur in this case, the court affirmed the jury's backpay
award.445
Gorges also challenged the award of mental anguish damages, although
it limited its appeal to the severe emotional distress standard of a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As Gorges did not address
the mental anguish component of a claim for retaliatory discharge, the
court affirmed the jury's award of $150,000 for past mental anguish.446
Gorges also challenged the award of prejudgment interest on the dam-
ages for lost wages in the future. The court noted that generally prejudg-
ment interest was not allowed on future damages.447 However, a statute
allows recovery of prejudgment interest on judgments in wrongful death,
personal injury, and property damage cases.448 The court found that the
loss of wages in the future was a purely economic loss.449 Economic loss
is not property damage or personal injury as set forth by the statute. 450
Consequently, the court found that prejudgment interest would not be
allowed on the damages for lost wages in the future. 451
Gorges also challenged both the evidence supporting and the amount
of the jury's $500,000 award of punitive damages. The jury was asked
whether Gorges acted willfully or maliciously. Malice can be either ac-
tual or implied.452 Actual malice is "characterized by 'ill-will, spite , evil
motive, or purposing the injuring of another"' while implied malice oc-
442. Id.
443. See id. at 662.







451. See id. at 673.
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curs "when wrongful conduct is intentional and without just cause or ex-
cuse." 453 The court found sufficient evidence to meet these standards.
454
Huerta presented evidence that Gorges was to blame for his failure to
perform the light duty assignments he received. Gorges' actions in deny-
ing Huerta access to a restroom on two of these assignments showed ill-
will and spite. Further evidence of ill-will and spite was presented by
Huerta's testimony that Gorges would not discuss his return to work until
he had terminated the attorney he had hired to assist him with his work-
ers' compensation claim. Also, after Huerta "brought a full duty release
to Gorges which removed any just cause or excuse Gorges had for contin-
uing to limit Huerta's employment in any way, Gorges wrote him the
October 26, 1993 letter that we have held provided ample evidence of
Huerta's termination. '455 Consequently, the court found the evidence le-
gally and factually sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
4 56
In considering whether the amount of punitive damages was reason-
able, the court was guided by "(1) the nature of the wrong, (2) the charac-
ter of the conduct involved, (3) the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer, (4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned,
and (5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice
and propriety. '457 As far as the nature of the wrong and the character of
the conduct, the court noted that Huerta testified that Gorges had humili-
ated and undermined his efforts to return to work on light duty, refused
to honor later light duty requests, insisted that he fire his attorney, and
fired him when he produced a full duty release.458 Furthermore, the
court held that culpability for these actions could only lie with Gorges
and its agents. 459 As far as the situation and sensibilities of the parties
were concerned, the court pointed out that Gorges was a corporation
with a net worth of approximately ten million dollars while Huerta was a
father of six who had never earned more than $9,000 in a year. 460 Addi-
tionally, Huerta also testified that no one wanted to give him a job after
his experience with Gorges. Finally, the court stated that it was hesitant
to substitute its sense of "a public sense of justice and propriety" for that
of the jury and that the facts of the case could be substantially offensive
to a public sense of justice and propriety.461 As a result, the court af-
firmed the amount of the jury's punitive damages award.462
Lastly, Gorges challenged the trial court's exclusion of two letters.
They included testimony regarding sending the letters, and testimony re-









461. Id. at 675.
462. See id.
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neys working on a purchase of Gorges, indicating that Gorges considered
Huerta to still be an employee and that he should return to work. In
some, but not all of this evidence, Gorges expressed the desire that
Huerta's return to work would end the need for any lawsuit. The court
found that Gorges had properly preserved error on this argument.4 63
Huerta argued that the evidence was properly excluded as offers of settle-
ment. Gorges asserted that offers of re-employment could only be ex-
cluded as settlement offers if some condition were attached to the offer,
with Gorges asserting the offer was unconditional. The court stated that
the test for whether such offers should be excluded was "whether some
concession is being made by a party to avoid litigation. ' '464 The court
found that Huerta was not required to make any concessions in order to
return to his job and that nothing in the excluded evidence would have
prohibited Huerta from going ahead with his lawsuit.465 Therefore, the
court had erred in excluding the evidence. 466 As to whether the error was
reversible, Gorges pointed out that without the evidence, a swearing
match existed between Gorges and Huerta as to whether he had been
offered re-employment. However, with the admission of this evidence,
there would have been uncontroverted evidence of repeated attempts to
bring Huerta back to work. While noting the general duty to mitigate
damages, the court pointed out that an offer of re-employment may be
rejected without violating the duty to mitigate where the sincerity of the
job offer is questionable. 467 The court held that in light of the jury's reso-
lution of various issues involving Gorges' good or bad faith toward
Huerta and the jury's resolution of all the other contested issues in favor
of Huerta, the jury would have found that the offers of re-employment
were insincere and that Huerta was entitled to reject them.4 68 Conse-
quently, the trial court's error in failing to admit the evidence was not
reversible. 469
In Urquidi v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.,470 Felipe Urquidi was ter-
minated from his employment with Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.
(Phelps), because Urquidi's work tolerance test indicated that he was un-
able to perform essential functions of his position. Urquidi sued Phelps,
alleging that he was terminated in violation of Texas Labor Code
§ 451.001. The trial court granted a directed verdict and rendered judg-
ment in favor of Phelps, and Urquidi appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the directed verdict in favor of Phelps.4 71
The court reasoned that while the company had a practice of requiring
463. See id. at 676 (making the trial court aware of the content of the letters and the




467. See id. at 677.
468. See id.
469. See id.
470. 973 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1998, no pet. h.).
471. See id. at 405.
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employees who were absent from work for more than thirty days due to
illness or injury to undergo a physical examination and be cleared by the
company doctor before returning to work, there was no evidence that the
policy had an adverse effect primarily on workers' compensation claim-
ants.472 The court concluded that the fact that the company's safety di-
rector advised the company nurse that Urquidi should not be returned to
work until he passed a drug test and physical, did not amount to a display
of an impermissible negative attitude toward workers' compensation
claimants, nor did that the safety director's insistence that nondiscrimina-
tory company procedures be followed. 473 The court also concluded that
Urquidi's subjective belief that he "passed" all physical examinations did
not support a finding of workers' compensation retaliation, inasmuch as
the results of many of the examinations were not positive and inasmuch
as Urquidi's assertions amounted to no more than conclusions inadequate
to raise a fact issue precluding a directed verdict.474 The court noted that
while Urquidi's doctor had provided him a release to return to work, the
release was given at Urquidi's insistence and against the doctor's medical
advice. 475 Because the refusal to allow Urquidi to return to work was
based on a functional capacity assessment showing that Urquidi could not
perform the job, the evidence did not show that the company doctor's
refusal to release Urquidi was false.476 The court additionally rejected
Urquidi's argument that the company's refusal to provide him a light duty
job indicated workers' compensation retaliation because Urquidi
presented no evidence that a light duty job was available. 477 Company
policy permitted light duty assignments where the employee's recupera-
tion was expected to take less than thirty work shifts, however, it was
apparent that Urquidi's recuperation would require much longer. Noting
that there was no evidence that this light duty policy had a discriminatory
application or impact on workers' compensation claimants in general or
on Urquidi in particular, the court concluded that it could not infer a
negative attitude or discrimination in violation of Section 451.001.478 The
court concluded that, because there was no evidence that Phelps would
not have terminated Urquidi when it did but for Urquidi's filing of the
workers' compensation claim, the trial court did not err in granting the
directed verdict. 479
In Castor v. Laredo Community College,480 Castor had a heated discus-
sion with his supervisor during which Castor became verbally abusive and
hostile. Six days later, Castor was terminated. Castor filed suit against
his former employer, Laredo Community College (LCC), alleging that he
472. See id. at 404.
473. See id.
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was terminated in response to his filing of a workers' compensation claim.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of LCC, and Castor
appealed.481
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that
LCC set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Castor's dis-
charge (i.e., Castor's insubordination).482 Moreover, Castor brought
forth no circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive.483 The court
noted that no inference of retaliatory motive was raised by the fact that
Castor received negative work evaluations following his workers' com-
pensation claim, inasmuch as Castor received his first negative work eval-
uation prior to filing his first workers' compensation claim and there was
a four month gap between Castor's termination and his last negative
work evaluation.484 The court concluded that there was no evidence that
LCC was aware of Castor's work limitations or that LCC had required
Castor to perform tasks in contravention to those limitations. 485 The fact
that one of the deans of the college had given Castor a letter containing
positive remarks about Castor's work performance did not support an
inference of retaliatory motive, because Castor was not terminated be-
cause of poor performance. 486 Finally, the court concluded that Castor's
affidavit testimony setting forth his belief that his workers' compensation
claims contributed to his discharge was not summary judgment proof, as
the affidavit amounted to no more than mere conclusions.487
In McIntyre v. Lockheed Corp.,488 R.W. McIntyre sued his former em-
ployer, Lockeed Corporation (Lockheed), alleging that he was wrong-
fully terminated in retaliation for his filing a workers' compensation
claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lockheed,
and McIntyre appealed. 489 The court of appeals affirmed the summary
judgment.490 The court noted that in order to recover for retaliatory dis-
charge, "the employee must prove that but for their filing of a workers'
compensation claim, the discharge would not have occurred when it
did. '491 The court concluded that McIntyre failed to establish a causal
link between his termination and the filing of his workers' compensation
claim.49
2
In Stewart v. Littlefield,493 Paul Stewart sued his former supervisor al-
leging that he had been discharged in retaliation for seeking and receiving
481. See id. at 784
482. See id. at 785-86.
483. See id. at 785.
484. See id. at 785-86.
485. See id. at 786.
486. See id.
487. See id.
488. 970 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet. h.).
489. See id. at 696.
490. See id. at 698.
491. Id. at 697.
492. See id. at 698.
493. 982 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
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workers' compensation benefits. Littlefield, Stewart's supervisor, argued
that he could not be individually liable as a supervisory employee and
that a claim for workers' compensation retaliation required an employer/
employee relationship. The trial court granted Littlefield's motion for
summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.494 Stewart claimed
that Section 1 of Article 8307c allowed for his suit to proceed against
Littlefield. Section 1 provided that, "[n]o person may discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee
has in good faith filed a claim ... under the Texas Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act."'495 Stewart asserted that the use of the term "person" encom-
passes both employers and fellow employees. The court of appeals
disagreed noting that no Texas case has directly addressed the issue; how-
ever, other courts have found that a person cannot discharge an em-
ployee unless that person was the employee's employer. 496
In Garcia v. Rainbo Baking Co.,497 Rafaela Garcia, a union member,
filed suit in state court against Rainbo Baking Company of Houston
(Rainbo), alleging that Rainbo violated Texas Labor Code § 451 by retal-
iating against her after she filed a workers' compensation claim and inten-
tionally inflicting emotional distress upon her. Rainbo removed the case
to federal court. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that
Garcia's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress required in-
terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and was therefore
preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).498 Plain-
tiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, which pleaded only a Sec-
tion 451 claim and did not assert a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Thereafter, Rainbo filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing that Garcia's section 451 claim was preempted by the
LMRA and that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the claim.
The district court concluded that the Section 451 claim was not pre-
empted by the LMRA and denied Rainbo's motion for summary judg-
ment.499 The court noted that section 301 of the LMRA preempts
application of state law only when such application would require the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.5110 The court con-
cluded that it was not necessary to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement in order to resolve Garcia's claim that Rainbo's refusal to al-
low her to return to work was motivated by illegal retaliation.501 Even if
Rainbo were able to show that Rainbo's treatment of her did not violate
the collective bargaining agreement, Garcia could still bring a cause of
action for retaliation if Rainbo also retaliated against her for filing a
494. See id. at 134.
495. Id. at 136.
496. See id. at 136-37.
497. 18 F. Supp. 2d 683 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
498. See id. at 685.
499. See id. at 689.
500. See id. at 688.
501. See id.
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workers' compensation claim.502 Thus, interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement was not "inextricably intertwined" with the section
451 claim.503 The court also noted that Garcia's right to be free from
retaliation was grounded in Texas statute, and not the collective bargain-
ing agreement, further supporting the court's holding that interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement was not inextricably intertwined
with Garcia's claim.5°4
The court then remanded the case to state court, explaining that, be-
cause the only remaining claim (i.e., section 451) was not preempted by
the LMRA, there was no remaining claim over which the court had origi-
nal jurisdiction.50 5 The court added that remand was required by 28
U.S.C. section 1445(c), which provides that an action arising under the
workers' compensation laws may not be removed to federal district
court.506
In Dempsey v. Beaumont Hospital, Inc.,50 7 Beaumont Hospital, Inc.
(the Hospital) provided an ERISA plan in lieu of workers' compensation
insurance. Dempsey filed suit in state court against the Hospital for neg-
ligence associated with an on-the-job injury. Soon thereafter, Dempsey
was terminated, and she amended her complaint to include a wrongful
discharge claim. The Hospital then removed the case to federal court,
contending that the wrongful discharge claim related to the ERISA plan
and was therefore preempted by ERISA, giving the court federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over the case. Dempsey filed a motion to remand, con-
tending that retaliatory discharge claims arise under state workers'
compensation laws and are not removable to federal court. The district
court denied Dempsey's motion to remand. 50 8 The court reasoned that
because the existence of an ERISA plan is a critical factor in establishing
liability for the wrongful discharge claim (i.e., whether Dempsey was ter-
minated in retaliation for filing a claim under the Hospital's ERISA
plan), the claim "relates to" ERISA and is thereby preempted.51 9
In Porter v. Mesquite Independent School District,510 Grace Porter sued
her employer, Mesquite Independent School District (the School Dis-
trict), for workers' compensation retaliation. Porter filed for and re-
ceived workers' compensation benefits from the School District during
the period she was out due to a work related injury. She claimed that the
School District took the following six adverse employment actions against
her in violation of section 451.001 of the Texas Workers' Compensation
Code: (1) Porter faced discriminatory attitudes when she returned to




506. See id. at 689-90
507. 3 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
508. See id. at 741.
509. Id. at 743.
510. No. 3:96-CV-3311-BF, 1998 WL 641814 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 1998).
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work; (2) the School District failed to give her a schedule that met her
physician's restrictions; (3) her request that she not be expected to par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities was not honored; (4) Porter's request
for Sick Bank Leave was denied; (5) the School District concurrently ran
Porter's leave under the Family Medical Leave Act with her Tenure
Leave; and (6) the School District sent her unsolicited information re-
garding early retirement. 511
The trial court granted the School District's motion for summary judg-
ment.512 The court found no authority to support Porter's contention
that being subjected to discriminatory attitudes violates section 451.001,
but that Porter must show that she suffered some sort of adverse employ-
ment action because of the discriminatory attitudes.513 The court also
found that the School District complied with the orders given by Porter's
doctor related to her physical restrictions.514 With regard to Porter's re-
quest that she not be expected to participate in extracurricular activities,
Porter's summary judgment evidence established only that she was ap-
proached by a teacher who may not have been informed of her restric-
tions and not by an administrator with knowledge of the restrictions, and
that the School District had in fact informed the other teachers that
Porter would not be able to assist in extracurricular activities such as the
PTA programs.515 With regard to the sick bank issue, Porter did not pro-
duce summary judgment evidence on the Sick Bank Leave program or its
policies, therefore Porter could not carry her burden of proof on this is-
sue.516 With regard to the concurrent running of her Tenure Leave and
FMLA Leave, Porter again failed to produce summary judgment evi-
dence that she was entitled to take the leave consecutively rather than
concurrently and, the court again found that Porter's summary judgment
evidence failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact. 517 With
regard to Porter's final claim that she was sent unsolicited information
regarding early retirement, the undisputed summary judgment evidence
showed that the School District sent the retirement packages to all em-
ployees who were eligible.518 Accordingly, the court concluded that
Porter could not show that the School District sent the information with
the intent to discriminate against her because she filed a workers' com-
pensation claim. 519
In Carrillo v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center,520 and Har-
ris County v. Louvier,52 1 the respective courts held that the antiretaliation
511. See id. at *3.
512. See id. at *5.
513. See id. at *3.
514. See id.
515. See id.
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provision of the TWCA (section 451 of the Labor Code) did not waive
the sovereign immunity of the Texas Tech University Health Sciences
Center and Harris County.522 Although the reasoning of the courts
slightly differs because of the varied factual backgrounds of the two cases,
essential to both cases is the finding that section 451 does not clearly and
unambiguously waive sovereign immunity for the entities involved.523
In Leger v. Texas EMS Corp.,524 Patricia Leger (Leger) sued her for-
mer employer, Texas EMS Corporation (Corporation), for among other
things, workers' compensation discrimination. Leger's claim arises from
her position as an emergency medical technician with the Corporation.
Leger reported that she had injured her back while attempting to lift a
patient. After this report, Leger was placed on light duty. However, she
was unable to sit for long periods of time so she took a paid temporary
leave of absence. Leger returned to work in July of 1994; and in February
of 1996, she reported that she was unable to work again because of recur-
ring back problems related to her injury. The Corporation gave Leger a
leave of absence and arranged for her to receive disability benefits.
Leger never returned to work after February of 1996. She filed suit
against the Corporation shortly thereafter. The Corporation was not a
subscriber to workers' compensation insurance. The court held that only
employees of subscribers to the TWCA can bring workers' compensation
claims, therefore, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. 525
In Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.,526 Azubuike sued his former em-
ployer, Fiesta Mart, Inc. (Fiesta) alleging, among other things, that he was
wrongfully terminated in retaliation for exercising his rights under the
Texas TWCA, in violation of section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fiesta, and
Azubuike appealed. 527 The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
on the workers' compensation retaliation claim.528 The court noted that,
since the appeal was briefed and argued, the Texas Supreme Court deter-
mined in Texas Mexican Railway Co. v. Bouchet529 that section 451.001 of
the Texas Labor Code does not apply to non-subscribers. 530 The court
concluded that because it was undisputed that Fiesta was not a subscriber
under the Texas TWCA, any alleged retaliation by Fiesta against
Azubuike for filing a workers' compensation claim was not actionable
under section 451, and summary judgment was proper.531
522. See Carrillo, 960 S.W.2d at 875.
523. See Carillo, 960 S.W.2d at 875; Harris County, 956 S.W.2d at 109.
524. 18 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
525. See id. at 697.
526. 970 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
527. See id. at 61-2.
528. See id. at 63.
529. 963 S.W.2d 52 (1998).




2. Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
In Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Franco,532 Odilia Franco
and Patricia Mendez claimed that their terminations from their positions
with Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. (Southwestern Bell) were in
retaliation for reports of sexual harassment. Franco and Mendez sued
Southwestern Bell for, among other claims, retaliatory discharge in viola-
tion of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The jury
found that retaliatory discharges had occurred, but awarded no damages
on their claims. Based on post-verdict motions, the trial court ordered
Southwestern Bell to reinstate Franco and awarded attorney's fees in
favor of Franco and Mendez. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed
the reinstatement order as to Franco. 533 The court of appeals also held
that, although an award of attorney's fees was proper in the case, Franco
and Mendez had not properly proven the fees and remanded for proof
supporting the fees. 534
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment on
Franco's reinstatement. 535 The court reasoned that the jury's finding that
Southwestern Bell discharged Franco and Mendez in retaliation for their
complaints of sexual harassment specifically empowered the trial court to
order the equitable relief of reinstatement. 536 Moreover, the court noted
that while Southwestern Bell produced some evidence that Franco's re-
turn might be disruptive, other evidence indicated that Southwestern Bell
was opening a new office and that the company's employees would be
willing to work with Franco. 537 The court concluded that because the
facts were disputed, it could not concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering reinstatement.538
The Texas Supreme Court next considered the award of attorney's fees
in favor of Franco and Mendez. The court explained that when the pre-
vailing party is awarded nominal or no damages, an award of attorney's
fees is usually inappropriate. 539 Thus, the court reversed the award of
attorneys' fees in favor of Mendez and rendered judgment that Mendez
not recover fees. 540 However, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
award of attorney's fees in favor of Franco.541 The court reasoned that,
although the jury awarded zero damages on the retaliatory discharge
claim, the court had awarded more than nominal damages - namely, equi-
table relief in the form of reinstatement. 542 The court concluded that an
532. 971 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1998). See supra notes 111-118 for additional facts and causes
of action.
533. See id. at 53.
534. See id. at 54.
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award of attorney's fees was therefore not an abuse of discretion. 543
In Rennels v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,544 Margaret Rennels was employed
by Sierra Laboratory Associates (SLA) as a pathologist. SLA contracted
with NME Hospitals, Inc. (Hospital) to provide pathology services.
While employed by SLA, Rennels overheard the Hospital CEO tell an
SLA shareholder that he had no plans to allow Rennels to become a
shareholder in SLA and requesting the SLA shareholder's help in
preventing Rennels from becoming a shareholder. Soon thereafter, SLA
advised Rennels that she would not be made a shareholder and condi-
tioned Rennels' continued employment upon her signing a release of
claims of employment discrimination. When Rennels refused, she was
terminated. Among other parties and claims, Rennels sued the Hospital
for retaliation in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (TCHRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Hospital on the basis that the Hospital was not her employer, and
Rennels appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling on the
TCHRA claim.545 The court explained that the TCHRA does not re-
quire a direct employer/employee relationship, instead prohibiting dis-
crimination not only by employers, but also by labor unions and
employment agencies. 546 The court concluded that even though the Hos-
pital did not directly employ Rennels, it had the power to adversely affect
her business opportunities in much the same manner as a direct em-
ployer, a labor union, or an employment agency.547 The court added that
by allowing claims against a third-party employer who adversely affects a
person's business opportunities, the court was advancing the stated goal
of the TCHRA to secure for persons freedom from discrimination.548
The court referenced the D.C. Circuit decision in Sibley Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Wilson,549 in which the court recognized a cause of action under
Title VII where persons have been unfairly prejudiced by discriminatory
interference with their employment opportunities by a party other than
their direct employer. 550
In Cornyn v. Speiser, Krause, Madole, Mendelsohn & Jackson,551 Olivia
Cornyn and a group of former employees of Southwest Airlines (Appel-
lants) filed suit against Speiser, Krause, Madole, Mendelsohn & Jackson
and two individual lawyers of the firm (Lawyers) claiming that the Law-
yers had committed malpractice by failing to file a lawsuit in federal court
on their behalf alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
543. See id.
544. 965 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. granted).
545. See id. at 740.
546. See id. at 738.
547. See id. at 738-39.
548. See id. at 739.
549. See id. (citing Sibley, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
550. See id. at 739.
551. 966 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
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(ADA). In response, the Lawyers filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting, among other claims, that the Appellants were estopped from
filing a suit under the ADA or the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act (TCHRA) because they had elected to file for workers' compensa-
tion and long term disability benefits during settlement negotiations. In
response to this motion, the Appellants brought suit against Southwest
Airlines (Southwest) alleging disability discrimination in violation of the
TCHRA. The trial court granted the Lawyers' motion for summary judg-
ment, after which Southwest filed its own motion for summary judgment,
asserting, among other things, the same estoppel argument raised by the
Lawyers.552 Southwest's summary judgment was granted.
On appeal, the court noted that if the Appellants were estopped from
asserting an ADA claim by virtue of their disability or workers' compen-
sation applications, summary judgment in favor of Southwest would be
appropriate. 553 Summary judgment also would have been proper on the
legal malpractice claims because, if the Appellants were so estopped, the
Lawyers acted properly in failing to file suit and continuing out-of-court
settlement negotiations with Southwest.554 Each of the Appellants ad-
mitted to applying for workers' compensation and long term disability
benefits. Connected to these applications, each of the Appellants, along
with their health care providers, certified that they were unable to work
and, in some instances, were totally disabled. Furthermore, all of the Ap-
pellants received some type of disability or impairment benefit based
upon the unequivocal assertion that she could no longer work. The court
stated that if an individual is unable to perform their job even with ac-
commodation, then the individual is not entitled to protection under the
TCHRA.555 The court also noted that many federal courts had held that
a plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability if the plaintiff
has represented that she is unable to perform the essential functions of
the job to obtain disability benefits. 556 However, the court pointed out
that Texas courts have held that application for and receipt of disability
benefits does not automatically foreclose an ADA suit.557 The courts
have held that the focus should be on the substance of the representa-
tions made by the plaintiff and his agent in seeking disability benefits.558
Furthermore, these "holdings indicate that an unqualified statement of
disability cannot be later mitigated by statements that work could be ac-
complished if accommodations are made," thereby requiring such miti-
gating statements to be made at the time of the disability application. 559
552. See id. at 647
553. See id. at 648.
554. See id.
555. See id. at 649.
556. See id. at 648-49.
557. See id. at 650.
558. See id. at 651.
559. Id.
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The court found that each of the appellants made an unqualified state-
ment that she was unable to work sometime during the pendency of her
claim with the EEOC.560 While some of the appellants filed affidavits in
response to Southwest's motion for summary judgment claiming that they
had never stated that they could not work if reasonable accommodations
were made, the court held that the assertions "create[d] the very inconsis-
tency at issue and they come too late. '561 Moreover, the affidavits did
not create a fact issue because their content was implied by the very as-
sertion of an ADA claim and, under Texas law, self-serving affidavits re-
garding a witness's state-of-mind or subjective belief are mere
conclusions and not competent summary judgment evidence. 562 There-
fore, Appellants were estopped from making a TCHRA claim and, con-
sequently, an ADA claim.563 The appellate court affirmed the awards of
summary judgment for the Lawyers on the legal malpractice claim and
for Southwest on the TCHRA claim.564
In Norwood v. Litwin Engineers & Constructors, Inc.,565 Durand P.
Norwood (Norwood) filed suit against his former employer, Litwin Engi-
neers & Constructors, Inc. (Litwin), alleging that he was fired because he
was disabled by diabetes, in violation of the TCHRA. The district court
granted summary judgment for Litwin, and Norwood appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's opinion and re-
manded the case. 566 The court noted that there were fact issues as to
whether Norwood was disabled within the meaning of the TCHRA and
whether Litwin's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
Norwood was a pretext for discrimination. 567 In addition, the court
stated that summary judgment on the grounds that Norwood's employers
did not know of Norwood's diabetes was improper because agency law
dictates that notice to an agent is deemed notice to the principal if the
agent's acts were within his authority and vice versa. 568 Thus, Litwin's
knowledge of Norwood's diabetes could be imputed to his employers.5 69
The court addressed two additional issues. The first issue was whether
an oath under federal law was sufficient under state law if the federal
oath was not notarized.570 The defendants claimed that the court did not
have jurisdiction over this case because Norwood's oath was not nota-
rized. The court indicated that an oath that subjects an individual to per-





564. See id. at 652.
565. 962 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).




570. See id. at 222-23.
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the Texas Labor Code. 571 The second issue was whether the after-ac-
quired evidence doctrine barred Norwood's discrimination claim because
Norwood lied on his employment application and resume. The court
stated that the after-acquired evidence doctrine, if proven, would not act
as a complete bar to recovery, but would only bar Norwood's reinstate-
ment and his damages incurred after the date that Litwin discovered the
alleged lie on Norwood's employment application and resume. 572
In Perez v. Living Centers-Devcon, Inc.,573 Carmen Perez sued her for-
mer employer (Living Centers) for sexual harassment. The trial court
dismissed Perez' lawsuit because she failed to exhaust administrative
remedies under either the TCHRA or Title VII.574 Perez claimed that
her lawsuit was a common law action brought against her former em-
ployer for physical, sexual, and emotional abuse committed by one of
Living Centers' supervisors. She argued that the effect of the trial court's
order was to hold that her claim could only exist under Title VII or the
TCHRA. She claimed that her action was one in tort, and therefore was
properly maintainable under common law. Living Centers contended
that Texas law holds the TCHRA to be the exclusive remedy for the con-
duct about which Perez complained. Living Centers further asserted that
because Perez failed to file a claim with the EEOC or the TCHR within
the required time frame her suit was barred by her failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the TCHRA was not the
exclusive remedy for Perez' claims and that Perez' failure to file a com-
plaint with the TCHR did not preclude her from pursuing common law
causes of action that arise from the same facts as any sexual harassment
claim.575 The court noted that the TCHRA contains no intent to serve as
an exclusive remedy, nor an intent to preclude common law causes of
action.576 The court found the opposite proposition to be implied from
Section 21.211. 577 The court also found that nothing in the legislative his-
tory of the TCHRA indicates that legislators meant for the TCHRA to
preclude common law causes of action. 578 The court further noted that
the legislative history of the TCHRA indicates that the legislators be-
lieved the law would give Texans an additional remedy for employment
related issues.579 The court, however, did state that a plaintiff cannot first
sue an employer for a non-TCHRA cause of action for conduct arising
from the same facts as employment discrimination and then pursue a
claim of employment discrimination through the administrative review
571. See id. at 223.
572. See id. at 223-24.
573. 963 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
574. See id. at 871.
575. See id. at 875.
576. See id. at 874.
577. See id.
578. See id. at 875.
579. See id.
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system established under the TCHRA. 580
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie,581 Jeremiah McKenzie sued Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) for violating the TCHRA by firing him be-
cause of his race. McKenzie managed the tire, battery, and accessory
(TBA) department at Wal-Mart's North Tyler store. The poorly perform-
ing TBA department improved under McKenzie's guidance, and he re-
ceived favorable evaluations from his supervisor. McKenzie, however,
had difficulty with two former TBA department managers who still
worked in the store, particularly Cathy Laughlin. Laughlin allegedly dis-
played a negative attitude towards McKenzie and told him that she
"wasn't going to take any orders from a young black person. ' 582 After
McKenzie complained to the store manager, Rick Rumfelt, about Laugh-
lin, her conduct worsened. Rumfelt also allegedly told McKenzie that he
would have to do as he was told because he was the "black sheep of the
family. ' 583 After a jury trial, McKenzie was awarded significant damages,
including punitive damages and attorney's fees.584
On appeal, Wal-Mart alleged that punitive damages were improper in
this case because the controlling version of the TCHRA, former Article
5221k, did not allow recovery of such damages. However, the court
found that Wal-Mart had failed to preserve error on this issue by not
raising it before the submission of the court's charge to the jury.585 Wal-
Mart also argued legal and factual insufficiency of the evidence to support
punitive damages and the finding that Wal-Mart committed an unlawful
employment practice against McKenzie. On these issues, the court found
that the court reporter did not transcribe all of the questions and answers
in the videotaped depositions of two witnesses which were seen and
heard by the jury, and the videotapes were not in the record before the
court.586 Therefore, in the absence of a complete or agreed statement of
facts, the argument was overruled. 587 The court also found sufficient evi-
dence to support the $141,975 award of attorney's fees. 588 Wal-Mart's
claims that damages for mental anguish and loss of credit were not al-
lowed by Article 5221k were also held to have been waived by failing to
raise them before the court's charge was submitted to the jury and be-
cause of the lack of a complete or agreed statement of facts.589 Finally,
Wal-Mart argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
hearsay testimony of Robert Cluff, a TBA department manager at an-
other Wal-Mart store, through the deposition of Tammy Price, a Wal-
Mart employee. Price testified that she heard Cluff say of McKenzie
580. See id.
581. 979 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet. h.).
582. Id. at 366.
583. Id.
584. See id. at 366-67.
585. See id. at 367.






"'[w]e finally got rid of that n .-- -,591 The court held that Cluff's state-
ment was not hearsay but was an operative fact and was not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 591 Consequently, the court over-
ruled Wal-Mart's evidentiary argument as well.5 92
In Gorges Foodservice, Inc. v. Huerta,593 Gorges Foodservice, Inc.
(Gorges) challenged a judgment won by Guadalupe Huerta following a
jury trial award of significant compensatory and punitive damages.
Gorges first challenged the evidence supporting the jury's finding that
Huerta had a "disability" for purposes of the TCHRA. A disability
means "a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least
one major life activity, or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment. '5 94 On appeal, Gorges failed to address the issue of whether
Huerta was regarded as having a disability. Consequently, the court held
that Gorges had waived its right to complain about the disability
finding.595
Gorges next challenged the jury's finding that Huerta had been dis-
charged because of his disability. Rejecting case law from federal courts
on the issue, the court first found that Huerta was not required to prove
that his disability was the sole cause of the discriminatory conduct he
faced.596 The court then focused on a letter Gorges wrote to Huerta stat-
ing that they had no positions available for a person with his medical
restrictions and that he would be at risk working at Gorges.597 Gorges
argued that this letter did not actually terminate Huerta. The court how-
ever found that the letter's references to lack of "permanent" light duty
positions and that Huerta would be at risk working at Gorges, indicated
that Gorges had no intent of returning Huerta to work.598 The court re-
jected Gorges claim, finding sufficient evidence to support an implied
finding that the letter terminated Huerta's employment. 599
Gorges also challenged the jury's finding that it had failed to reason-
ably accommodate Huerta. Gorges argued that it tried four different
light duty posts for Huerta following his injury and he was unable to per-
form any of them. Both sides agreed that Huerta was moved from his
first two light duty positions because they aggravated his medical condi-
tion. However, Huerta testified that these injuries resulted from Gorges'
failure to respect his light duty status. Regarding the other two jobs,
Huerta testified he had difficulties with one because Gorges denied him
access to a restroom (which Gorges denied) and difficulties with the other
590. Id. at 366.
591. See id. at 368.
592. See id.
593. 964 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. withdrawn). See supra
notes 426-69 for additional facts and causes of action.
594. Id. at 667.
595. See id.
596. See id.
597. See id. at 666.
598. See id.
599. See id. at 667.
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job because it was a night shift. Huerta admitted he discussed his diffi-
culty in adjusting to working nights with Gorges but claimed that he ac-
cepted the post when he was told it was the only job available. The court
held that the jury was the sole evaluator of the credibility of the witnesses
and could resolve conflicts as it desired.600 Furthermore, Gorges' policy
indicated that there were two more light duty jobs that were never of-
fered to Huerta. Consequently, the court felt that there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that Gorges failed to reasonably
accommodate Huerta.601
Gorges made extensive challenge to the damages awarded including a
challenge to the award of attorney's fees. Gorges claimed that the award
of attorney's fees was a jury issue and that the trial judge had erred in
making this determination for himself. However, the court of appeals
pointed out that under the TCHRA, attorney's fees are awarded as part
of the costs. 602 According to the court, the trial court was the proper
authority to determine and award costs and, consequently, was the
proper authority to award attorney's fees under the TCHRA.60 3 The
court also rejected Gorges' assertion that the use of a lodestar multiplier
was inappropriate. 6°4
In Gold v. Exxon Corp.,605 Gerald Gold was terminated from his posi-
tion as a staff tax agent in the midst of a reduction in force. Exxon
targeted two groups, those agreeing to resign or retire and those involun-
tarily terminated or retired due to low performance evaluations. Gold
was terminated for poor performance and he filed suit for age discrimina-
tion in violation of the TCHRA. Exxon moved for and was awarded
summary judgment and Gold appealed.
The court first addressed Exxon's contention that Gold had failed to
establish that he was qualified to assume another position at the time of
discharge, a necessary element of a prima facie case in a termination in a
reduction in force context.60 6 Exxon argued that Gold's poor perform-
ance made him unqualified for the job. However, the court noted that
questions of performance were usually reserved for the second and third
phases of the burden-shifting analysis in employment discrimination
cases.60 7 As Exxon alleged only that Gold's work performance was poor,
not that he was absolutely incapable of performing the job of staff tax
agent, Gold had established this element of his prima facie case.608 Gold
also established the final element of intent for his prima facie case by
showing Exxon retained younger staff tax agents during its reduction in
600. See id. at 668.
601. See id.
602. See id. at 672.
603. See id.
604. See id.
605. 960 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).






Determining that Exxon had produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
rationale for the termination (low performance evaluations), the court
discussed whether Gold had established pretext. 610 The court rejected
Gold's contention that pretext could be inferred from the subjective na-
ture of Exxon's evaluation system, finding this fact within itself to be
"wholly innocuous. '611 Gold also argued that the affidavits of two Exxon
employees as to the reasons for his termination made summary judgment
improper because Exxon's interrogatory answers indicated that these
persons were not responsible for the decision to terminate Gold. How-
ever, the court believed that the two employees, with supervisory capac-
ity over Gold, were competent to testify to the reasons behind Gold's
termination even if they did not actually make the decision themselves. 61 2
Gold also attempted to show pretext by alleging that his evaluations
were "improper, contrived and false. ' 613 The only evidence he had of
falsity, however, was his own sworn statement to that fact, and his allega-
tion that the evaluations were improper and contrived reflected merely
his subjective belief based on Gold's own inferences from remarks his
supervisor made about the abilities of other agents who happened to be
younger. 614 Importantly, the court then went on to say that the TCHRA
would require a heightened standard of proof as in federal employment
discrimination cases and that, when applied to Gold's claims, his mere
subjective belief of age discrimination was insufficient to overcome Ex-
xon's motion for summary judgment.615 The court felt that this applica-
tion of an elevated standard of proof was in keeping with the legislative
intent of the TCHRA to correlate state law with federal law in the area of
employment discrimination and that the standard would allow courts to
manage cases in this complex area of the law.616 In closing, the court
stated that it was affirming the award of summary judgment for Exxon
because Gold had failed to offer any proof to support his subjective be-
liefs of age discrimination. 617
In Garcia v. Schwab,618 Debra Garcia filed suit against Paul Schwab,
and her employer Valley Mortgage Company claiming, among other
things, sexual harassment. Garcia had been hired as a loan officer for
Valley Mortgage, for which Schwab served as president and general man-
ager. While Garcia was supervised directly by Belinda Garza, Schwab
was involved in Garcia's training and had direct, daily contact with her.
Garcia alleged that Schwab engaged in a host of offensive conduct, in-
609. See id. at 383.
610. See id.




615. See id. at 385.
616. See id.
617. See id.
618. 967 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h).
1066 [Vol. 52
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
cluding staring at and commenting on her breasts, touching his genitals,
frankly discussing highly personal and sexual matters with her, remarking
on her appearance, staring at and commenting on the photograph of a
female client, commenting on the appearance of other women, making
repeated sexual references, insulting her, and yelling at her. After several
counseling sessions in which she was informed that her training progress
was insufficient, Garza ultimately fired Garcia for incompetence. The
district court granted summary judgment for defendants on Garcia's quid
pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims and
Garcia appealed, but only on her hostile work environment harassment
claim.
The court first dispensed with Valley Mortgage's claim that Garcia had
failed to plead a claim for hostile work environment harassment. 61 9 Val-
ley Mortgage based its argument on Garcia's reference to her firing as
evidence of harm suffered, which Valley Mortgage contended was related
to a quid pro quo claim. While agreeing that the firing was evidence only
for a quid pro quo claim, the court did not agree that such a claim fore-
closed Garcia's charge of hostile work environment harassment. 620 The
court held that Garcia's pleadings sufficiently stated a cause of action for
hostile work environment harassment. 621 Turning to the facts, the court
found that while:
Garcia's summary judgment evidence reveals Schwab engaged in re-
peated incidents of ill-mannered or undesirable behavior, we find, as
a matter of law, these instances did not amount to the quality or
severity of misbehavior designed to subject Garcia to sufficiently
hostile or abusive conditions to materially alter her condition of
employment.622
Garcia presented no evidence of intimidation or discriminatory ridicule
or insult which interfered unreasonably with her job performance. 623
Furthermore, although noting this was not dispositive, the court stated
that Garcia presented no evidence that she voiced any objections to
Schwab or Garza regarding her discomfort with Schwab's conduct. 624 Fi-
nally, the court found that the most serious incidents did not show a pat-
tern of behavior likely to poison the work environment and took place
outside of the workplace in a social setting.625 Consequently, the court
affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment for Valley Mort-
gage on Garcia's hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.626
In McMillon v. Texas Department of Insurance,627 two former employ-
ees of the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) filed suit against TDI








627. 963 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
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alleging, based on separate factual circumstances, that they were sub-
jected to unlawful discrimination and retaliation.
Laura McMillon complained to TDI that she had been subjected to
sexual harassment by a coworker. While investigating the sexual harass-
ment claim, TDI became aware that several employees supervised by
McMillon had complaints about her communication skills and manage-
ment style. As a result of these complaints and a perceived inability to
improve over time, McMillon was transferred to the special projects divi-
sion. TDI later terminated McMillon and contended that the termination
was the result of continued work deficiencies. McMillon sued TDI for
retaliation and sexual harassment under the TCHRA. The jury found
that McMillon had not been subjected to retaliation or discrimination,
and the court rendered judgment that McMillon take nothing. McMillon
filed a motion for new trial, alleging there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict. The motion was denied, and McMillon
appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of McMillon's motion for new
trial as to the sexual harassment claim.628 The court explained that when
McMillon complained of her coworker's unwanted sexual comments and
conduct, TDI quickly investigated the allegations. 629 After concluding
that McMillon had been the subject of unwanted sexual harassment, TDI
demoted the coworker, required the coworker to attend sexual harass-
ment training, and required the coworker to review the agency's policies
regarding sexual harassment. 630 The court concluded that although the
coworker was not fired, the actions were prompt and remedial, particu-
larly considering that the harassment stopped after TDI transferred the
coworker. 631 Moreover, while McMillon complained that the investigator
was biased against her in focusing not only on the sexual harassment
complaint, but also on other employees' complaints about McMillon's
communication skills, the jury was free to disregard the argument, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the investigation substantiated McMillon's
complaint against her coworker. 632 The court concluded that the verdict
on the sexual harassment issue was not against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence.633
The court of appeals also affirmed the denial of McMillon's motion for
new trial as to the retaliation claim.634 The court reasoned that TDI had
presented evidence that it did not transfer or fire McMillon because of
any complaint of sexual harassment, but because of her deficient job per-
formance.635 The court also concluded that the jury was free to believe
628. See id. at 941.




633. See id. at 939-940.
634. See id. at 941.
635. See id. at 940.
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TDI's professed reason for terminating McMillon, even though TDI did
not have much documentation of McMillon's allegedly poor work
performance.636
Judith Mitchell had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that TDI failed to promote her
because of her race and gender. While the charge was pending, TDI em-
ployed Audrey Selden, who became Mitchell's immediate supervisor.
Selden transferred Mitchell to another position with no managerial re-
sponsibilities in another division. Thereafter, Selden and Mitchell had a
tense working relationship, culminating in an angry exchange. Selden
was upset with Mitchell and told Mitchell they would continue their con-
versation on Monday. Mitchell called in sick on Monday and Tuesday.
While away from the office, Mitchell signed a conciliation agreement,
resolving the prior discrimination complaint. On Wednesday when
Mitchell returned, Selden informed Mitchell that she could resign or be
fired. Mitchell took an administrative leave of absence and was ulti-
mately terminated. Mitchell filed suit, alleging that she was subjected to
unlawful retaliation, in violation of the TCHRA. The jury found that
Mitchell had not been subjected to retaliation, and the court rendered
judgment that Mitchell take nothing. Mitchell filed a motion for new
trial, alleging there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
The motion was denied, and Mitchell appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Mitchell's motion for new
trial as to the retaliation claim.637 TDI produced evidence that it did not
fire Mitchell because of her discrimination complaint, but because of her
deficient job performance. 638 Moreover, the court noted that a lack of
documentation of the allegedly poor work performance is not enough, in
and of itself, to establish a retaliation claim.639 In addition, the court
noted that while Selden did reveal her intent to fire Mitchell one day
after Mitchell signed a conciliation agreement resolving the prior discrim-
ination charge, Selden did not know that the conciliation agreement was
before Mitchell for signing when considering firing Mitchell. 640 The court
added that when Mitchell suspected she would be fired, she stayed away
from the office and made arrangements to sign the conciliation agree-
ment before returning the work. 641 The court noted that the record sup-
ported the inference that Mitchell might have arranged the close
temporal proximity between the resolution of the prior discrimination
charge and her termination.642 The court concluded that the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence did not favor Mitchell on the causation ele-
ment of her retaliation claim, and that the evidence was factually
636. See id.








sufficient to support the jury's verdict.643
In Cox & Smith, Inc. v. Cook,6 " Mary Cook (Cook) complained that
her supervisor, George Casbeer, made sexually discriminatory comments
towards her. Cook brought a retaliatory discharge suit against her former
employer, Cox & Smith, Incorporated (C & S), claiming she was dis-
charged for reporting her supervisor in violation of the TCHRA. The
district court entered summary judgment against C & S and it appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's opinion, stating that
Cook had failed to meet the burden of proof under the McDonnell-
Douglas analysis by demonstrating a good faith, reasonable belief that
her employer engaged in an activity made unlawful by the TCHRA.645
The court noted that the discriminatory comments Cook complained of
do not support a jury's finding that they caused Cook to believe, in good
faith, that Casbeer had engaged in sexual harassment or that any such
belief would have been objectively reasonable. 646 Specifically, the court
noted that three of the incidents were not sexual in nature and that the
two sexual comments were tenuous support for Cook's good faith belief
because these comments were in social settings during nonwork hours.647
Finding the evidence factually insufficient, the court reversed and ren-
dered judgment that Cook take nothing.648
In Passons v. University of Texas at Austin,649 Donna Passons (Passons)
sued her former employer, the University of Texas School of Law (the
University), for sex discrimination in violation of the TCHRA. Specifi-
cally, Passons claimed that her supervisors forced her to resign by creat-
ing an abusive and hostile work environment. In addition, Passons
alleged that the University underpaid her and then hired a man to replace
her at a higher salary. Passons claimed these employment decisions were
made because of her sex, and thus the University's actions constituted
gender discrimination. The case was tried to a jury, which failed to find
that Passons was either constructively discharged as the result of discrimi-
nation or discriminated against in terms of pay. Passons appealed the
verdict. The court of appeals reversed the verdict because of an error in
the jury charge.650 Specifically, the court held that adding the word "the"
before the word "basis" in the jury charge stating that "Donna Passons'
sex must be the basis for the employer's conduct" created a sole cause
instruction regarding causation. 651 The court held that the appropriate
standard of causation under the TCHRA is a "but for" standard.652 Due
to this error in the jury charge, the court declined to address any other
643. See id.
644. 974 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
645. See id. at 227, 229.
646. See id.
647. See id.
648. See id. at 227, 229.
649. 969 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
650. See id. at 564.
651. Id. at 562.
652. See id. at 563.
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issues and reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the
case for a new trial.653
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 654 Wendy Davis sued Wal-Mart
Stores for sexual harassment. Davis complained of the conduct of the
store manager, Tom Patterson, who did things such as commenting that
she looked good in jeans, standing too close to her, rubbing her arms, and
poking her ribs. Davis alleged that she would wear slacks on days when
she needed to climb ladders, however on days she was wearing a dress,
Patterson would find reasons for Davis to climb a ladder and would tell
her to climb it so that he could have a better view. Patterson also re-
marked at a company event in the presence of Davis' husband that he
had wanted Davis to wear a short skirt and bend over so he would have
something to look at. Davis complained that during a counseling session
where she began to cry, Patterson placed his chair in front of hers, putting
his legs on either side of hers, and pinned her knees between his. Davis
alleged Patterson then grabbed her by the thighs, told her to stop crying,
and held on for two or three minutes even after she told him to stop. A
similar event occurred a few months later. Davis complained to Wal-
Mart's regional personnel manager. Wal-Mart investigated the complaint
and transferred Patterson out of the store later that same year. The jury
awarded close to $200,000 in actual damages, $32,215 as equitable back
pay and $56,165 as equitable front pay. Wal-Mart appealed.
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, re-
jecting Wal-Mart's contention that it took prompt remedial action. 655
The evidence showed that the in-store personnel manager did not know
anything about Wal-Mart's sexual harassment policy and procedures, and
had no training in any policies and procedures for dealing with sexual
harassment. The regional vice president and regional personnel manager
both admitted that Patterson had violated Wal-Mart's sexual harassment
policy. Furthermore, the regional vice president testified that he had al-
ready decided to remove Patterson from the store before the investiga-
tion of Davis' complaints were initiated.656 Finally, the regional
personnel manager, who investigated Davis' complaints, testified that the
regional vice president never told her that Patterson was transferred to
protect Davis.
The record also contained evidence that Wal-Mart failed to follow its
own policies and procedures in dealing with Patterson after Davis' com-
plaint. Sexual harassment usually results in immediate termination per
Wal-Mart policy. In Patterson's case, no coaching form was even placed
in his file indicating that he had been disciplined for sexual harassment.
In addition, Patterson's transfer to an assistant manager's position in San
Antonio did not result in financial loss to him. The court further noted
653. See id. at 565.
654. 979 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
655. See id. at 33.
656. See id. at 36.
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that within six months of transfer, Patterson was again a manager, evi-
dencing an inconsistency with Wal-Mart's policies, which require that em-
ployees under active counseling for improvements must demonstrate
satisfactory performance during a one year period before they can be
promoted or transferred. 657 The court found that Wal-Mart's actions to-
wards Patterson and Davis did not appear to have been designed to serve
any significant Title VII purpose.658
Finally, Wal-Mart complained that the TCHRA does not provide for
the award of front pay. The court of appeals held that "'a trial court's
award of front pay constitutes a legitimate exercise of its equity powers,'
and that the trial court had determined all matters concerning front
pay. 65
9
In Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, Inc.,660 Azubuike filed suit against Fiesta
Mart, Inc. (Fiesta), his former employer, alleging, among other things,
that Fiesta denied him pay increases, promotions, and transfers and ulti-
mately terminated his employment in violation of the TCHRA.661 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fiesta, and Azubuike
appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Fiesta. The court reasoned that Azubuike had presented no evi-
dence showing that he was paid less or treated differently than other em-
ployees with respect to transfers or promotions. 662 Moreover, Fiesta
proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Azubuike's dis-
charge-Azubuike's failure to report to work as scheduled. 663 Azubuike
failed to present any evidence that Fiesta's proffered nondiscriminatory
reason for the termination was pretextual or any proof that others who
had failed to report to work as scheduled were treated any differently.
Regarding Azubuike's complaint of retaliation for letters he wrote to
management complaining of discriminatory treatment, the court rea-
soned that even if it were assumed that the letters put management on
notice of Azubuike's discrimination complaints, Azubuike failed to show
that the letters, which were written several years before his termination,
were the cause of or motivation for his termination. 664 The court ex-
plained that the lapse of time between the letters and Azubuike's termi-
nation, without more, is too long to establish a causal connection between
657. See id.
658. See id. at 39.
659. See id. at 45 (quoting City of Austin v. Gifford, 825 S.W.2d 735, 743-44 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, no writ)).
660. 970 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.).
661. See id. at 62. Azubuike also alleged disability discrimination under the TCHRA.
However, finding that Azubuike was capable of performing a wide range of jobs and had
failed to show that he was severely restricted in his ability to perform work-related func-
tions in general, the court concluded that Azubuike's physical problems did not constitute
such severe barriers to employment or other life functions as to rise to the level of a disa-
bility subject to protection under the TCHRA.
662. See id. at 64.
663. See id.
664. See id. at 65.
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the letters and the termination. 665 The court also reasoned that the con-
tent of the letters did not support an inference that Azubuike was engag-
ing in a protected activity (i.e., complaining of discrimination), inasmuch
as Azubuike's race, color, or national origin were not even identified in
the letters.666
In Stewart v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 667 plaintiff Starla Stewart
resigned from her position as a Reactor Plant Operator at Houston Light-
ing and Power Company's (HL&P) South Texas Project Nuclear Electric
Generating Station (STP) alleging a host of violations of the TCHRA.
First, Plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion to a Reactor Op-
erator (RO) position and treated differently in the workplace because of
her sex. Giving broad latitude to Stewart's affidavit and assuming all of
her conclusory allegations to be true, the court found Stewart's claim suf-
ficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination under the familiar
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.668 The court then discussed
HL&P's legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its conduct. 669 First,
HL&P presented evidence that Stewart was not qualified for the RO po-
sition. Stewart never applied for the Licensed Operator Training (LOT)
class necessary to become a RO. Also, her credentials were inferior to
not only those who were selected for the class but also several employees
who were not selected, including several males. The court pointed out
that Stewart had no supervisory experience, no prior nuclear experience,
and only one recommendation from a supervisor. 670 Also, she did not
have a college degree. Additionally, seniority was of no consequence be-
cause the RO position was not subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment.671 Secondly, HL&P proved that the RO position was heavily
regulated and that it could lose its accreditation to conduct its own train-
ing program if the failure rate on the final Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion licensing examination for the RO position became too high. As a
result of these rigorous requirements, HL&P hired a number of ex-Navy
personnel with prior experience on nuclear powered vessels. While many
of these personnel were men due to the composition of Navy submarines,
HL&P argued that any disparate impact in its hiring was not actionable
as it had no control over the gender makeup of Navy personnel.672 The
court found as a matter of law that HL&P's evidence regarding Stewart's
lack of qualifications and the strict requirements for the RO position es-
tablished a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for HL&P's decisions
with respect to Stewart. 673
665. See id.
666. See id.
667. 998 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1998).








Moving to the issue of pretext, the court found that Stewart failed to
show HL&P's actions were a pretext for promotion discrimination be-
cause she failed to rebut the evidence presented that she was not quali-
fied. 674 Stewart put forward no proof of her qualifications for the RO.
position outside of the fact that she received ratings from "good" to "su-
perior" on evaluations and her own self-serving affidavit containing her
opinion that she did not get promoted because she was a woman. 675 In
fact, the court found that the only evidence supporting her claims that she
was denied promotion or treated unfairly because of her sex was her per-
sonal beliefs. 676 As speculation and belief and conclusory allegations
were insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext, the court granted
HL&P's motion for summary judgment on Stewart's claims of intentional
sex discrimination under the TCHRA.677
Stewart also made a claim for hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment, relating various alleged incidents to support her claim.678 The
court found that none of the identified incidents rose to the level of creat-
ing a hostile work environment.679 Several of the events did not relate to
Stewart but to other women, thereby not meeting the requirement that
she personally be subject to sexual harassment. Stewart also failed to
establish that the conduct complained of was based on her sex, and did
not allege the "highly offensive 'verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature'" necessary to prove sexual harassment.680 Merely alleging that
women were treated differently than men was insufficient and Stewart
had, at most, proved that she did not have a good working relationship
with her coworkers. 68 1 Finally Stewart failed to identify any of the super-
visors to whom she allegedly reported the offensive conduct, never filed a
grievance with her union, nor inform HL&P's human resources depart-
ment as required by HL&P's policy on sexual harassment. Accordingly,
Stewart did not establish that HL&P knew or should have known of the
conduct and failed to take prompt remedial action. Her vague allegations
were insufficient to meet her summary judgment burden and the court
granted summary judgment to HL&P on Stewart's sexual harassment
claims as well. 682
Stewart's claim of constructive discharge likewise failed. The court
found that the only possible factor governing a constructive discharge
claim was "reassignment to menial or degrading work. '683 Plaintiff al-
leged that she had been assigned, but not permanently reassigned, to
674. See id.
675. See id. at 753.
676. See id.
677. See id. at 754.




682. See id. at 755-756.
683. Id. at 756 (quoting Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir.
1994)).
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some degrading and menial work but the evidence again consisted of her
own self-serving and conclusory allegations. Additionally, because the
court had ruled that Stewart had failed to establish a hostile work envi-
ronment, her constructive discharge claim would necessarily fail as well.
The court held that Stewart's allegations, even if true, did not show, as a
matter of law, that HL&P deliberately caused a hostile working environ-
ment.6 84 As a result, the court found that summary judgment was proper
for HL&P on Stewart's constructive discharge claim.685
In Hutchison v. SabreTech, Inc.,686 Elmer Hutchison brought suit
against SabreTech under the TCHRA concerning his termination pursu-
ant to a reduction in force at SabreTech, a termination which Hutchison
alleged was due to his age. Although SabreTech employed less than 101
employees and was therefore subject to the $50,000 cap for compensatory
damages under the TCHRA, Hutchison argued that because SabreTech
was a wholly owned subsidiary of SabreLiner, the two corporations were
a single integrated enterprise and he could add together the employees of
both corporations and thus take advantage of the $300,000 damages
cap.687 As to whether the employees of the two corporations should be
aggregated, the court stated that the appropriate test was to consider the
interrelation of operations, centralized control of labor relations, com-
mon management, and common ownership or financial controls. The
court found that there was no question that Hutchison was a SabreTech
employee and that his immediate supervisor, also a SabreTech employee,
made the decision to lay him off. 688 Also, other than the presence of a
SabreLiner employment practices manual at the SabreTech plant, there
was no evidence that SabreLiner attempted to exercise control over the
employment decisions at SabreTech or participated in the decision affect-
ing Hutchison. To the contrary, all the evidence pointed to the fact that
the corporations were separate entities and that SabreTech generally
made independent decisions with respect to reductions in force. Further-
more, Hutchison's supervisor testified that he did not consult the Sabre-
Liner manual or anyone at SabreLiner before making his decision. In the
face of this evidence, plaintiff offered absolutely no testimony or evidence
concerning interrelation of operations, centralized control of labor rela-
tions, common management, or common financial controls. Conse-
quently, the court granted summary judgment for SabreTech that the
$50,000 compensatory damages cap was applicable.689
In Hanna v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber,69° Charlee Hanna, employed
by Goodyear, alleged that coworker Eric Wright sexually harassed her in
684. See id.
685. See id.
686. 1 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
687. See id. at 634.
688. See id. at 635.
689. See id. at 635.




violation of the TCHRA. Defendant moved for summary judgment,
which was denied, and the case proceeded to trial. To establish a case of
sexual harassment, Hanna was required to show conduct directed against
her because of her sex and conduct severe enough or sufficiently perva-
sive to affect a term or condition of employment. 69' The court found that
there was no evidence that Wright behaved differently towards Hanna
because of her sex, that the allegedly harassing behavior was directed
equally towards both men and women, and neither was there any evi-
dence that the conduct alleged affected a term or condition of employ-
ment.692 Finally, Hanna presented no evidence that Goodyear failed to
act promptly to remedy the situation. Evidence put forth at trial showed
that the supervisor involved, who was in charge of both plaintiff and
Wright, "acted quickly, decisively, and compassionately, and took reason-
able steps to defuse the apparent personality conflict between the plain-
tiff and her coworker. '693 Consequently, the court granted the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.694
In Matthews v. High Island Independent School District,695 the plain-
tiffs, teachers at High Island Independent School District (the District),
filed grievances alleging that the school principal made crude sexual innu-
endoes and profane and offensive comments to students and teachers.
Less than three months after the grievances were filed, the District noti-
fied the plaintiffs that their teaching contracts were not being renewed.
The plaintiffs sued the District for, among other claims, retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of the TCHRA. The District moved to dismiss the
claim on the basis that the plaintiffs could not show a cause and effect
connection between their filing of grievances and termination of their
contracts. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. 696 The court
explained that the close temporal proximity (i.e., less than three months)
between the grievances and the decision not to renew the plaintiffs' con-
tracts was sufficient as a matter of law to imply a cause and effect rela-
tionship between the two.697
In Colbert v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,698 Colbert complained that she was
sexually harassed by the crew leadman. Upon being made aware of Col-
bert's allegations, Georgia-Pacific Corp. (GPC) began an investigation,
which resulted in the termination of the leadman. During the investiga-
tion, Rob Williams, a GPC manager, asked several employees whether
Colbert had ever been provocative or flirtatious with the leadman. Fol-
lowing her resignation, Colbert sued GPC and Williams for sexual harass-
ment under the TCHRA.
691. See id. at 648.
692. See id.
693. Id. at 648-49.
694. See id.
695. 991 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
696. See id. at 846.
697. See id.
698. 995 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
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The court granted summary judgment in favor of Williams.699 The
court reasoned that Colbert had submitted no evidence that Williams
qualifies as Colbert's "employer" under the TCHRA and thus could not
be held personally liable for sexual harassment under the TCHRA.7110
The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of GPC rea-
soning that Colbert did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that
GPC knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt remedial action.70' The court noted that Colbert had conceded
that the leadman never made sexual comments to her within the earshot
of other employees, that she never witnessed him engaging in sexual har-
assment toward any other employee, and that she had no first-hand
knowledge of the leadman sexually harassing anyone else.702 In addition,
the court noted that Colbert was aware of the extensive mechanisms to
report sexual harassment, but chose not to avail herself of those proce-
dures for several months. 703 The court also noted that after Colbert re-
ported the sexual harassment complaint, Colbert never had to work with
the leadman again and that he was soon terminated. 70 4 Moreover, Col-
bert agreed that GPC had done everything it could to stop the harass-
ment, and that the harassment had stopped after she reported her
complaint. 70 5 In holding that GPC took prompt remedial measures, and
that summary judgment was therefore appropriate, the court noted that
GPC conducted a prompt and thorough investigation of Colbert's com-
plaints, suspended the leadman immediately, and terminated him at the
conclusion of the investigation. 706
In Cochrane v. Houston Light and Power Co., 7 0 7 Linda Cochrane
(Cochrane), employed by Houston Light and Power Company (HL&P),
claimed that she was discriminatorily denied promotion based on her sex
and race, and that she was retaliated against after she complained of such
mistreatment. Cochrane sued HL&P for, among other claims, discrimi-
nation in violation of the TCHRA. The district court granted summary
judgment for HL&P and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. 708
The court indicated that Cochrane failed to show that her employer's
nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to promote her were a pretext for
race or sex discrimination. 709 The court noted that Cochrane's personal
beliefs amount to speculation and belief, which are insufficient to create a
fact issue as to pretext, and that Cochrane's conclusory reasons to sup-
port her assertion that she was denied promotions based on her sex and
699. See id. at 702.
700. See id.
701. See id.





707. 996 F. Supp. 657 (S. D. Tex. 1998).
708. See id. at 667.
709. See id. at 665.
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race were insufficient to support her claim. 710
3. Texas Whistle Blower Act and other Anti-Retaliation Statutes
The Texas Whistle Blower Act 71' protects public employees from dis-
crimination when an employee has, in good faith, reported a violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority.712 Notably, the Act
does not require that the reported activity actually be illegal, provided
the employee in good faith believed the conduct was illegal. 713 Numer-
ous other Texas statutes also provide protection to employees from retali-
ation in specified circumstances. 714
In Clark v. Texas Home Health, Inc.,715 Karen Clark, Lavern Worrell,
and Jan Woodard, sued their former employer, Texas Home Health, Inc.
(Home Health), alleging that they were retaliated against for reporting a
medication error to the Texas Board of Vocational Nurse Examiners and
for participating in a peer review in violation of article 4525(a), sections 6
and 11 of the Nurses Practice Act (the Act). The nurses, acting through a
committee, reviewed Ursula Shaw, whose medication error resulted in a
patient's death, and concluded that they had a responsibility to report the
incident to the nursing board. Their employer indicated that he did not
want the committee to take action. After nearly a month and a half, the
nurses indicated that they had to report the incident. Their employer re-
moved them from the committee and relieved them of their administra-
tive duties. Subsequently, the nurses brought a retaliation claim under
sections 6 and 11 of the Nurses Practice Act. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on both the section 6 and section 11
claims. The court of appeals affirmed and stated that the nurses could
not recover under section 6 because it did not cover peer review of a
vocational nurse. Furthermore, the court noted that section 11 did not
apply because the plaintiffs could not establish that they had filed the
written report complaining of the error with the nursing board prior to
demotion.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that
Section 6 provides no protection for the nurses because evaluation of a
nurse was not a proper subject of peer review. 716 However, the Texas
710. See id.
711. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon 1997).
712. See Texas Dept. of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ denied) (jury awarded $13,500,000.00 to a state employee discharged for report-
ing wrongdoings within his agency); City of Brenham v. Honerkamp, 950 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied) (termination following report to Texas National Re-
sources Conservation Commission of alleged unrepresentative test sites for bacteria
levels); Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 902 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Jones v. City of Stephenville, 896 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1995, no writ).
713. See Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ
denied).
714. See, e.g., supra section IIC(1); infra section 11C(3).
715. 971 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1998).
716. See id. at 437.
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Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' holding in regard to the
section 11 claim stating that the statute prohibits retaliation, not just
against those persons who have already reported under the Act, but also
those who have indicated their intent to report under the Act.717 Other-
wise, the protection under Section 11 would be significantly diluted be-
cause employers would be able to act with impunity simply by retaliating
against an employee before that employee filed a report with the appro-
priate authority.718 In addition, the court indicated that Home Health
failed to conclusively demonstrate that there was no causal relationship
between the nurses' expressed intent to report and their retaliatory
action. 719
In Lee v. Palo Pinto County,720 Edward Lee, an assistant jail adminis-
trator, filed suit against Palo Pinto County (the County) alleging that he
was discharged for reporting illegal racial discrimination committed by
his supervisor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
County, holding that Lee's cause of action under the Texas Whistle
Blower Act was subsumed by the TCHRA, and Lee appealed.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, reasoning that Lee's
pleading reflected more than an employment discrimination case, includ-
ing allegations that Lee was discharged in retaliation for reporting, in
good faith, illegal conduct committed by his supervisor. 721 The court thus
concluded that Lee properly pleaded a cause of action under the Whistle
Blower Act that was not subsumed by the TCHRA, and that summary
judgment was thus inappropriate. 722
In Anders v. Weslaco Independent School District,72 3 Anders filed suit
against the Weslaco Independent School District (Weslaco) under the
Texas Whistle Blower Act. He filed his lawsuit 132 days after Weslaco's
last alleged Whistle Blower Act violation. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Weslaco on the basis that Anders had not filed
suit within the appropriate limitations period, and Anders appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment in
favor of Weslaco. 724 The court explained that under the Whistle Blower
Act, suit must be filed not later than the ninetieth day after the date of
the alleged violation, excluding time spent exhausting the grievance pro-
cedure.725 The court added that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required if the employer fails to render a final decision before the
thirty-first day after the grievance is initiated.72 6 Thus, suit under the
Whistle Blower Act must be filed no later than 120 days following the
717. See id.
718. See id.
719. See id. at 438.
720. 966 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, pet. denied).
721. See id. at 86.
722. See id. at 87.
723. 960 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no. pet.).
724. See id. at 293.




alleged violation. 727 Because Anders did not file suit within the 120-day
window, his claims were untimely.728
The court dismissed Anders' arguments that the Whistle Blower Act
limitations period should not bar his suit against Weslaco. 729 First, the
court held that section 554.006(a) of the Whistle Blower Act (which pro-
vides that an employee of local government must exhaust the govern-
ment's grievance or appeal procedures before bringing suit) does not
contract section 554.006(d) of the Act (which provides that the section
does not apply if a final decision is not rendered before the thirty-first day
after the date on which the employee initiated the grievance or ap-
peal). 73°) The court also concluded that the provisions of the Whistle
Blower Act should not be expanded beyond their literal text.731 The
court rejected Anders' argument that the applicable statute of limitations
should be disregarded, concluding that even if Anders' claim was filed in
a "reasonable period of time," it was barred by limitations.732 The court
noted that even if the current version of section 554.006 were applied,
Anders' claim would nevertheless be time-barred. 733 Finally, the court
concluded that the statute of limitations should not be extended on public
policy grounds.734
In Upton County v. Brown,735 Larry Joe Brown (Brown) was termi-
nated from his employment with Upton County (the County). Prior to
his termination, Brown repeatedly complained that he was exposed to
fertilizer without proper safety equipment, in violation of OSHA. In ad-
dition, Brown reported the use of County equipment for personal use and
the use of County equipment at a private country club, and the alleged
misuse and theft of gasoline belonging to the County. Following his ter-
mination, Brown sued the County, alleging, among other things, retalia-
tion in violation of the Texas Whistle Blower Act. The jury returned a
verdict against the County, and the County appealed. Affirming the
judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals concluded that Brown
timely filed suit, even though he did not file his claim until ninety-one
days after his termination.736 The court reasoned that on or before the
ninetieth day after his termination, Brown did invoke the grievance pro-
cedure in place at the County and that the time used to follow grievance





729. See id. at 293.
730. See id. at 291-92.
731. See id. at 292.
732. Id.
733. See id.
734. See id. at 292-93.
735. 960 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1997, no pet.).
736. See id. at 814.
737. See id.
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The court of appeals also held that because Brown reported his con-
cerns of violations of the law to the County Judge, the local municipal
judge, and two of the County Commissioners, his immediate supervisor,
and an officer of the Texas Department of Public Safety, Brown must be
considered to have reported the violations to an "appropriate law en-
forcement authority." 738
Finally, the court of appeals held that there was more than a scintilla of
evidence to support the jury's finding that the County did violate the
Whistle Blower Act, inasmuch as there was evidence of a nexus between
the reports made by Brown and his subsequent termination. 739 The court
reasoned that the Whistle Blower Act provides a rebuttable presumption
of retaliation if an employee's termination occurs within ninety days of a
report of violation of the law.74° Because Brown was terminated within
ninety days of making such a report, there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that the County violated the Whistle Blower Act. 74 1
Brown also presented evidence showing his termination was the result of
the reports made by him. Specifically, there was evidence that after
Brown made the report to the municipal judge, he was sent out by him-
self to do a job that under normal circumstances requires two or three
people to perform. 742 There was also evidence that upon reporting the
loss of gasoline, Brown was told by a county commissioner to "keep his
mouth shut and mind his own business. ' 743 Moreover, there was evi-
dence that a county commissioner ordered Brown's supervisor to termi-
nate Brown and that Brown was terminated within one month of the
order. In addition, and despite the County's normal termination policy,
Brown was never reprimanded or otherwise given a chance to improve
any of the conduct that the County alleged led to his termination. 7 "
While the County alleged that one of the reasons for Brown's termination
was that he was being "rough" on equipment, there was evidence that an
oral reprimand would be the normal response to such a concern and that
no one had ever been terminated for being "rough" on equipment. 745
In Villarreal v. Williams,746 Lamar Villarreal, James Stokes, and Robert
Davila, former Falfurrias police officers, sued the City of Falfurrias for
retaliatory discharge. The plaintiffs were terminated by the Chief of Po-
lice, as directed by the City Council, after the city budget called for a
reduction in the police force. The police officers believed they had been
retaliated against for recent whistleblowing activities. The Mayor sent
written notification to the police officers on July 17, 1995, confirming the
terminations effective August 1, 1995. On October 30, 1995, the police
738. See id. at 822.
739. See id. at 824.




744. See id. at 824.
745. See id.
746. 971 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet. h.).
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officers filed suit against the City for retaliatory discharge under the
Texas Whistle Blower Act. The trial court granted the City's summary
judgment on the basis that the police officers' claims were time-barred.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment
granted by the trial court.747 The Whistle Blower Act "requires suit to be
filed within ninety days after the date the alleged violation occurred or
was discovered by the employee through reasonable diligence. ' 748 The
police officers alleged that their limitations period began on July 31, 1995,
their last day of employment, while the City asserted that the limitations
period began on July 11, 1995, the date the police officers learned the
Council voted to proceed with the terminations. 749 The court of appeals
held that the police officers' cause of action accrued on July 17, 1995,
when the police officers received unequivocal written notification of ter-
mination.750 The court noted that the police officers' deposition testi-
mony confirmed that on July 11 they knew they had been terminated, and
they subjectively believed the terminations were driven by a retaliatory
motive for whistle blowing activities.7 51 Because the police officers' suit
was not brought within ninety days of July 17, when the police officers
received unequivocal written notification of termination, their suit was
time-barred.
In Ruiz v. City of San Antonio,752 Ramon Ruiz sued his employer, the
City of San Antonio (the City), alleging that he was suspended on two
occasions in retaliation for reporting violations of the law by police of-
ficers, in violation of the Texas Whistle Blower Act. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Ruiz appealed. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment
in favor of the City.753 The court reasoned that while the Whistle Blower
Act does not protect a report of conduct that only violates an internal
policy manual, Ruiz had alleged that the reported conduct violated the
law, including theft, stealing, and criminal conspiracy. 754 The court also
concluded that summary judgment was improper on the basis that Ruiz
had not reported violations of the law in good faith. 755 The court ex-
plained that the City did not produce evidence that Ruiz did not subjec-
tively believe that the reported conduct violated the law, nor did the City
produce evidence that Ruiz's beliefs were objectively unreasonable. 756
Finally, the court concluded that Ruiz raised a material fact issue of a
causal link between his reports and the disciplinary action. 757 The court
747. See id. at 626.
748. Id. at 624.
749. See id. at 625.
750. See id. at 626.
751. See id.
752. 966 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
753. See id. at 132.
754. See id. at 130-31.
755. See id. at 131.
756. See id.
757. See id. at 132.
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explained that pursuant to section 554.004 of the Whistle Blower Act, a
causal nexus is presumed to exist if the retaliatory conduct occurs within
ninety days of the report of a violation of law.758 Because Ruiz made
four of his reports within ninety days preceding the suspensions, causa-
tion is presumed. In addition, Ruiz had produced affidavit evidence that
the City selectively enforced the discipline rules against him. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the City did not rebut the presumption of
causation as a matter of law and that summary judgment was therefore
inappropriate. 759
In City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich,760 Julius D. Zimlich, a deputy for the
Solid Waste Environmental Enforcement Program (SWEEP), filed suit
against the City of Fort Worth, alleging that he was retaliated against for
reporting an illegal disposal site to the Texas Natural Resource Conserva-
tion Commission after he was told to stop his investigation. The district
court rendered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Zimlich, finding
that the City had retaliated against Zimlich for reporting the illegal dispo-
sal site. The City appealed the verdict.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision in favor of
Zimlich.76' Concluding that Zimlich had shown the requisite causal con-
nection between his report and the acts of retaliation, the evidence
showed that (1) after his return to the Marshal's Office, Zimlich was or-
dered to sit at the courthouse metal detectors; (2) the post was ordinarily
filled by rookies or retirees wanting an extra paycheck; (3) experienced
employees regarded the post as humiliating; (4) Zimlich was an exper-
ienced deputy; (5) Zimlich and his partner were the only experienced
deputies assigned to the metal detectors on a permanent basis; (6) the
post was Zimlich's first assignment after reporting the illegal disposal site;
(7) during Zimlich's assignment at the metal detectors, positions were
open in the warrants division where Zimlich worked before his assign-
ment at SWEEP, but Zimlich remained at the metal detectors for over
eight months; and (8) when Zimlich asked one of his employers when
Zimlich would get a better assignment, his employer told him he was
lucky to have a job after reporting the illegal disposal site.762 The court
stated that the evidence permitted a reasonable inference that "but for"
Zimlich's protected activity, he would not have suffered the discrimina-
tion found by the jury.7 6 3 Finally, the court found that there was suffi-
cient evidence that Zimlich had acted in good faith when he reported the
illegal disposal site because he believed that the site was a violation of the
law, and he had never in his fourteen years of experience encountered
efforts to hinder his law enforcement work.764 Thus, the court overruled
758. See id. at 131.
759. See id. at 132.
760. 975 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. filed).
761. See id. at 402.
762. See id. at 406-07.
763. See id. at 406.
764. See id. at 409.
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the City's points of error and affirmed the trial court's judgment.765
In Housing Authority v. Lopez,766 the Housing Authority of the City of
Crystal City challenged a jury's award of damages to Ricardo Lopez for
his claims of retaliatory discrimination in violation of the Whistle Blower
Act. The Housing Authority first claimed that there was no or insuffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's finding that Lopez was discharged in
retaliation for his complaints to the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD). The Whistle Blower Act provides
for relief when a governmental entity discriminates against a public em-
ployee who in good faith reports a violation of law to an appropriate law
enforcement agency. 767 The court found that Lopez was given a poor
evaluation, and his title changed from assistant executive director to fi-
nancial officer within two weeks after he reported the first violation to
HUD. Less than a week after Lopez reported three other violations, he
was demoted to clerk and incurred a substantial pay cut. The court held
that, under the statute, the jury was free to find a causal connection be-
tween the reports and the discriminatory acts.768 Although there was tes-
timony to the effect that Lopez had failed to complete tasks assigned to
him, Lopez testified that some of these jobs were not complete because
he was out on approved leave and that obstacles placed in his path by
Maria Farias, the executive director, prevented him from completing the
others. Another witness for the Housing Authority implied that Lopez
was demoted because he was rude, refused to do his work, and had an
"attitude" with Farias. The substance of this testimony, however, was
that Lopez was always "contradicting" what Farias had to say in a few
meetings, which was clarified to mean that he was telling her she was not
doing things by the regulations. Consequently, the court found legally
and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of retalia-
tory discrimination. 769
The Housing Authority next challenged the evidence to support the
award of $28,549.57 for past lost earnings, which should represent the
actual lost income due minus any benefits received such as unemploy-
ment or earnings from a new job. The damages supported by evidence
amounted to only $8,801.89 for lost salary, underpaid compensation and
vacation time, and lost health and insurance benefits, and was upheld by
the court. 77° However, outside of $1,100 in medical and life insurance
benefits, the court found insufficient evidence to support the remainder
of the $20,847.68 awarded for lost benefits because Lopez did not provide
a monetary breakdown of his request for damages.771 Furthermore, no
damages would be awarded for the annual salary adjustment as this was a
765. See id. at 415.
766. 955 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.).
767. See id. at 154.
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bonus given at the discretion of the Housing Authority.772
The Housing Authority also argued that the evidence did not support
the award to Lopez of $10,000 in damages for lost future earning capac-
ity. Lopez failed to testify as to his salary at the new job he got after five
and a half months of unemployment. Without any evidence of a reduced
earning capacity, the jury was left to speculate about Lopez's future loss
of earning capacity and the court held that there was legally and factually
insufficient evidence to support the award for future lost earning capac-
ity.773 Lopez attempted to argue that the $10,000 award represented the
salary decrease he received when he was moved from assistant director to
financial officer and then clerk. However, this sum represented past lost
earnings, for which he had already received damages. Consequently, the
court rejected Lopez's argument.774
The Housing Authority additionally challenged the award of $25,000
for past mental anguish. In the only portion of his testimony that even
arguably related to mental anguish, "Mr. Lopez attempt[ed] to present
testimony regarding his reputation and market potential as evidence that
he suffered mental anguish without offering any testimony as to whether
he even felt any emotion. ' 775 Because Lopez did not offer any testimony
as to his emotional state or its consequences, the court found that the
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support an award of
damages for past mental anguish. 776
Also challenged was the evidence supporting the jury's finding of mal-
ice, which was necessary to support the award of punitive damages. First,
the court found that the Housing Authority had failed to properly pre-
serve any complaint with respect to the jury instruction regarding mal-
ice. 777 Next, as evidence of malice, the court noted that Farias completed
an extensive and negative evaluation of Lopez only one month after she
took the position of executive director and after working with Lopez for
only eleven days. Lopez testified that before the evaluation, there had
been no mention of dissatisfaction with his job performance and, on occa-
sion, the Director told him he was doing a good job. On December 12,
Farias listed Lopez's failure to purchase computer software as one of the
reasons for his poor evaluation, even though she had given him until the
end of the month to complete the purchase. When Lopez reminded her
of this fact, Farias refused to reconsider the evaluation. Furthermore,
although she placed Lopez on probation, Farias did not outline what he
needed to do to improve his performance, did not list any policies he
failed to follow, nor name any coworker who found him uncooperative.
Additionally, Farias demanded in a memo that Lopez train employees on
software within seventy-two hours and then issued conflicting orders that
772. See id.
773. See id. at 157.
774. See id.





it could be done later. However, the demotion was in large part based on
this failure to train. Other evidence of malice included the fact that
Farias sent Lopez memos regarding his failure to purchase software and
failure to train employees when he was out of the office on approved
leaves for a death in his family and for personal illness. Despite these
leaves, the Housing Authority faulted Lopez for not immediately re-
sponding to the memos. Finally, the Housing Authority claimed that rent
checks were found in Lopez's filing cabinet instead of in the bank or
safety vault. However, the court found that Lopez had a reasonable ex-
cuse for not getting to the bank and that Farias had prevented his use of
the vault by changing the combination to the office vault without telling
Lopez, in spite of his financial duties.778 In light of these circumstances,
the court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the
jury's finding of malice, which had been defined as acting "intentionally
without just cause or excuse of believing it to be right or legal, or done
with conscious disregard to the rights of others. '779
Finally, the Housing Authority claimed that the evidence was legally
and factually insufficient to support an award of $100,000 in punitive
damages and that such an award was excessive. In considering whether
these damages were reasonable, the court was guided by "(1) the nature
of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of
culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and sensibilities of the par-
ties concerned; and (5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public
sense of justice and propriety. ' '780 In assessing the nature of the wrong,
the court considered that the purpose of the Whistle Blower Act was "(1)
to protect public employees from retaliation by their employers for re-
porting violation of law in good faith, and (2) to secure in consequence
lawful conduct on the part of those who direct and conduct the affairs of
public bodies."' 78' Although Lopez was not reporting a violation of a
health or safety code, the court noted that he was reporting a violation in
good faith by a public agency of its governing regulations.782 Also, the
short period between the report and the demotion suggested retaliatory
animus. The evidence further indicated that Farias harassed Lopez in a
personal manner and made it difficult, if not impossible, to do his job
well. The court found that the Housing Authority could not avoid liabil-
ity for Farias's behavior. The court also noted that the relative positions
of the Housing Authority and Lopez were unequal, finding that Lopez
could not force Farias or the board to follow regulations. Additionally,
even though Lopez was not required to report the violations or to persist
in informing HUD that regulations were being broken, he did so without
regard for the consequences. According to the court, the Housing Au-
thority assumed that Lopez's demotion would cause him to stop or that
778. See id. at 159.
779. Id.
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he would quit. The court stated that the Whistle Blower Act was
designed to protect employees who urged public entities to conduct their
affairs honestly and to correct their mistakes and that the actions of the
Housing Authority could not be condoned.783 As a result, the court
found sufficient evidence to support the award of $100,000 in punitive
damages.784 Finally, the Housing Authority argued, and Lopez conceded,
that he was not allowed to recover prejudgment interest on his award of
punitive damages. Consequently, the court overruled the trial court's
award in this respect. 785
In Carey v. Aldine Independent School District,786 Mary Ann Carey was
a teacher for the Aldine Independent School District (Aldine). Carey
filed suit alleging, among other things, violation of the Texas Whistle
Blower Act.
Carey claimed to have made several complaints of violations of state
law by school principal Cleba Leschper and, possibly, by Aldine. Her
complaints concerned denying her a conference period, a duty-free lunch,
special education supplies, and the help of an aide assigned to her, over-
crowding her classroom, placing students of inappropriate grade levels in
her class, and physical and verbal abuse by Leschper. She also stated that
her complaints involving the need for an additional special education
teacher and that Leschper was having a special education aide teach regu-
lar classes, raised questions about the possible misuse of funds designated
for special education.787 Leschper and Aldine argued that Carey had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before suing by not appeal-
ing the denial of a grievance she filed with the superintendent's office.
The court disagreed, however, reasoning that the Whistle Blower Act was
amended in 1995 to require only that an employee "initiate action under
the [employer's] grievance or appeal procedures. ' 788 Nonetheless, even
if Carey's filing of a grievance was enough to have permitted her to sue,
the court found that her whistle blower claims failed because she did not
report the alleged violations to "an appropriate law enforcement author-
ity" as required by the Whistle Blower Act.789
Carey claimed that she made her complaints to the Aldine "Special
Education Office," to Leschper, to assistant principal "Ms. Walker," and
to "the diagnosis person for the district. '790 Under the Whistle Blower
Act, an appropriate law enforcement authority is defined as "part of a
state or local governmental entity or of the federal government that the




786. 996 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Tex. 1998) see supra notes 42-49 for additional facts and
causes of action.
787. See id. at 654.
788. Id. at 655 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.006(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).




enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report; or (2) investigate or
prosecute a violation of criminal law."'791 The court found that the sum-
mary judgment evidence Carey offered did not show that Carey had a
good faith belief that those she complained to were law enforcement au-
thorities with the capability to regulate under or enforce the law alleged
to be violated.792 The court found that Carey had also offered no evi-
dence that such a belief would have been reasonable, "in the absence of
her presentation of any evidence explaining these actors' roles in enforc-
ing state or local law."' 793 Therefore, the court granted Aldine's and
Leschpuer's motion for summary judgment on Carey's Whistle Blower
Act claims.79 4
In Mallek v. City of San Benito,795 Barry Mallek filed suit against the
City of San Benito alleging, among other claims, that he was wrongfully
terminated in violation of the Texas Whistle Blower Act. Mallek alleged
that he was terminated because he spoke out to the City Manager, the
police officers, the media, and the citizens about alleged violations of law
occurring in an area known as Skid Row. Before removal, the state trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the Whistle
Blower Act claim, and Mallek appealed. The Fifth Circuit vacated the
summary judgment on Mallek's Whistle Blower Act claims and re-
manded the case.796 The court reasoned that fact issues existed as to
whether Mallek reported any violations of law and as to whether Mallek
was a public employee. 797
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS, ARBITRATION
AND PREEMPTION 798
The courts continue to closely and critically examine covenants not to
compete for compliance with statutory requirements and to prevent an
unreasonable intrusion on free enterprise. 799 Enforcement of covenants
have, of recent, met with some success.80
791. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
792. See id.
793. Id. at 656.
794. See id.
795. 121 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1997).
796. See id. at 998.
797. See id.
798. See Benedict, supra note 5, at 1008-09 & nn.569-75 for a comprehensive
explanation of the Texas standard.
799. See, e.g., Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994); Donahue v.
Bowles, Troy, Donahue, Johnson, Inc., 949 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ de-
nied) (promise to give 30 days notice of termination did not support interest in restraining
competition, covenant rejected); CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (covenant rejected).
800. See, e.g., Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997,
n.w.h.) (promise not to disclose trade secrets sufficient to support restraint on competitive
activities, covenant enforced); American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Scott, 955 F. Supp.
688 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (preliminary injunction granted to enforce covenant because training,
confidential information and trade secrets given by plaintiff and not to be disclosed by
defendant gave rise to plaintiff's interest in restraining defendant's competitive activities).
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In Totino v. Alexander & Associates., Inc.,80 Glenn Totino, Scott
Newell, James Nolen, and Jack Freeman were sued by Alexander & As-
sociates (A&A) for unfair competition, breach of their employment
agreements, and misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential infor-
mation. The four employees signed employment agreements containing
substantially similar noncompetition covenants. The covenants provided
that they would not directly or indirectly, for a period of two years after
termination, solicit, contact, or call upon any A&A client for the purpose
of providing services to such client. The covenant not to compete ex-
pressly stated that it was ancillary to the remaining otherwise enforceable
and binding obligations of the parties under the employment agreement.
Totino left A&A to join Willis Corroon Corporation, a competitor of
A&A. Newell, Nolen, and Freeman followed suit, as did at least seven
other A&A employees. A&A obtained a temporary injunction prevent-
ing the employees from using A&A's confidential information, from
soliciting or communicating with A&A's clients, and from soliciting or
recruiting current A&A employees.
The Houston Court of Appeals noted that, to be enforceable, a non-
competition covenant must: "(1) be ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement at the time the agreement is made and (2) contain limitations
of time, geographic area, and scope of activity that are reasonable and do
not impose a greater restraint than necessary to protect the promisee's
goodwill or other business interest. 802 The employees alleged that the
covenant did not contain a geographic restriction and therefore was per
se unreasonable. The court of appeals found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in implicitly finding the noncompetition covenants
contained a reasonable geographic restriction as written by virtue of lim-
iting the restriction to clients of A&A.80 3 The employment agreement
defined A&A's clients with respect to each employee's covenant as those
clients with whom the employee had personal contact.80 4
The court next considered whether the covenants were ancillary to an
otherwise enforceable agreement by reviewing each employee's individ-
ual circumstances. The court found that each individual employee's at-
will employment was not an otherwise enforceable agreement to which
the non-competition covenants could be ancillary.8 05 The court further
noted that at-will employment, however, does not preclude the formation
of other contracts between employer and employee.806 The court found
several non-illusory promises between employer and employee. Each in-
dividual employee made promises not to recruit A&A's employees, not
to disclose confidential information after termination, to return all A&A
801. No. 01-97-01204-CV, 1998 WL 552818 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20,
1998, no pet. h.).
802. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
803. See id. at *4.
804. See id.




property, to conduct an exit interview if asked, to inform A&A of new
employment after termination, not to disparage A&A, and to submit to
certain restrictions and remedies upon breach or litigation after termina-
tion. 8o7 The court further found that, in exchange for Totino's and
Newell's signing the employment agreements, A&A awarded Totino and
Newell stock options, a non-illusory promise A&A actually performed.
A&A also made the non-illusory promise to Freeman that, if he was ter-
minated for any but seven enumerated reasons during the first two years
of his employment, the non-competition covenant would not be binding
on him.80 8 The court further found that A&A made the non-illusory
promise to Nolen that on the second anniversary of his termination, un-
less A&A had a good faith belief Nolen had violated the employment
agreement's terms, it would pay Nolen $7,500. Furthermore, A&A
promised that the employees would be entrusted with and become ac-
quainted with A&A's confidential information. 80 9
Next, the court considered whether the noncompetition covenants
were ancillary to or a part of the otherwise enforceable agreements found
by the court. To be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment, the consideration given by the employer must give rise to the em-
ployer's interest in restraining the employee from competing, and the
covenant must be designed to enforce the employee's consideration or
returned promise in that agreement. 81  With regard to Freeman, the
court noted that A&A promised to provide Freeman with confidential
information, and in exchange Freeman promised not to disclose this in-
formation. Thus, the noncompetition agreement was ancillary to an
otherwise enforceable agreement.8 11 The court also found that Totino's
and Newell's noncompetition covenants were ancillary to Totino's and
Newell's stock options. The evidence showed that the stock option
awards were: "(1) expressly conditioned on the signing of the non-compe-
tition covenants, (2) offered in recognition of Totino's and Newell's con-
tributions to... [A&A] and as part of a long-term incentive plan, and (3)
meant to reaffirm management's commitment to linking employee inter-
est to those of ... [A&A's] shareholders. '812 The court held that these
options were offered to encourage Totino's and Newell's loyalty and con-
tinued employment. 813 With regard to Nolen, the court found that the
noncompetition covenant was not designed to enforce Nolen's promise to
return A&A's materials to it upon termination. Similarly, A&A's prom-
ise to pay Nolen $7,500 after termination did not give rise to A&A's in-
terest in restraining him from competing. Therefore, the court found no
promise to which Nolen's non-competition covenant could be ancillary at
807. See id.
808. See id.
809. See id. at *6 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647).
810. See id. at *6-7.
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the time of its making.814
The employees also attacked the injunction against recruiting or solicit-
ing any of A&A's current employees to leave or violate their duties to
A&A. The employees argued that the nonrecruitment covenant was an
improper restraint of trade. The court found that the nonrecruitment
covenants did not significantly restrain the employee's trade or com-
merce. 81 5 Instead, the covenants merely prevented them from recruiting
A&A's employees for two years. The court considered nonrecruitment
covenants to be more like nondisclosure covenants than noncompetition
covenants.816 Covenants not to disclose the former employer's confiden-
tial information do not necessarily restrict a former employee's ability to
use the general knowledge, skill, and experience acquired in former em-
ployment. Therefore, the court concluded that "while noncompetition
covenants restrain trade and are enforceable only if reasonable, nondis-
closure covenants do not restrain trade and are not against public
policy. "817
In McNeilus Companies, Inc. v. Sams,818 George Preston Sams signed
an employment agreement when hired that included a noncompetition
clause. The noncompetition clause provided that if Sams left the employ
of McNeilus, he was prohibited from working in any capacity for a
McNeilus competitor in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, or Oklahoma for
three years. After Sams left his employment and went to work for a
McNeilus competitor, McNeilus sought to enjoin Sams from working for
the competitor. The trial court denied McNeilus's application for a tem-
porary injunction, finding that the noncompetition agreement signed by
Sams was unreasonably broad, and McNeilus appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying McNei-
lus's application for temporary injunction.819 In so doing, the court rea-
soned that the trial court could have reasonably found that prohibiting
Sams from working in any capacity for a McNeilus competitor was a re-
straint too broad in scope. 820 The court noted that there was testimony
that Sams sold to end users while working for McNeilus, but sold only to
wholesalers and resellers in his new position, and that the purported con-
fidential information that Sams obtained at McNeilus was thus of no use
to him in his new position.821 In addition, the court of appeals held that
the trial court's refusal to reform the agreement was not appealable at the
interlocutory stage, therefore, dismissed McNeilus's point of error com-
plaining that the trial court erred in refusing to reform the agreement for
814. See id.
815. See id. at *8.
816. See id. at *9.
817. Id.
818. 971 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet. h.).






In Evan's World Travel, Inc. v. Adams,823 Paula Adams, a travel agent
with ten years of experience, signed an employment agreement contain-
ing a covenant not to compete shortly after starting her employment with
Evan's World Travel in October 1993 in Marshall. Adams performed her
job well but left the company in October 1996 to work for a competing
travel agency that was just beginning business. After Adams's departure,
Evan's suffered a significant drop in business and sent Adams a letter
asking her to honor the terms of her employment agreement. Adams
refused and Evan's brought suit in state district court to enforce the terms
of the noncompetition clause of the employment agreement. A bench
trial was held, with the trial court finding for Adams and awarding her
attorney's fees. Evan's brought this appeal.
The court of appeals discussed whether there was an otherwise en-
forceable agreement, pointing out that an at-will employment relation-
ship could not serve as an otherwise enforceable agreement. Disagreeing
with the trial court's determination that Adams had been an at-will em-
ployee, the court noted that the employment provision of the contract
between Adams and Evan's provided the dates of employment, Adams's
monthly compensation, and a stated term of employment of three
years.824 The court also stated that, as a general rule, whenever parties
agreed to a term of service, the employee could not be fired except for
good cause.8 25 Consequently, the court found that the at-will relationship
had been altered, and Adams could only be fired for cause.
The employment agreement also contained a clause stating that em-
ployment would end, but the agreement otherwise would remain in effect
upon the occurrence of "the termination by the Employer of the Term of
Employment for any reason, including, but not limited to, the commission
by the Employee of any act constituting a dishonest or other act of mate-
rial or a fraudulent act or a felony ... (and act results or is intended to
result directly or indirectly in the Employee's substantial gain or personal
enrichment to the detriment of the Employer). ' 826 Evan's pointed to this
list of reasons for termination of the employment agreement to show that
only "for cause" reasons were contemplated. The court rejected Adams's
assertion that the "for any reason" language in this clause created an at-
will relationship, agreeing with Evan's that "any reason" could only be
read to mean any "for cause" reason.827 The court also found that Ad-
ams could logically only be fired for a "for cause" reason after this ninety
day period. 828 This finding was based on the term of years in the con-
tract, the presumption that the parties to a contract intend every clause to
822. See id.
823. 978 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
824. See id. at 230.
825. See id.
826. Id. at 229.
827. See id. at 230.
828. See id.
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have some effect, and the fact that the employment agreement allowed
for termination without cause only during the initial ninety day proba-
tionary period. 829
The court then focused on whether the agreement was ancillary to an
otherwise enforceable agreement. The court found that the training pro-
vided by Evan's to Adams concerned general housekeeping functions and
did not rise "to the level required in order for one to perform the core job
duties expected which should be protected by restrictive covenants. s8 30
However, Evan's also asserted that Adams had access to client informa-
tion that constituted confidential information under the covenant and
would support the covenant. The court noted that customer information
was a legitimate interest to be protected by a noncompetition agree-
ment.8 31 Nonetheless, the court pointed out that the only evidence sug-
gesting that this information was confidential was the act of making the
covenant not to compete an integral part of the employment agreement,
thereby attempting to protect the information, and Evan's owner's opin-
ion that such information was confidential. The only evidence Adams
had to dispute this point was her belief that the information she had ac-
cess to was not confidential. The court found that the record supported
the belief that the information was confidential and was ancillary to an
otherwise enforceable agreement.8 32
The court then stated that, to be enforceable, a noncompetition agree-
ment must contain reasonable limitations as to time, geographic area, and
scope of activity to be restrained. The covenant in question stated that:
[For three-year period after the Ending Date] ... Employee will not,
directly or indirectly, either as an employee, employer, consultant,
agent, principal, partner, stockholder, corporate officer, director, or
in any other individual or representative capacity, engage or partici-
pate in any business that is in competition in any manner whatsoever
with the business of the Company on the Ending Date within the
counties of Gregg and Harrison, State of Texas, or any State in which
the Employer is conducting or has conducted its business during the
Term of Employment. 833
The court found the restriction on Adams doing business anywhere in
the United States or in Texas to be unreasonable. The court also rejected
Evan's attempt to claim that the "State of Texas" language merely made
specific Harrison and Gregg. Counties. Evan's owner also attempted to
assert that he understood the noncompete only to restrict Adams from
working in Harrison and Gregg Counties. Noting that the owner had
read the agreement, the court rejected this and stated that the noncom-
pete attempted to restrict Adams from working anywhere Evan's con-
ducted business, not just in areas where she had worked. Consequently,
829. See id.
830. Id. at 231.





the court found the trial court had not erred in determining that Evan's
knew the noncompete was greater than necessary to protect its inter-
ests.834 Because of the unreasonable geographic restriction, the court was
required by law to reform the noncompetition agreement. Noting that
Texas courts have generally upheld limitations imposed on an employee
that consisted of the territory within which the employee worked, the
court found the restriction on working in Harrison County, where Mar-
shall is located, to be reasonable. 835 Evan's argued that it had offices in
Gregg County, but the court stated that it was undisputed that Adams
and Evan's owner could not recall her having any customers in Gregg
County. Consequently, the court held the agreement to be enforceable
only as to Harrison County.836
The court then went on to discuss the award of attorney's fees for Ad-
ams, noting that the law allowed for recovery of fees where the person
attempting to enforce the covenant knew at the time of the execution of
the agreement that the geographic limits were unreasonable and the per-
son sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than necessary to
protect its interests.8 37 Evan's claimed that the amount of fees awarded
Adams for appeal was unsupported by the evidence. Adams had to
prove that the amount of fees were actually and reasonably incurred or
that the amount was reasonable and necessary. Because the record did
not contain any evidence to establish either of these standards, the court
held that there was no evidence to support the award of attorney's fees to
Adams. 838
A. BEYOND NON COMPETITION AGREEMENTS: TRADE SECRETS
In T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc.,839 Joe and
Roy Terpstra worked for Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., which specialized
in high performance upgrades for vehicles, including the Dodge Viper.
During their employment with Hennessey, the Terpstras, with Hennes-
sey's knowledge, formed a part-time body shop known as T-N-T Motor-
sports, Inc. (TNT). TNT manufactured and designed products sold to
Hennessey and performed engine modifications for customers other than
Hennessey's. TNT, however, did not perform engine modifications on
Vipers. After terminating their employment with Hennessey, the Terp-
stras began performing and advertising upgrades on Vipers. Roy Terpstra
told a private investigator hired by Hennessey that the TNT upgrades
were identical to the Hennessey upgrades, that he had learned how to
create the packages while employed by Hennessey, that he offered the
same upgrades as Hennessey but at a better price, that three of Hennes-
sey's customers had already moved their business to TNT, and that Hen-
834. See id. at 233.
835. See id.
836. See id. at 234.
837. See id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
838. See id.
839. 965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd).
1094 [Vol. 52
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
nessey was TNT's only competitor. Hennessey obtained injunctive relief
against TNT and the Terpstras (the Defendants) based on misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, and the Defendants appealed.
Initially, the court explained that even in the absence of a written con-
tract, an employee has a duty to not use confidential or proprietary infor-
mation acquired during the employment in a manner adverse to the
employer.84 This obligation also survives termination of employment.84
The court noted that while the duty does not bar use of general knowl-
edge, skill, and experience, it does prevent the former employee's use of
confidential information or trade secrets acquired during the course of
employment.842 The court noted that a trade secret consists of "any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information that is used in
one's business, and which gives one an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use it.''843
The court concluded that all the information about the specifics of the
upgrades performed by Hennessey, it's customers, and it's vendors was
confidential and intended to be kept secret.844 The court noted that Roy
Terpstra admitted that Hennessey advised him that the information con-
cerning the design, modification, and building of the upgrade was propri-
etary, and also that the component parts of the upgrade packages were
confidential.84 5 In addition, the court noted that the overall cost of the
upgrades, the cost of items sold separately, the cost of components, and
the costs of labor associated with assembling the upgrades were not pub-
lic, neither were the specifics of the upgrades, Hennessey's customer and
vendor information, nor Hennessey's pricing.84 6 The court noted that
customer information was kept confidential and that only certain employ-
ees were allowed access to it. Based on these and other facts, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
determining that Hennessey had shown a probability of success in prov-
ing that its confidential information deserved trade secret protection.847
The court next determined that the Defendants possessed Hennessey's
confidential information and were in a position to use the information to
compete directly with Hennessey.848 The court noted that, under the cir-
cumstances, it was likely that the Defendants would use the information
to Hennessey's detriment.84 9 Moreover, the court concluded that the
only effective relief available to Hennessey was to restrain the Defend-
ants' use of its trade secrets and confidential information, inasmuch as
840. See id. at 21-22.
841. See id. at 22.
842. See id.
843. Id. (citing Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Aitai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.
1996)).
844. See id. at 23.
845. See id. at 22-23.
846. See id. at 23.
847. See id.




Hennessey would lose its advantage if confidential information was dis-
tributed and would lose goodwill from the Defendants' actions.850 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that a legal remedy was inadequate
because the potential damage to Hennessey could not be easily calcu-
lated, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the tem-
porary injunction against the Defendants. 851
The court of appeals concluded, however, that the temporary injunc-
tion was overbroad.8 52 Thus, the court ordered that the temporary in-
junction be reformed to forbid the disclosure of Hennessey's trade secret
information, as opposed to any information at all, about certain motor
vehicles. 853 Similarly, the court reformed the agreement restricting only
the use of Hennessey's trade secret information on motor vehicles, but
not restricting all services on motor vehicles.854
B. ARBITRATION
In Gutierrez v. Academy Corp.,855 Mary Jane Gutierrez signed an arbi-
tration, release, and indemnification agreement in exchange for receiving
medical and other benefits from her employer, Academy Corporation.
After her termination, Gutierrez sued Academy, alleging that Academy
discriminated against her in violation of Title VII and constructively dis-
charged her. Academy moved to stay the litigation and to compel arbi-
tration. Gutierrez opposed arbitration and alleged that the agreement
was unenforceable because the arbitration clause was unconscionable. In
particular, Gutierrez complained that she was not allowed to seek legal
counsel before signing the agreement and that there was an inequality of
bargaining positions when she signed the agreement.
The court held that if a plaintiff's complaint regarding the enforcement
of an arbitration clause contained in an arbitration, release, and indemni-
fication agreement related to the entire contract, the complaint should be
decided by an arbitrator. 856 Where, however, the complaint relates to the
arbitration clause itself, the court should decide the issue.857 The court
concluded that because Gutierrez was attacking the arbitration, release,
and indemnification agreement and the formation of the agreement, as
opposed to any clause in particular, the issue should be decided by an
arbitrator. Accordingly, the court granted Academy's motion to stay liti-
gation and to compel arbitration. 858
The court did provide guidance to the arbitrator in evaluating the en-
forceability of the agreement, noting that the arbitrator should "ascertain
850. See id.
851. See id.
852. See id. at 25.
853. See id. at 25-26.
854. See id.
855. 967 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
856. See id. at 947.
857. See id.
858. See id. at 948.
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whether this agreement was extended to all employees of like class of
circumstance or whether it was offered to one or a few individual employ-
ees to forestall or impede those individuals' access to the courts. ' 859 The
court also recommended that the arbitrator consider whether the consid-
eration for the agreement was reasonable under the circumstances. In
addition, the court asked the arbitrator to consider whether the choice of
responses was clearly presented to the employees and whether Academy
made the employees aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the
choice made. 860
In In re Foster Mold, Inc.,861 Patricia Arellano sued Foster Mold, alleg-
ing wrongful termination. Arellano was hired as a packer/inspector. She
suffered an on-the-job injury on October 29, 1994, and her employment
was terminated by Foster Mold on December 14, 1994. At the time that
Arellano was hired, Foster Mold informed her that they were not a sub-
scriber under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, but that they did
provide an Occupational Injury Benefit Plan. Arellano signed an "Em-
ployment and Arbitration Contract" that stated in plainly visible lan-
guage that the contract required arbitration of claims for on-the-job
injuries and other claims, including termination. The contract further
stated that punitive damages were not recoverable, that the employee
could consult a lawyer before signing it, and that if not signed, the em-
ployment would not be continued. During the pendency of the lawsuit,
Foster Mold filed a motion to stay the proceedings and refer the case to
arbitration. Arellano responded and alleged that the provisions of the
arbitration contract were unconscionable. She did not allege unconscio-
nability in the making or formation of the contract. The trial court de-
nied Foster Mold's motion.
The court of appeals conditionally granted Foster Mold's writ of man-
damus and ordered the trial court to stay the proceedings and refer the
case to arbitration.862 The court found that the "Federal Arbitration Act
does not permit a trial court to consider claims of unconscionability of an
arbitration contract generally. '863 It is the arbitrator who determines
whether the terms and conditions of the complained-of arbitration con-
tract render it generally unconscionable. The court held that once the
trial court has determined that the actual making of the agreement to
arbitrate is not an issue, it has the mandatory duty to refer the matter to
arbitration.864
In Dallas Cardiology Assocs., P.A. v. Mallick,865 the plaintiffs filed a
declaratory judgment action in the trial court seeking a declaration that
859. Id. at 947.
860. See id. at 947-48.
861. 979 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet. h.).
862. See id. at 668.
863. Id. at 667 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 338 U.S. 395
(1967)).
864. See id.
865. 978 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
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Dallas Cardiology Associates, P.A. (DCA) committed an anticipatory
breach of their employment agreements, and sought an accounting to de-
termine the proper amounts due under the employment agreements.
DCA filed a motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision
contained in the employment agreements. The plaintiffs subsequently
amended their petition to add tort claims for interference with a contract,
slander, and defamation, and to request injunctive relief. After a hearing,
the motion to compel arbitration was denied and DCA appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to
compel arbitration.866 The court denied the plaintiffs' argument that
DCA was not entitled to arbitration because it had not mediated the dis-
pute before pursuing arbitration, as required by the employment agree-
ments. 867 The court explained that neither party attempted to resolve the
dispute informally. Moreover, the court held that the mediation provi-
sion in the employment agreements did not rise to the level of a condition
precedent to arbitration and the arbitration provision was not defeated
by a failure to mediate. 868 The court also denied the plaintiffs' argument
that DCA anticipatorily breached, therefore, repudiated the employment
agreements by significantly reducing the plaintiffs' compensation
levels.869 The court reasoned that arbitration agreements made under the
Texas arbitration statute are enforceable and irrevocable in spite of at-
tacks made upon the contract as a whole.870
The court then determined that the plaintiffs' tort claims were also sub-
ject to arbitration.871 The court explained that tort claims are subject to
arbitration where the claim is so interwoven with the contract that it
could not stand alone.872 The court noted that the tort claims were based
on allegations that DCA erroneously told patients that the plaintiff doc-
tors had left to pursue other interests and that DCA told patients that
one of the plaintiffs had suffered a heart attack and his continued medical
practice was in question. 873 The court concluded that because the arbitra-
tion agreement covered "[a]ny dispute arising over the terms and condi-
tions" of the agreement or "in any manner relating" to the agreement, it
could not be positively said that the claims were not subject to arbitra-
tion, therefore, the parties should be required to arbitrate the tort
claims. 874
The court also concluded that the noncompetition provisions of the
agreement fell within the scope of the arbitration clause.875 The court
explained that, given the broad wording of the arbitration agreement, the
866. See id. at 215.
867. See id. at 212.
868. See id. at 213.
869. See id.
870. See id.
871. See id. at 215.
872. See id. at 214.
873. See id.
874. Id. at 215.
875. See id.
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dispute required arbitration, especially because a dispute about the cove-
nant is directly related to the agreement.8 76
Finally, the court held that the arbitration clause was not so broad and
one-sided as to be unenforceable. 877 The court reasoned that because the
agreements were signed by the plaintiffs, they were presumed to know
and understand its contents. Thus, there was no reason in law or equity
to hold the arbitration clauses unenforceable. 878
In Turford v. Underwood,8 79 Brian Turford filed a declaratory judg-
ment action seeking a declaration of invalidity of a covenant not to com-
pete contained in an employment contract between Turford and his
former employer, Anatec. Approximately two months after Turford filed
his lawsuit, Anatec filed a suit against Turford in Michigan seeking in-
junction and damages for breach of contract. Before filing the Michigan
lawsuit, Anatec filed a general denial and a motion to dismiss the Texas
litigation, alleging that the employment contract included a Michigan fo-
rum selection clause. The trial court in Texas denied the motion to dis-
miss. Anatec then filed a motion to compel arbitration that the trial court
granted.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Anatec waived its right to
arbitration.880 The court found that in order to establish waiver, Turford
must have established that Anatec acted inconsistently with the arbitra-
tion agreement and that Anatec's conduct prejudiced him. The court
found that by filing its lawsuit in Michigan, Anatec acted in a manner
inconsistent with the arbitration agreement.8 81 The court further found
that Anatec's Michigan pleadings sought $10,000 in damages against
Turford and Turford incurred over $20,000 in legal fees. The court found
that merely incurring litigation expenses cannot establish prejudice.88 2
The court noted, however, that by forcing Turford to arbitrate in Texas
while suing him for damages in Michigan, Anatec simultaneously exposed
Turford to liability and prevented him from litigating his claims against
his former employer. 883
In Tenet Healthcare Ltd. v. Cooper,s84 Mary Cooper brought suit for
wrongful discharge against her employer, Tenet Healthcare Limited.
Tenet sought enforcement of an arbitration agreement contained in an
employee handbook that was issued to Cooper in 1993, as well as an
agreement to arbitrate that was attached to the handbook and titled an
"Acknowledgment Form." The trial court denied Tenet's motion to com-




879. 952 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.).




884. 960 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
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The court of appeals stated that arbitration was a "creature of con-
tract," therefore, the agreement to arbitrate would be interpreted under
contract principles.8 85 The court found that the controlling issue in the
case was whether there was an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. With
respect to the handbook, the language explicitly stated that it was not
intended to constitute a legal contract "because that can only occur with a
written agreement executed by a facility Executive director and an AMI
Senior Executive Officer. '886 The court found that the evidence showed
that no such agreement was ever executed. Next, the language in the
acknowledgment form stated that nothing was binding on the employer,
and the employer reserved the right to amend or rescind any provisions
of the handbook as it deemed appropriate. The acknowledgment form
also stated that Cooper was an at-will employee, and as a condition of her
continued employment, she agreed to submit claims concerning her em-
ployment to arbitration. This language was found to be insufficient, how-
ever, because consideration for a valid contract between an employer and
an at-will employee cannot depend on continued employment.8 7 The
court stated that this type of promise is illusory. 88 Tenet next argued
that the mutual promises to arbitrate made by the parties were considera-
tion for the contract. The court rejected this argument, finding that "1)
there was no mutuality of obligation because appellant's agreement to
continue Cooper's employment was illusory from the purported con-
tract's inception; and 2) the language from the handbook, including the
acknowledgment form, expressly denied that appellant was bound by the
policies set out in that document. '8 89 Finally, Tenet argued that Cooper's
continued performance as an employee constituted a unilateral contract
to arbitrate. The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the
argument did not address the issue of whether a valid agreement to arbi-
trate existed because the argument called "for Cooper to furnish all of
the consideration for a binding contract containing a term she did not
desire nor negotiate." 890 As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court denying Tenet's motion to compel arbitration. 891
C. PREEMPTION
In Timmons v. Special Insurance Services,892 plaintiff Kenny Timmons
was hurt on the job while working for Sibon Beverage Corporation.
Sibon had established an Employee Benefit Plan (the Plan) to provide
certain health care benefits to employees and their eligible dependents.




889. Id. at 389.
890. Id.
891. See id.
892. 984 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Tex. 1997), affd, No. 97-41545, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
33628 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 1998).
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Sibon contracted with American Medical Security, Inc. (AMS) to admin-
ister the Plan. Timmons was not working while he was recovering at
home from his injuries but alleged that Sibon paid his insurance premi-
ums and informed him that he would have insurance coverage until No-
vember 30, 1995. While at home on November 7, 1995, Timmons fell
down the stairs and was injured. Sometime after November 30, 1995,
Timmons' health care providers submitted medical bills related to this
second injury for payment to AMS. Payment for these bills was denied.
Timmons brought suit alleging, among other things, state law causes of
action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, violations of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, and violations
of the DTPA.
AMS and another defendant (collectively the Defendants) argued that
Timmons' state law claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). In order to make this determination, the
court first had to decide whether the Plan was an ERISA plan. Then the
court had to decide whether the state law claims related to the plan. In
making the ERISA plan determination, which the court stated was a
question of fact, the court found that such a plan would exist "if from the
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the in-
tended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and pro-
cedures for receiving benefits." 893 Also, the plan must not fall under the
ERISA safe harbor provision, which does not apply if the employer con-
tributed to the benefit plan. The court found it undisputed that the Plan
was funded by Sibon, Timmons's employer, thereby making the safe har-
bor provision inapplicable. 894 As far as the remainder of the test was
concerned, the court pointed out that the Plan defined those who were
potentially covered as participating employees and described their eligi-
ble dependents as covered beneficiaries in the Plan booklet. The benefits
to be provided by the Plan were also described at length in the booklet, as
were the procedures for obtaining benefits and for appealing a decision
concerning benefits. The Plan booklet also notified participants that it
was self-funded. Finally, the Plan contemplated that it was governed by
ERISA. As a result, the court found that the Plan was an ERISA plan. 895
As to whether the state law claims were preempted, the court noted the
broad preemptive effect of ERISA and stated that a state law claim was
related to a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan. ' 896 The court found that Timmons' aforementioned state law
claims were preempted by ERISA in this case. The court held that the
claims were "predicated upon conduct allegedly related to the denial of
Timmons' claims under Sibon's Plan. '897 Accordingly, the court granted
893. Id. at 1002 (quoting Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d
236, 240 (5th Cir. 1990)).
894. See id. at 1002-03.
895. See id. at 1003.




summary judgment to the Defendants on Timmons's state law causes of
action. 898
In Guilbeaux v. 3927 Foundation, Inc.,8 99 Wanda Guilbeaux sued her
employer for breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Guilbeaux worked for Changing Seasons Nursing Home which
was owned by the Foundation. She injured her back while attending to a
patient. She reported the injury to a supervisor, who instructed her to
obtain medical treatment for her injury under Changing Seasons's No-
Fault Employee Benefit Plan, an ERISA Plan. Guilbeaux obtained the
initial treatment, as well as additional treatment. The additional treat-
ment was unauthorized. Changing Seasons refused to pay for any medi-
cal services related to the unauthorized treatment. The court found that
Guilbeaux's breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing claims relating to the refusal of medical payments were pre-
empted by ERISA.90° The court noted that the Fifth Circuit has already
held that the causes of action of breach of contract and breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing relate to an ERISA plan in such a way as to be
preempted. 90 t Therefore, Guilbeaux's claims were preempted as they re-
late to an ERISA plan.90 2
In Branson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,903 Jennell Branson sued his em-
ployer for breach of contract. In July 1987, Branson voluntarily resigned
his employment with Greyhound after approximately ten years of service
under the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement. In April 1990,
Branson returned to work for Greyhound as a replacement employee
during a strike. During the strike, to encourage experienced drivers to
cross the picket line, Greyhound introduced a program called Experience
Based Seniority, whereby it gave seniority credit for any past commercial
driving experience. Branson applied for seniority credit based on previ-
ous work experience, but Greyhound gave Branson credit only for his
prior Greyhound service because his other driving experience was only
part-time. The Experience Based Seniority Program became a major is-
sue in the negotiations between Greyhound and the Union. The Union
and Greyhound agreed to leave the resolution of the Experience Based
Seniority Program to the National Labor Relations Board, which found it
to be an unfair labor practice and ordered Greyhound to eliminate all
effects of the Experience Based Seniority Program by all appropriate
means. Greyhound then began an Experience Based Seniority Program
buyout, whereby the Company offered cash payments to those employees
that had earned experience-based seniority in exchange for their signing a
standard waiver form. Branson refused to sign the waiver, insisting that
he wanted the additional seniority as opposed to the cash buyout. Bran-
898. See id.
899. 177 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
900. See id. at 394.
901. See id. (citing Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1992)).
902. See id.
903. 126 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1362 (1998).
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son sued, claiming breach of contract on the alleged promise of seniority.
The trial court dismissed his breach of contract claims on preemption
grounds.
The Fifth Circuit held that Branson's breach of contract claim was not
preempted under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).9°4 The
court found that Greyhound's alleged breach of contract did not consti-
tute activity protected by section 7 of the NLRA, the rights of employees
to organize, strike and collectively bargain, and thus preemption does not
apply. 905 The court also analyzed whether Branson's claim involved an
activity actually or arguably forbidden under section 8 of the NLRA that
prohibits employers from engaging in unfair labor practices. Branson ar-
gued that his claim arose solely under an individual promise, unrelated to
Greyhound's implementation of the Experience Based Seniority Pro-
gram. The court noted that federal labor law may create, in represented
employees, a certain expectation and interest that an employer will abide
by terms properly and unilaterally implemented during negotiations over
a collective bargaining agreement.906 The court explained, however, that
the expectations of replacement employees, who trust that an employer
will keep its promises, stem from different and more traditional sources
of state contract law.9117 The court also analyzed whether Branson's
breach of contract claim depended on analysis of one or more collective
bargaining agreements, which would require preemption. The court
found that deciding whether or not Greyhound made a promise in 1990
to credit Branson with the amount of seniority that he had in 1987 and
whether Greyhound breached such a promise, would not require an inter-
pretation of the 1987 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The court addi-
tionally noted that neither what Greyhound and the Union agreed to in
1993, nor the new Collective Bargaining Agreement, can alter the analy-
sis of the 1990 Agreement between Branson and Greyhound. 908 Thus,
Branson's breach of contract claims were not preempted. 909
In Oney v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.,910 Roger Oney sued his
employer, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS), for breach of
oral contract and fraud, among other claims. Specifically, Oney claimed
that KCS promised him, in exchange for exercising restraint in filing time
slips for overtime pay for work improperly given to someone else, that
KCS would promote him to a management position. Furthermore, Oney
claimed that KCS had no intention of fulfilling its promise, thereby com-
mitting fraud in the inducement. KCS countered that this was an issue
requiring an interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between the union and KCS; therefore, the district court was pre-
904. See id. at 753.
905. See id. at 751.
906. See id. at 752.
907. See id.
908. See id. at 754.
909. See id. at 756.
910. 3 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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empted under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) from hearing this matter.
The district court held that Oney's state law claims of oral contract and
fraud were not preempted by the RLA, because federal law may not pre-
empt state law claims that are only of peripheral concern to the federal
labor law.9 11 Oney's claims were peripheral because no one needed to
"interpret the CBA provision regarding the filing of time slips to know
that Oney had the right to file them." 9t 2 Thus, Oney's state law claims
were not preempted by the RLA.913
IV. CONCLUSION
While a strong national and statewide economy with low unemploy-
ment may signal a temporary drop in the amount of traditional employ-
ment litigation, the tangential areas of tortious interference, covenants
not to compete, and mandatory arbitration may well see increased activ-
ity. In short, any attempt to summarize Texas employment law today re-
mains difficult as the parameters of the field continue to contract in some
areas while expanding in others.
911. See id. at 735-36.
912. Id. at 736.
913. See id.
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